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ABSTRACT
This dissertation contains three articles that focus on several ways to measure
human and social capital and their links to different entrepreneurial outcomes. The study
begins by providing an overview of entrepreneurship policy research, highlighting the need
for an interdisciplinary approach in this subfield of policy analysis. In the first article,
human capital theory is used to understand variations in innovative behavior depending
on the size of manufacturing companies in a developing economy. In the second article,
factors associated with entrepreneurs' cumulative advantages in the financial systems(s)
were identified by applying a novel statistical modeling strategy from the field of
entrepreneurship research. In the third research article, an estimation of entrepreneurs'
human capital impact on new venture performance is analyzed by applying a heterodoxic
theory of human capital, widely used in entrepreneurship research at the regional level, but
for the first time at the firm level. The dissertation concludes by providing a general
discussion of the findings, policy implications, and potential further research avenues.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

Several investigations have focused on the relationship between entrepreneurship and
economic growth (Urbano, Aparicio, and Audretsch, 2018), using different theoretical frameworks
and methodologies, finding a positive relationship between these factors, at the regional, national,
and international level. Entrepreneurship is not only crucial for economic growth, but also new
companies have an essential role in the creation of employment and innovation as well. For
example, Birch (1979) found that companies with few than 100 employees generated 82% of the
net gain of employment in the U.S. economy between 1969 and 1976. In addition, in investigating
leading European economies, Storey and Johnson (1987) found that employment net generation in
small and medium enterprises was higher compared to large companies. Timmons (1994)
discovered that new ventures generated 50% of innovations in processes and 95% of the radical
innovations in the U.S. economy during the last years of the 80s. Acs and Armington (2004)
estimated that new firms create between 20-50 % of net new jobs and almost all net jobs during
the first years of the 21st century.
Entrepreneurship research emerged to provide information on how to foster these economic
development aspects. This research field explores questions about who, where, how, and why
individuals initiate, expand, and close their business. Since individuals do this for a wide variety
of reasons, ranging from economic to psychological ones, this domain of knowledge is an
interdisciplinary research field. Therefore, entrepreneurship scholars come from a range of
backgrounds, from management science, economics, sociology, or anthropology, and policy
analysis, to mention a few.
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This dissertation aims to focus on the latter by suggesting policy recommendations.
However, historically and currently, the transformation of entrepreneurship research into policy
recommendations is not simple and straightforward. The development of entrepreneurship policy
was developed pragmatically by trial and error rather than beginning from an ex-ante and welldefined theoretical approach (Hart, 2003). Probably, the interdisciplinary nature of the field of
entrepreneurship research played a role in delaying a precise translation of the research findings
into policy recommendations. Consequently, the researcher needs to become involved in a broad
range of research fields and approaches to understand the entrepreneurial phenomena before
suggesting precise policy recommendations.
Specifically, this dissertation contributes to the field of entrepreneurship policy by
providing empirical findings on the relationship between the accumulation of assets that
individuals can acquire and entrepreneurship. The three research articles of this dissertation use
several outcomes such as product innovation, external funding, the creation and survival of new
companies, and new job creation. The series of articles draws insight from various disciplines,
primarily economics, but also regional and management studies, sociology, psychology, and public
policy, allowing for a comprehensive perspective for policymakers in addressing issues regarding
entrepreneurial development. It also applies a broad set of statistical techniques.
The cutting-edge advantage of the articles presented in this research is the scope of the
analysis they share: the firm level. Several policy recommendations in the field of entrepreneurship
research are derived from aggregated data, either from companies or from individual
entrepreneurs. In this sense, mainstream Economics often treat the companies as black boxes that
use inputs in and create outputs. This treatment of companies could lead to misleading policy
recommendations, especially for entrepreneurship policy, since nascent ventures are more fragile
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as they first attempt to become operative compared to already operating established firms. For this
reason, a deep understanding of the characteristics of nascent enterprises and entrepreneurs is
useful for detecting critical factors for this type of business. This research opens the black box of
new ventures and companies. In addition, analyzing firm-level' data has the advantage of
contextualizing understanding of a firm’s operativeness. In small and less developed economies,
such as those examined in the first article, firms operate far from the technological frontier,
applying out of date methods of production. If the firm level is not considered, an imprecise picture
of new ventures and the companies of the developing world will result from the analysis, leading
to ineffective policy recommendations. The second and third articles analyze new ventures by
investigating factors at the new venture level, from the initial steps of the nascent entrepreneurs to
set up a company until its creation or disengagement, allowing for a thorough picture of the factors
that foster or inhibits the entrepreneurial process.
Theoretically speaking, this dissertation innovates in several ways. In this first paper, the
human capital theory is applied to explore its relationship with innovation outcomes in the context
of a developing economy. As is explained in this article, only limited research conducted similar
studies for the Latin American region and none for Uruguay specifically. The second article
applied the sociological Matthew effect theory of cumulated advantages for the first time to
investigate entrepreneurial financing. Third, the theory of the creative class, which has been used
extensively over the last two decades to understand entrepreneurship outcomes at the regional
level, was applied at the firm level for the first time as well.
More specifically, the data source used in the first research article is a unique panel dataset
for the Uruguayan economy. The Uruguayan Innovation Survey (UIS) is a triennial project that
surveys industrial data. Its creation followed the international recommendations based on the
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Bogotá Manual (RICYT, 2001), an adaptation of the Oslo Manual (OECD, 1992) to Latin
America, to capture a firm's technological behavior. The National Agency for Research and
Innovation of Uruguay collects this data from Uruguay on a triennial base. I collaborated with the
Instituto de Economía, Universidad de la República in Uruguay, which was the research
organization that combined all the UIS available created the panel dataset as a result. This panel
dataset combines four triennial industrial surveys, making it the best source to investigate the
research topic.
The Panel Study of Entrepreneurial Dynamics (PSED) is the data source used for the
second and third articles. The PSED contains data from individuals engaged in the start-up process,
and by applying follow-up interviews, it tracks the entrepreneur’s progress as they move toward
the creation of a profitable new venture. The two datasets, PSED-I and PSED-II represent two
cohorts, one started in 1999 and the second in 2005. These datasets were combined, using the
PSED harmonized transition dataset (Reynolds and Curtin, 2011). As Shim and Davidsson (2018)
argued, using the PSED projects combined with the harmonized transition PSED is arguably the
best available resource for assessing the duration of venture creation processes since PSED sample
is based on a random sampling of individuals attempting to start a company in the U.S. PSED
reduces to the minimum the biases associated with recalling the past activities. In other datasets
available, the respondent entrepreneurs have to recall the initial steps and activities taken to create
their company, resulting in the so-called recall-bias. PSED offers the advantage of tracking
entrepreneurs during the entrepreneurial process from the very beginning, reducing this bias. Also,
it allows for reducing the overestimation of successful ventures over those that stop their
operations, since PSED surveys individuals regardless of the future of their new venture projects.
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Often, business datasets include only operating firms at the time of the survey, overestimating
successful firms.
The structure of this dissertation is as follows. The first article focuses on the relationship
between human capital and entrepreneurship development in the context of Uruguay, a Latin
American economy that developed a broad set of policies towards improving its innovation levels
in the manufacturing industry through human capital. This research found that while the vast
majority of these policies focused on targeting the improvement of the formal education of
employees, not all dimensions of human capital impact innovation positively and in the same
direction for all types of companies, similar to results found for other developing economies
(Nazarov and Akhmedjonov, 2012; De Winne and Sels, 2010). This research calls for precise
policies that target specific companies and their critical human capital assets to foster positively
their innovation levels.
The second article focuses on the relationship between a broad set of entrepreneurial
assets, ranging from wealth to social capital, and their impact on receiving external funding in the
U.S. context. Receiving external funding has found to be a critical factor of entrepreneurial success
(Hechavarría, Matthews, and Reynolds, 2016; Gartner, Frid, and Alexander, 2012). This article
extends from the Matthew effect theory (Merton, 1968), which explains why initial advantages
lead to further cumulative advantages. The original development of this theory aimed to explain
the scientific reward system. Scientists with more recognition in their fields are usually funded,
while conversely, less well-known scientists are less likely to be rewarded for their contributions.
More specifically, this article investigated if some factors associated with an entrepreneur’s
primary advantages also impact the further advantages of receiving external funding. This
hypothesis extends on previous research that has shown an unbalance external funding awarded to
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wealthier entrepreneurs (Gartner, Frid, and Alexander, 2012; Frid, Wyman, Gartner, and
Hechavarria, 2016; Frid, Wyman, and Coffey, 2016). Since some entrepreneurs are funded several
times during their initial actions to set up a company while others never obtain external funding,
this research applied a novel statistical modeling strategy for entrepreneurship research that takes
into account the repetitive nature of receiving funding. The findings from this research emphasize
that receiving funding several times is a critical factor for new startup creation and survival. They
also challenge previous findings associated with the reception of external funding that did not
consider the repetitive nature of this event. As a result, the article highlights a potential Matthew
effect occurring in entrepreneurship funding.
Lastly, the third article investigates the performance of nascent startups led by
entrepreneurs exhibiting a specific human capital asset, creativity. Based on the theory of the
Creative Class (Florida, 2002), which has had a considerable influence on regional studies and
economic geography, this theory questions the mainstream approach toward the relationship
between entrepreneurship and human capital, which aims to measure the latter through the
knowledge that people possess using educational attainment and other related variables. The
Creative Class approach suggests an alternative way of measuring human capital based on an
individual’s occupation. While the Creative Class has been found to be more precise than the
classical approach to human capital for several entrepreneurship outcomes at the regional level,
this theory has never been applied and tested at the firm level. Given the significant evidence of
the relationship between the Creative Class measurements and regional entrepreneurship, this third
article focuses on the entrepreneurial teams and investigates the relationship between the number
of creative owners and their startup performance. The findings from this article highlight the
superior levels in employment creation and firm survival for those teams composed of creative
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entrepreneurs, defined as those who had a creative occupation before transitioning to
entrepreneurship. The findings also provide insights on how to improve human capital
measurement at the firm level, showing that as well as in regional studies, creative class variables
outperform the classical human capital variables that measure educational attainment for several
outcomes explored.
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CHAPTER TWO
HUMAN CAPITAL AND INNOVATION IN URUGUAYAN MANUFACTURING FIRMS
1-INTRODUCTION

The determinants of innovation at the country level are worth investigating since it is a
critical component of economic growth (Romer, 1990; Solow, 1956; Schumpeter, 1934). At the
country level, firms are the primary producers of innovations, and because it is a knowledge-based
activity (Quintane, Casselman, Reiche, and Nylund, 2011) understanding how these agents
acquire, update, and manage the knowledge of its employees is a crucial factor for economic
growth. Thus, examining the relationship between human capital and innovation at the firm level
is a critical component of entrepreneurship in a nation and for understanding the gap between
developed and developing countries (Verspagen, 1993). To explore this phenomenon, this research
investigates the role of human capital at the firm-level in the case of a small developing economy,
specifically Uruguay. In the Latin American region, paradoxically, this country ranks among the
top on several human capital dimensions. However, its manufacturing industry exhibits decreasing
levels in incorporating human capital elements such as educated workers or internal training
(ANII, 2015; Bianchi, Gras, and Sutz, 2011; Bianchi and Gras, 2003).
The effect of several human capital dimensions on firm product innovation is estimated by
applying binomial logistic regression models with firm and time fixed effects. We consider three
aspects of human capital. The first is the human capital endowments of firms, measured in this
research by the number of employees holding a college degree. Second, we use two firm-level
practices that impact on firm’s human capital levels: internal training, and an index accounting for
a relational-based management approach in manufacturing companies. The data used here come
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from a unique dataset created by merging triennial innovation surveys from the Uruguayan
National Agency for Research and Innovation, covering from the period 2004-2006 to 2013-2015.
Based on these resulting estimations, this article made several contributions to the field.
The most important is that not all dimensions of human capital operate in the same way for all
companies. Individual endowments have a more significant impact on small firms, while firmlevel practices such as internal training are a more critical factor for large companies. These
findings suggest that the policy strategy followed by Uruguay should be reshaped by considering
how human capital affects innovation depending on firms’ size. While the policy approach to
fostering innovation through human capital in the Uruguayan manufacturing industry currently
relies primarily on increasing the educational level of employees, this approach can result in a
negative impact on innovation for large firms.

2. PREVIOUS FINDINGS AND HYPOTHESES
2.1. Innovation studies in Uruguay
As innovation is a knowledge-based outcome (Quintane, Casselman, Reiche, and Nylund,
2011), how the agents acquire and manage knowledge is an essential factor for economic growth.
Innovation requires a learning process, which is predominantly interactive and socially embedded
(Arocena and Sutz, 2003; Lundvall, 2010). Therefore, the cultural context matters, and for that
reason, examining the determinants of innovation at a particular cultural level such as a national
context is essential for gaining a better understanding of innovation phenomena.
During the last two decades, innovation in developing countries has received increasing
attention from scholars and policy-makers (Bartels, Voss, Lederer, and Bachtrog, 2012; The World
Bank, 2010; Lundvall, Joseph, Camindade, and Vang, 2009). Firms in developing countries are
particularly stimulating for innovation studies because the most important producers of
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innovations generally operate below the technological frontier. Through innovation, such as
technology acquisition or imitation, firms in developing countries play a central role in reaching
the global technological frontier.
This research focuses on one small developing economy such as Uruguay. This country
has been a pioneer in innovation studies in the Latin American region. In 1985, the first empirical
analysis of innovation activities conducted in the country (Argenti, Filgueira, and Sutz, 1988) and
also the first in Latin America. In subsequent research, a handful of surveys provided information
about the innovative behavior of the manufacturing industry, but not as a primary topic (Tansini
and Triunfo, 1998a; 1998b). It was no until 1998 that the National Agency for Research and
Innovation of Uruguay (ANII in Spanish acronym) conducted the first of six, systematic, and
internationally standardized triennial surveys to understand the innovative behavior of the
Uruguayan manufacturing industry1. These surveys are known as the Uruguayan Innovation
Surveys (UIS).
Using UIS databases, researchers have highlighted stylized facts about the product and
other innovation outcomes finding that innovation is a rare phenomenon in the Uruguayan
manufacturing industry. In the UIS of 1998-2000, it was found that only 24% of the percentage of
manufacturing firms that made one product innovation was. In 2002, a profound economic crisis
occurred affected all economic sectors. In the UIS following the crisis in 2004-2006, only 14% of
manufacturing firms introduced a product innovation.

1

The last two surveys are not representative of the entire manufacturing industry. These surveys incorporated specific knowledgeintensive service activities to the sample.
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Figure 1 – Percentage of manufacturing firms that introduced a product innovation 19982015
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Source: UIS database, weighted. Own elaboration.

As a result of this crisis, the economic structure of the Uruguayan industry changed due to
the exit of a significant number of manufacturing companies. Even today, the percentage of
manufacturing firms that introduced a product innovation has never reached the levels before the
2002 economic crisis with less than 20% of manufacturing firms having achieved product
innovation over the period of this study as Figure 1 shows. As this data suggests, innovation is still
a rare phenomenon during Uruguay’s ongoing economic recovery. Following the Bogotá manual
(RICYT, 2001)2, a firm can innovate at different levels; a product can be new to the firm itself, to
the local market, or the external market. When we consider these two levels of innovation, the
picture for the Uruguayan industry is even worse. Between 1998-2000, 12% and 4% of
manufacturing introduced a new product for the local and the external market, respectively. After
that year, there was a steady decrease in both levels of product innovation until conducted in 2010-

2

The Bogotá Manual is an adaptation of the OECD's Oslo Manual to Latin-America that incorporates measurement tools and
procedures to capture firms' technological behavior in this region, accounting for regional specificities. Further explanation can
be found in section 4.

13

2012. Between 2013-2015, the number of firms that introduced a product innovation for the local
market increased considerably from 5 to 10%.
From the last two decades, one definite conclusion of the research conducted in this field
is that there is no clear pattern for innovation. However, some identifiable factors influence the
innovative behavior of the Uruguayan manufacturing industry, standing out the size of companies.
There is evidence that larger firms are more likely to innovate and to be innovative3 (Bianchi,
Lezama, and Peluffo, 2015; Cassoni and Ramada, 2010; Bianchi, 2007; Pittaluga, Llambí, and
Lanzilotta, 2005; Argenti, Filgueira, and Sutz, 1988).
Figure 2 – Percentage of manufacturing firms that introduced a product innovation by size
1998-2015
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3

Firms that have carried out innovation activities, but not necessarily achieved innovation results.
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As Figure 2 shows, the picture is even worse when comparing firms by size, measured as
5-19 employees for small companies, 20-99 employees for medium firms, and large-firms with
more than 99 employees. Although a slight recovery on the percentage of companies that
introduced a product innovation in 2013-2015 occurred, this number decreased during the 19982015 period. In the case of large firms, 59% innovated in products in 1998-2000, dropping to 30%
in 2013-2015. The mid-sized firms showed a similar trend from 45% in 1998-2000 to 15% in
2013-2015. The performance of small firms was more volatile in this regard, showing that 15% of
companies in 1998-2000 could introduce a product innovation, and 17% of them did it in 20132015. Although in the last survey, small firms behave similarly to mid-sized firms, they were the
least innovative regarding introducing new products, if the whole period is taken into account, as
Figure 2 depicts.
Even though the firm size has been found to be a critical factor in innovation for developing
countries, including Uruguay, many scholars emphasized another critical dimension which fosters
innovation that was not investigated in depth: human capital assets. For example, following
Becker’s (1975) approach, education and training are seen as critical investments in human capital.
In the author’s perspective, the abilities, intelligence, and skills of employees acquired from formal
education and job experience constitute an organization's human capital level. Scholars identified
both factors as primary sources of innovation, and Uruguay has historically belonged to the group
of countries with the highest levels of human capital in Latin America (Iván, Leonardo, PérezFuentes, and Castillo-Loaiza, 2016). However, Uruguayan manufacturing firms have reduced both
factors in the last years, as can be seen in Figures 3 and 4 in the next section. Perhaps, this reduction
is linked to the weak innovation performance of the Uruguayan industry, suggesting that Uruguay
is a compelling case to study the relationship between human capital and innovation.
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2.1.1 Human capital and innovation: The Uruguayan context
As mentioned previously, Uruguay was a pioneer in developing innovation surveys in Latin
America. In 1988, Argenti, Filgueira, and Sutz (1988) found that close to 75% of manufacturing
companies between 20 and 49 employees did not have even one engineer in its staff. This
percentage was similar when looking at the proportion of companies between 20 and 49 employees
without a professional in their entire workforce.
Nevertheless, this early detection did not lead to a solution. During the first decade of the
21st century, this relationship still detected (Bianchi et al., 2011). As it was pointed out by Bianchi
et al. (2011), the proportion of firms that have professionals varies with their size; relatively
smaller firms tend to hire fewer professionals. That trend became increasingly problematic: The
reduction of professionals in small and medium firms is particularly dramatic and grew into a
significant drawback during the last twenty years (Bittencourt, 2012). This negative relation
between size and employee level of education has worsened during the period of this study.
The number of professionals is one of the proxies for a firm’s knowledge absorptive
capacity (Schmidt, 2010; Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). However, to assume the idea that increasing
the number of professionals enhances a firm absorptive capacity implies that this relationship is
linear. There is no reason to believe that hiring the 10th engineer for a 200-employee
manufacturing firm will have the same effect as for a small 20-worker company that employs its
first one does. For that reason, Argenti et al. (1988) address this issue, observing those firms that
do not have any professional employees. As Figure 3 shows, the size of the firm and those having
professionals and technicians are inversely related. It is also possible to note that the number of
small manufacturing firms with no professionals grew over time, from 42.5 in 2004-2006 to 65.1
in 2013-2015. Similarly, mid-sized firms with no professionals in their workforce increased from
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22.8 in 2004-2006 to 33.4 in 2013-2015. In the case of large firms, these percentage remained low
and stable over the 2004-2015 period.
Figure 3 – Percentage of manufacturing firms that have at least a professional in its
workforce or not, by size 2004-2015
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Just as important as having skilled employees is maintaining their knowledge updated.
Thus, internal training is another human capital asset. In this regard, again, the size of the firm is
a critical factor. According to Cassoni and Ramada (2010), the role of a combined pool of
innovative inputs (including training) is essential to increase the likelihood of innovation results
in the Uruguayan industry. Through multiple correspondences and cluster analysis, Baptista (2015)
identifies various business innovation patterns in Uruguay. She found that innovative high-tech
firms represented only 6% of Uruguay productive structure. Almost 90% of these innovative firms
employ professionals or technicians, and 60% develop internal training activities, investing
significant financial resources in this area.
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Figure 4 shows that the level of training varies with firms’ size. Only between 5% and 10%
of small firms provided internal training between 2004 and 2015, a percentage that increases for
mid-sized firms to 25% in 2004-2006 but then slightly decreases to 9.3% in 2013-2015. In the case
of large companies, 45% provided internal training in 2004-2006 but then also drops to 25.7% in
2013-2015. Summing up, the number of firms that pursues hiring professionals or did internal
training was declining during the 2004-2015 for every size cohort.
Figure 4 – Percentage of manufacturing firms that did internal training or not, by size
2004-2015
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Investigating how firms incorporate, manage, and update human capital is critical for
recommending policies to foster innovation. These recommendations become even more
important since the primary innovation input in the Uruguayan manufacturing industry has been
the incorporation of "hard" innovative assets such as capital goods (ANII, 2015; Bittencourt, 2012)
rather than "soft" ones such as hiring college-degree professionals, developing professional
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approaches of human resource management, or providing internal training (Bittencourt,
Rodriguez, and Torres, 2009).
There is of importance to highlight the rise in the number of public policies aimed to
promote firms’ innovation through human capital during the last decade in Uruguay. In Appendix
C depicts the objectives of these policies. However, in Uruguay and as well in other Latin
American countries, such policies had limited success since they were formulated by imitating,
mostly, developed countries’ strategies. Through this policy-making approach, the local
environment was not considered (Arocena and Sutz, 2010). An examination of the relationship
between the firm's human capital and their innovation performance opens improvement
opportunities for policymaking in this regard in Uruguay.
2.2. Human Capital and Innovation
Several studies have investigated the relationship between human capital and innovation
at different levels, including individuals, organizations, and regions. This line of research focuses
on the fact that humans possess skills that can be improved through education, training, and
practice and can change how people behave (Pennings, Lee and van Witteloostuijn, 1998; Gimeno,
Folta, Cooper, and Woo, 1997; Coleman, 1988; Becker, 1975). This paper focuses on the
relationship between innovation and human capital at the firm level and results in that relationship
are mixed; however, it is possible to find a clear division between studies that focused on either
managers or employees. This paper focuses on the latter due to the lack of data exploring managers'
human capital in the Uruguayan context.
Smith, Collins, and Clark (2005) investigated how the human capital of top management
teams and production workers’ affects innovation in the US. They found that the amount of
education and its composition have a positive impact on the knowledge capabilities of large high-
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technology firms — the latter influences on their new products and services rates. Conversely, the
often-cited research of Subramaniam and Youndt (2005) found that employees’ human capital
negatively impact on the innovative capabilities of large firms. This relationship, however, was
moderated by social capital, implying that human capital only fosters innovation if it is networked,
shared, and channeled through interrelationships within the firm. Nevertheless, in Spanish firms,
according to Cabello-Medina, López-Cabrales, and Valle-Cabrera (2011), human capital exerts a
direct influence on innovation and mediates the impact of social capital on it.
Other intangible assets influence the relationship between human capital and product
innovation. In the study conducted by Costa, Fernández-Jardon Fernández, and Figueroa Dorrego
(2014) on Portuguese firms, human capital impacts innovation only if their structural capital
mediates it. Specific for the Taiwanese economy, Chen, Liu, Chu, and Hsiao (2014) found that
human capital is positively related to customer capital, defined as the knowledge that allows firms
to understand the preferences and latent needs of consumers, which in turn has a positive effect on
new product development.
Most of these studies investigated the relationship between innovation and intellectual
capital, for which human capital is a focal component, but in the context of developed economies.
However, there is limited research focused on developing economies (Buenechea-Elberdin, 2017),
where most of the firms are smaller and operate in low-tech sectors. This distinction is critical
because there are key dimensions of human capital often not considered in developed economies
that are important for understanding this relationship in the developing world. For example,
Cabello-Medina et al. (2011) and Costa et al. (2014) considered training as one of their
measurements of human capital, but neither Smith et al. (2005), Subramaniam and Youndt (2005)
or Chen et al. (2014) did. Firm’s internal training seems to be critical in the developing economies
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because the educational level of employees is one of the central innovation constraints in the
developing world (George, Corbishley, Khayesi, Haas, and Tihanyi, 2016). Because in the context
of a developing economy the lack of skilled workers is problematic, implementing internal training
could be a strategy for addressing this issue. Thus, employees’ educational level and internal
training must be considered when focusing on developing countries, such as Uruguay. However,
as the intellectual capital approach has found, intra-firm relationships could potentially influence
innovation performance as well. For these reasons, these three dimensions are the focus of the
research reported here.
2.2.1. Employees educational level and innovation
The number of educated employees in a firm is an indication of potential new ideas’
development and transformation. Formal education helps organization members to improve their
knowledge base, better predict outcomes, manage resources, and monitor results, meaning that it
fosters the firm’s learning process. For example, Kimberly and Evanisko (1981) suggested that a
higher level of education leads to higher innovation levels by improving cognitive processing and
problem-solving ability. The latter is supported by Glaser (1984), who found that education could
produce sophisticated changes in cognitive performance and information processing. In addition,
employees with higher levels of education are likely to be more receptive to new ideas and change
(Boeker, 1997). Similarly, Kyriakopoulos and de Ruyter (2004) demonstrated that basic
knowledge in new circumstances is helpful for solving problems and develop new products and
processes, and its usefulness increases if firms have a higher percentage of schooled employees.
The empirical study conducted by Smith et al. (2005) use the educational level of employees as a
measurement a firm’s capabilities to introduce new products and services into the market.
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The relationship between education and innovation in firms has been analyzed in
developing countries by several researchers, specifically in Latin America (Van Uden, Knoben,
and Vermeulen, 2016; Goedhuys and Veugelers 2012; Marotta, Mark, Blom, and Thorn, 2007).
However, no studies analyzed the effect of employees' educational level on product innovation in
Uruguay, although some data provide initial insights on this issue. According to Bianchi and Gras
(2003), the number of firms' employees educated in STEM is one key indicator of firms innovative
capabilities4. In addition, Cassoni and Ramada (2010), focusing on a broad definition of innovation
results5 in Uruguayan manufacturing firms, found that those more likely to innovate have a higher
engineer-to-professional ratio among their personnel.
More recently, Aboal, Garda, Lanzilotta, and Perera (2015) have shown that the type of
innovation affects the type of employment. Product innovation demands skilled labor when hightech firms do innovate, but it is important to note that most manufacturing firms in Uruguay are
low tech. Thus, because most findings suggest a positive relationship between employees’
educational level and the likelihood of product innovation in firms, the first hypothesis of this
study is

H1: The higher the percentage of educated workers within a firm, the higher its probability of
producing innovative output.
However, there are several reasons to think that this relationship is mediated by a firm’s
structural characteristics, most importantly, its size. As mentioned previously, approximately 60%
of small firms in Uruguay did not have any college-educated employees in 2013-2015. This

4

Innovation capabilities considered in this study are internal or external R&D, capital goods acquisition towards innovation,
hardware and software for innovation purposes, technology transfer, industrial design, management and training improvements
oriented to processes or product development or to organizational or marketing innovations.
5 In this study, product, process, organizational, and marketing innovation were considered when measuring innovation results,
weighted by their degree of novelty (innovation at the firm level, local, or external market).
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negative association between educated workers and the firm size was first found in the 80s (Argenti
et al., 1988; Bianchi et al., 2011). No studies have investigated the combination of both variables
on product innovation results. Therefore, it is hypothesized that

H1a: The smaller the firm, the stronger the effect of the percentage of educated employees on
product innovation.
2.2.2 Training and innovation
Training allows employees to acquire new skills, enriching the innovative capability of
firms (Shipton, West, Patterson, Birdi, and Dawson, 2006). Internal training helps employees to
solve problems efficiently and to understand better firm goals, further stimulating creativity (Giles,
van Knippenberg, and Jing, 2017). Several studies have focused on the relationship between
training and innovation. Internal training is one of the most critical drivers for product or service
innovation in the Danish wholesale trade and ICT-intensive service sectors (Laursen and Foss,
2003). Li, Zhao, and Liu (2006) found that employee training has direct and positive effects on
product and technological innovations in Chinese high-tech firms. Dostie (2018) provided
compelling evidence about the influence that training has on innovation. He found that both firmsponsored classrooms and on-the-job training have a positive impact on innovation performance,
measured as new products and new processes. By including workplace fixed effects and allowing
for time-varying productivity shocks, Dostie (2018) demonstrates that investing more in training
leads to more product and process innovation when controlling for other critical dimensions such
as turnover and workforce composition. In addition, the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) (2011) found that training contributes to a firm’s technological
development, and it is positively associated with innovation.
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Three pieces of research are of particular interest to this study. First, Nazarov and
Akhmedjonov (2012) investigated the determinants of a firm’s technological upgrading using
product, service, and quality accreditations in the former Soviet republics. They found that internal
training increases a firm’s ability to innovate, while investment in education does not. The
researchers concluded that a firm’s ability to innovate in Soviet-transition countries depends on
absorbing new technology, not on inventing it; thus, internal training is more important than formal
education for innovation because the former helps in adapting new technologies and the latter in
its creation. Second, Sung and Choi (2014) found that the objective measurement of training
investment increases managers’ subjective appreciation of product innovation in South Korean
companies. These firms created a climate of constant learning, thereby facilitating the exchange
of knowledge among employees, which enhanced these firms’ innovation. A positive relationship
between internal training and product or process innovation in Norweigan firms was found by
Børing (2017). His research highlights that this positive relationship is maintained even when
controlled by some human resource management practices in the firm, such as brainstorming
sessions and work teams.
Only a few studies have explored the association between training and innovation in Latin
America. Fiszbein, Cumsille, and Cueva (2016) shows the heterogeneity and inequality of training
among Latin-American firms. Specifically, they found that less-educated employees receive less
training than educated employees. González-Velosa, Rosas, and Flores' study (2016) also provides
similar evidence that compared to other developing regions, Latin-American firms are wellpositioned regarding offering internal training, but skilled workers receive more training than
unskilled workers. Also, they discovered differences between more innovative and less innovative
firms; the former provide more training to their employees than the latter. Consistent with the
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theoretical argument that the absence of innovative skill-intensive technologies limits the demand
for more training of skilled labor, these studies show that training is not perceived as an important
barrier to a firm operation because less-innovative firms do not see training as necessary.
Specifically for Uruguay, Quiñones, Segantini, and Supervielle (2012) found that firms
that provide training more often are those that have a more professional human resource
management, especially when the firm incorporates new technologies. De Mendoza, Di Capua,
and Rucci (2014) found that Uruguayan manufacturing and service establishments that are
knowledgeable about the value that human resources can provide to innovative activities are more
likely to train their employees. In addition, most quality-certificated companies or those with R&D
departments trained their employees more often and introduced innovations. By contrast, almost
half of the Uruguayan firms that did not train their staff did not innovate (De Mendoza et al., 2014).
These findings support that there is a relationship between training and innovation in
Uruguayan firms, although it has not been analyzed statistically. To address this lack of research,
this study hypothesizes states that:

H2: The higher the percentage of internally trained employees, the higher the probability of
producing innovative output.
As discussed previously, training was more frequently offered in large firms in Uruguay
(25% from 2006 to 2015). However, even among large firms, the percentage of manufacturing
companies that provides internal training has been declining. Among small firms, those that
offered internal training ranged between 5% and 10% over this period. Thus, the relationship
between training and size is central to the Uruguayan manufacturing industry. Therefore, this study
hypothesizes,
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H2a: The smaller the firm, the higher the impact of the percentage of employees who received
internal training on product innovation
2.2.3 Firms’ internal social relationships and innovation
Based on Polanyi (1975), Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) developed an approach that
distinguishes between tacit and codified knowledge. Tacit knowledge is internalized information,
which is difficult to formalize and communicate with other workers. Codified knowledge is
formalized information that we are aware, and for that reason, it is more straightforward to transfer
between colleagues. Thus, an efficient way of knowledge creation can be achieved in firms through
the development of a synergistic relationship between tacit and codified knowledge. The design of
social processes within firms that transform tacit into explicit knowledge foster knowledge
creation and creativity, essential inputs for innovation.
Social capital is a concept that addresses the ideas of Polanyi (1975) and Nonaka and
Takeuchi (1995). Structural and relational embeddedness are the two social capital dimensions
(Granovetter, 1992). The former relates to the structure of networks determining with whom each
person maintains contact; the latter focuses on the quality of these relationships. From the
intellectual capital approach, Subramaniam and Youndt (2005) found that social capital moderates
the effect that human capital has on innovation directly. However, according to Cabello-Medina
et al. (2011), social capital contributes to the improvement of innovation performance indirectly
through its positive effect on human capital, which affects innovation positively. Beyond its
nuances, both studies agree that social capital exerts some positive influence on innovation and
also affects its relationship with human capital.
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From human resources management (HRM) perspective, Hayton’s (2003) investigated
discretionary HRM policies and their relationship with firms’ innovation. The application of
participation mechanisms, empowerment, and specific incentives for employees might allow for
the discovery, diffusion, or utilization of local and tacit knowledge in American SMEs. This
research suggests that “these activities promote employee discretionary contributions. That is, they
encourage the kind of voluntary, helping, and cooperative behavior that supports the development
of social capital and thereby encourages knowledge creation and exchange.” (Hayton, 2003; p
388). However, focusing only on the HRM costs has little influence on a firm’s ability to innovate,
accept the risk, and identify and exploit entrepreneurial opportunities.
Using a similar approach, Sung and Choi (2014) found that the importance of knowledge
for innovation lies in the connections among people instead of knowledge as an individual asset.
In generating product innovations, collective processes based on groups of practice, distributed
expertise, and processes that link individuals and collective bodies seem to play a more critical
role than knowledge embedded in individual employees. These findings are supported by the
previous research of Shipton et al. (2006), who found that teamworking and contingent payments
are predictors of product innovation.
These ideas of codifying tacit knowledge have been incorporated into the Total Quality
Management (TQM) approach. TQM promotes collaborative practices, reduces complexity, and
integrates internal and external knowledge (Yusr, Sany Sanuri, Othman, and Sulaiman, 2016; Hsu
and Shen, 2005). These practices enhance knowledge management processes that impact
positively on innovation results.
In Latin America, the research has focused little on the relational side of human resource
practices and innovation. However, some studies provide evidence of HRM characteristics in this

27

region. The commonly accepted fact is that the creation and implementation of HRM practices in
Latin America have faced cultural barriers (Elvira and Davila, 2005; Rodriguez and Gomez, 2009).
For example, De Forest (1994) indicates that staffing policies in Mexico are based on personal
relationships, while in Chile they are grounded in social bonds with an authoritarian top-down
approach and male chauvinism (Rodriguez, 2010; Perez Arrau, Eades, and Wilson, 2012). Scholars
appear to agree that there is a preference for excessive authority centralization and rigid
organizational hierarchies in the implementation of HRM practices in the region (Elvira and
Davila, 2005). These characteristics in the Latin-American context are contrary to the features of
a pro-innovation HRM style. In this sense, there is evidence that more rigid and centralized
organizations may obstruct communication fluxes (Schmidt, 2005).
In Uruguay, Rama and Silveira (1991) studied firms' HRM policies in relation to four
economic sectors. In times of economic transformation in which the country became involved in
global competition, they found that high levels of physical capital investment were achieved
without human capital investment, referred to as "incongruous modernization." The human side of
the production is not recognized in Uruguayan manufacturing firms. Quiñones et al. (2012)
extended the work of Rama and Silveira (1991) finding that while the number of human resource
(HR) offices in the manufacturing industry increased between 1991-2010, they are still trying to
gain legitimacy within the companies. For example, employees are often evaluated based on
personal relationships with owners and top managers rather than on their performance (Quiñones
et al., 2012). HR offices are still highly dependent on the owners and supervisors, thus
complicating human resources’ professional management. Similar findings were highlighted by
Labadie (2005), who identified that most firms apply HR management with little focus on activities
such as compensation, performance evaluation, and training.
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One of the few statistical studies investigating HRM in Uruguay was conducted by BelloPintado (2015). However, his focus was the relationship between HRM and firm performance in
the manufacturing industry, not with innovation. Based on the research conducted by Jiang, Lepak,
Han, Hong, Kim, and Winkler (2012) and Jiang, Lepak, Jia, and Baer (2012), Bello-Pintado
examined the effect of the abilities, motivation, and opportunities (AMO) framework on firm’s
performance. He found that in the Uruguayan context, motivation is the key to the effectiveness
of an HRM system, and the effects of HRM practices aimed at increasing the skills and
involvement of workers have a positive and synergistic effect on performance, but only if practices
enhancing the motivation of workers have also been implemented.
Past research emphasizes that internal social relationships are critical for innovation results.
In developed economies, there is evidence of a relational based approach to HRM stimulates
innovation. However, previous Latin-American and Uruguayan studies have not focused on the
relationship between HRM approach and innovation. Therefore, this research hypothesizes,

H3: The more widespread the application of a relational based approach to human resource
management in the firm, the higher the probability of product innovation.
Evidence from various studies has shown that employee communication, motivation, and
proactivity enhance innovation. Hayton (2003) found that employee discretionary behavior
encourages a firm’s innovation results, especially in high-tech sectors. Cabello-Medina et al.
(2011) found that social capital affects innovation indirectly by influencing human capital, which
has a direct effect on innovation. According to Subramaniam and Youndt's (2005) research, social
capital moderates the impact of human capital on innovation. Since it is not possible to measure a
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firm’s social capital by distinguishing it from the tools to incentivize it using UIS, this research
uses them as proxies in two sub-hypothesis for hypothesis 3,

H3a: The more widespread the application of a relational-based approach to human resource
management in a firm, the stronger the influence of educated employees on innovation results.
H3b: The more widespread the application of a relational-based approach to human resource
management in a firm, the stronger the influence of the share of firms’ trained employees on
innovation results.
3. DATA AND METHODS
3.1. Data
In Latin America, the measurement of firm-level innovation activities is based on
recommendations from either the Oslo Manual (OECD, 1992) or the Bogotá Manual (RICYT,
2001). The latter is an adaptation of the Oslo Manual to Latin America, incorporates measurement
tools and procedures to capture the characteristics of a firm's technological behavior in this region.
Based on the Bogotá Manual, in Uruguay, UIS surveys collect information on a firm's innovation
activities, the human and financial resources specified for innovation, their relationships with other
agents, the obstacles perceived, and a firm’s innovation results, among other innovation-related
issues. ANII develops this survey in Uruguay.
To test the hypotheses proposed in this study, a unique dataset combines six UIS databases
available in for period 1998-2015, provided by the Instituto de Economía, Universidad de la
República, Uruguay6. Every UIS dataset is a triennial measurement, containing companies’ from
manufacturing industries and selected services activities for the last two waves (2010-12 and 20136

I'm thankful to the Instituto de Economia, Universidad de la República, especially to Dr. Carlos Bianchi and B.Sc Felipe Berruti,
who kindly provide the UIS panel database for this study.
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15). Since the focus of this study is companies of the manufacturing industry, those firms
belonging to the service sector for those years were removed.
To be potentially selected, a firm's average triennial employment has to be higher than or
equal to ten employees after the 2007-2009 UIS. In previous UIS, firms had to have five employees
or more. Large companies7 were always forcefully included in UIS samples8. Medium and small
companies were selected through a stratified random sample and within each stratum, they were
selected independently under a systematic randomized design, ordering the companies according
to their four-digit activity (ISIC, revision 3 until 2007-2009 and revision 4 onward) and the average
level of employment in the triennium.
However, the probability of being selected for the UIS is not entirely random for these
companies; selection positively correlates with firm size and turnover. For that reason, results must
be taken carefully and assessed for the specific biases and limitations. Also, it is important to
highlight that the panel dataset was intentionally balanced to take analytical advantage of it. For
the research reported here, only the manufacturing firms that were included from the third UIS
(2004-2006) to the last one (2013-2015), due to different variable measurements in the 1998-2000
and 2001-2003 waves9. This strategy reduces the number of cases in the dataset, especially small
firms. For that reason, these results must be taken with caution, considering the final structure of
the panel dataset, which is available in Table 1.

7

Large firms, those with 100 employees or more, and companies with a turnover larger than an amount that varies between 1 and
4 million US dollars are forcedly included.
8 Large firms for the Uruguayan case, those more than 50 employees or with an annual turnover to a specific amount that varied
across the period from 1 million to 4 million dollars were also forcefully included. Also, until 2009 companies, which had average
employed personnel in the triennium of 5 employees or more were in the random sample.
9 In appendix B it is explained the variables used and the reasons for excluding 1998-2000 and 2001-2003 waves.
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Table 1 – Panel data structure, by product innovation achievement; OECD tech
intensity levels and size, 2004-2006, 2013-2015
Product innovation
2004-2006 2007-2009 2010-2012 2013-2015
Technology intensity (OCDE)
Low-tech industries
Medium-low tech industries
Medium-high tech industries
High-tech industries

Total
firms (%)
62%
15%
14%
9%

Yes
32.2
17.4
3.6
6
5.2

No
67.8
44.4
10.6
8.8
3.9

2004-2006

Yes
31.4
17.9
3.9
5.2
4.4

No
68.6
43.9
11.4
8.6
4.7

Yes
27
13.5
4.4
4.9
4.2

No
73
48.3
10.9
8.8
4.9

Yes
30.6
17.7
3.6
5.5
3.9

No
69.4
44.2
11.4
8.6
5.2

2007-2009 2010-2012 2013-2015

Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
32.2
67.8
31.4
68.6
27
73
30.6 69.4
Small
1
4.9
0
6.2
0
0.3
0.3
0.3
Medium
15.8
41.6
14
36.9
2.1
15.1
15.1 14.3
Large
15.3
21.3
17.4
25.5
24.9
57.7
57.7 54.8
Source: UIS database, own elaboration. Note: OCDE manufacturing industries classification based on R&D intensities
can be accessed in OECD (2011). Note: Small firms represent those with 5-19 employees, medium-size 20-99
employees, and large-firms more than 99 employees. Since the number of firms by size measured using occupation
varies per panel wave, this data is not shown for the whole dataset, contrarily to the technological intensity, which does
not vary for each wave.
FIRM SIZE

Thus, small firms (those fewer than 20 employees) are virtually inexistent in the final data
structure. In addition, the dataset is skewed toward low-tech manufacturing industries.
Approximately one-third of the companies are low-tech firms (62%). Among firms that introduced
a product innovation, the vast majority belong to this technological level. The other two-thirds of
this dataset are composed of medium-low tech industries (15%), medium-high tech industries
(14%), and high-tech industries (9%). Even though these biases of the panel dataset, its use has
significant advantages. It allows controlling for time-invariant unobservable firm characteristics,
providing a broad set of time-varying observable characteristics.
3.2. Dependent variable
At the firm level, innovation can be studied in two ways – first, through an ex-ante
examination of the firm´s innovation capabilities, and second, through an ex-post analysis of their
practical innovation results. Given that most of the previous research on the relationship between
innovation and human capital has focused on innovation results, the dependent variable of this
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research will measure such outcomes. More specifically, most studies investigated the effect of
human capital on product innovation. Thus, in this study, product innovation is the dependent
variable, allowing this research to be comparable to other investigations of this issue. Specifically,
the dependent variable (PRODIN) is a dichotomous one, which measures whether the firm has
made a product innovation (1=Yes) in the last three years or not (0 = No).
Studies that have explored the relationship between human capital and innovation results
have employed different approaches regarding measuring the latter. According to the Bogotá
Manual definitions, an innovation outcome can be a new product, a new production process, a new
organizational method, or a new method of commercialization. Previous research focuses
primarily on product innovation, secondly process innovation, rarely evaluating evaluates
organizational or marketing innovation. Information about the dependent variables in previous
studies, differentiating whether they measured innovation activities or results is provided in
Appendix A. Also, the data in Appendix A provide information on if the dependent variables
measured product, process, organizational, or commercialization innovation.
The level of innovation matters. For this reason, a second dependent variable was tested
aimed to measure whether product innovation reached the local or the international market
(PRODIN-MKT). Due to the small number of cases innovated in the global markets, local and
international innovation was merged into one dummy variable. In this case, the variable is coded
“1” if the product reaches either the local or international market. Otherwise, the variable is coded
“0.” The objective of creating this dummy variable was to compare those firms that innovated at
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the firm level and those that took more risky innovations, reaching the local and international
markets10.
3.3. Independent variables
Educated employees is the first independent variable, defined as workers with at least a
college or a technical degree. The percentage of educated employees was used to test hypothesis
1. This variable was measured by asking the firm how many of their employees working in a
typical month last year had at least a college or a technical degree. The percentage of employees
with at least a college or technical degree in the firm was considered as a proxy for the amount of
codified knowledge in it. This variable has been used in several studies that investigated the
relationship between human capital and innovation as a representation for a firm’s knowledge base
(De Winne and Sels, 2010; Smith et al., 2013; van Uden et al., 2016).
Similar to Dostie (2018), the percentage of employees who received internal training
(TRAIN) was used to test Hypothesis 2. All firms that declare having conducted some internal
training had to report employees who received it. Then this number was divided by firms’ total
number of employees. The third independent variable is the Relational-based HRM tools (HRM),
used to test Hypothesis 3. This variable is an index that measures the breadth of the application of
relational-based HRM tools on firms. Similar to De Winne and Sels (2010), this index was
developed using the equally weighted sum of the following five binary variables:
•

Firm hierarchy reduction (1=Yes, 0=No): More rigid and centralized organizations may
obstruct communication flows (Schmidt, 2005). Thus, this variable measures for the
reduction of organizational levels during three years.

10

Uruguayan manufacturing industry mostly exports to regional markets, not to the most industrialized ones. That can make less
sophisticated the innovation that reaches external markets compared to those that enter the local market. Thus, combining both
variables would not imply very different technological levels.
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•

Application of systematic mechanisms to obtain employees’ opinions (1=Yes, 0=No): this
variable measures employees’ influence on decision making, associated positively to
firm’s product innovation (Hayton, 2003; Sung and Choi, 2014)

•

Creation of collaboration teams in the firm (1=Yes, 0=No); this variable accounted for
teamwork, which influences a firm’s product innovation (Shipton et al., 2006)

•

Creation of continuous improvement teams (1=Yes, 0=No); Total Quality Management
(TQM) practices and innovation are positively related (Hsu and Shen, 2005; Yusr et al.,
2016) and imply the use of codification tools for tacit knowledge.

•

Application of results-based economic stimuli (1=Yes, 0=No). Motivation enhances
innovation (Sung and Choi, 2014; Shipton et al., 2006; Hayton, 2003) and there is also
evidence that in the Uruguayan context, a set of motivation tools fosters the effectiveness
of a set of HRM tools (Bello-Pintado, 2015). Assigning results-based economic incentives
may foster employees’ motivation.

Each variable was equally weighted and then combined, creating a new variable ranging
from 0-1. When this variable indicated 0, there were no relational-based HRM tools applied in the
firm, while if this variable indicated 1, the maximum level of tools were applied.
3.4. Control variables
A set of variables was also added to the analysis to control for a firm’s observable
characteristics. The size of the company (SIZE), measured by the number of employees in logs,
was included. The most common rationale for the log transformation is to reduce variance
distribution of the values across observations. The implicit reasoning for the log transformation
relies on the fact that data on the number of employees are sometimes highly skewed, and extreme
scores can cause biases (Kimberly and Evanisko, 1981). Previous research supports that,
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notwithstanding nuances regarding methodologies used, the size of the firm influences innovation
activities and results in Uruguay (Cassoni and Ramada, 2010; Pittaluga et al., 2005; Bianchi,
2007).
The presence or absence of foreign capital (FK) in the firm is a dummy variable coded
1=Yes or 0=No. This variable was included because firms in developing countries often benefit
from the technological knowledge available from their headquarters (Isobe, Makino, and
Montgomery, 2000). However, for the Uruguayan case, Bianchi (2007) did not find a strong
correlation between the development of innovation capacities and the presence of foreign capital
in the firm. Pittaluga et al. (2005) found a similar result from the first UIS, conducted from 1998
to 2000. Cassoni and Ramada-Sarasola (2015) found that multinationals and exporters generated
innovations of enhanced value compared to those of local market-oriented firms. Based on these
previous studies, it was not possible to forecast the relationship between innovation results and the
presence of foreign capital, but it was a key dimension to include as a control.
In addition, the propensity of export (EXP) has been found to show a weak positive
association between higher export performance and a firm’s innovative capacity (Bianchi, 2007).
However, recent research on Uruguayan industry demonstrated a weak positive relationship or bidirectional effect (Resnichenko, 2017; Peluffo and Silva, 2016). In this study, the percentage of
exports in total sales standardized by 2005 prices is used. Based on previous results using panel
datasets, a positive relationship between EXP and product innovation is expected (Bianchi et al.,
2015).
The firm’s internal capacity to create knowledge influences innovation outcomes (Cohen
and Levinthal, 1990). As such, a variable that indicates a firm’s internal R&D investment relative
to the number of employees was included (adjusted by 2005 prices). Also, this variable was
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intended as a proxy for firms' innovation strategy. A firm that pursued a strategy based on internal
R&D investment (in-house innovation) were more likely to innovate in new products (Zuniga and
Crespi, 2013). Zuniga and Crespi’s (2013), found that these strategies had different impacts on the
labor skills needed. For that reason, a similar variable aimed to measure the amount invested in
purchasing external technology for innovation was included. This variable indicated the firms’
investment per employee in capital goods, ICT, external R&D, and external consultancies
(adjusted by 2005 prices). These variables were labeled “make” and “buy” innovation, respectively
(MAKESTRAT, BUYSTRAT). These variables were squared to account for decreasing marginal
returns (MAKESTRAT2, BUYSTRAT2). A proxy for external linkages was also included as a
dummy variable coded 1 if the company made cooperation agreements or participated in an
enterprise network over the period investigated, and 0 if not (COPNET). Based on national and
international studies (Jensen, Johnson, Lorenz, and Lundvall, 2007; Bianchi et al., 2011; Bianchi
and Gras, 2003; Cohen and Levinthal, 1990), a positive correlation is expected between
cooperative activities and innovation.
3.5 Analyses
Since both dependent variables (PRODIN or PRODIN-MKT) had a discrete distribution,
logistic regressions are applied. The improvement of overall model fit was used to identify the
appropriate models for hypothesis testing, based on log-likelihood tests (Osborne, 2017; Long,
2012). For formal hypothesis tests, conditional effect-specific relevant values of the independent
variables are reported. In addition, we provide graphs that show predicted probabilities for
significant interaction effects across the range of observed variable values. Equation 1 is the
baseline model (Model 1) that aims to identify the effect of the variables on product innovation (at
the firm or market levels);
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𝑙𝑛 (

𝑃 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑛
) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3 ℎ𝑟𝑚𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜑𝑖,𝑡 𝑥 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
1 − 𝑃 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑛 𝑖,𝑡

[Eq 1]

where 𝑙𝑛 (1 −𝑝 𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑛
) is the natural logarithm of the conditional odds for a firm i to achieve
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑛
𝑖,𝑡

a product innovation in year t 11. The coefficient 𝛽1 quantifies educated workers share effect for
firm i at year t; 𝛽2 is the coefficient that estimates the effect a firm proportion of employees who
received training on the odds of producing an innovation for firm i at year t; while 𝛽3 is the
coefficient that indicates HRM effect for firm i at year t. The vector 𝜑𝑖,𝑡 contains the defined
control variables for firm i at year t. The first step to disentangling sources of potential bias is
adding a firm’s fixed-effects. Firm-level characteristics (𝛿) that are correlated with both human
capital and innovation performance can introduce biases in our coefficients. For example, if highability managers introduce more innovations and invest more in human capital, its real impact on
innovation could be biased. Thus, 𝛿𝑖 and 𝛾𝑡 are a firm’s and year fixed-effects respectively, and
the error term is defined by 𝜀𝑖𝑡 for firm i at year t.
To test Hypothesis 1b and 2b requires integrating the firm’s size moderation. To test both
effects, we define Model 2 as
𝑝 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑛
𝑙𝑛 (1 − 𝑝
)

𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑛 𝑖,𝑡

= 𝛼 + 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3 ℎ𝑟𝑚𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃 (𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 ) + 𝜁(𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 ) + 𝜑𝑖,𝑡 𝑥 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡

[Eq2]

Equation 2 incorporates two new parameters. The first (θ ) accounts for the interaction term
between educated workers and size, and the second ( 𝜁 ) captures the multiplicative effect between
training and size. To further evaluate Hypothesis 1b and 2b, Model 3 is used.

11

When modeling product innovation (for the local or external market), the variable modeled also has a discrete distribution.
Logistic regression is applied with firm fixed effects is also applied. Equation 1 changes for these set of models: The dependent
𝑝_𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣_𝑒𝑥𝑡
variable 𝑙𝑛 (1 − 𝑝_𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣_𝑒𝑥𝑡) is defined as the natural logarithm of the conditional odds for a firm i to achieve external to the firm
𝑖,𝑡

innovation in year t.
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𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑛
𝑙𝑛 (1 − 𝑝
)

𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑛 𝑖,𝑡

= 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3 ℎ𝑟𝑚𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜏 (𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖,𝑡 ∗ ℎ𝑟𝑚𝑖,𝑡 ) + 𝜓 (𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖,𝑡 ∗ ℎ𝑟𝑚𝑖,𝑡 ) + 𝜑𝑖,𝑡 𝑥 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡

[Eq3]

Equation 3 defines this model, adding two interaction terms to Equation 1. One parameter
(τ) captures the multiplicative effect between educated workers and HRM, while the second (ψ)
does the same but between HRM and training. In Table 2, we summarize the hypotheses of this
study:
Table 2 – Summary of Hypothesis and Expected Relationships
Educated workers

Hypothesis 1

Equation
1

Coefficient

Training

Hypothesis 2

1

HRM

Hypothesis 3

1

Educated workers * Size

Hypothesis 1a

2

θ

-

Training * Size
Educated workers * HRM index

Hypothesis 2a
Hypothesis 3a

2
3

𝜁

+

Training * HRM index

Hypothesis 3b

3

𝛽1
𝛽2
𝛽3
τ
ψ

Expected sign
+
+
+

+

These models have their limitations. There are concerns of potential sources of bias that
might lead to simultaneity between human capital and innovation. First, firm-level innovation in
itself can lead to or require firm-sponsored training and more professionals. For example, a new
product can be a consequence of a new production process. Employees would need training on
this process, and, an experienced engineer may be hired to train them. This complicated
relationship is by no means easy to disentangle. Even when considering lagging dependent
variables, previous trends in product innovation that can affect them must be taken into account.
For that reason, a new design is needed to understand the actual causality between human capital
and innovation. Thus, this research aims to identify associations using panel data controlling for
firms’ unobserved characteristics.
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4. RESULTS
4.1. Internal product innovation
The outcomes of the binary logistic regressions specified for product innovation are listed
in Table 1. All variables were standardized using Z-scores. All models were calculated using
robust errors, allowing for the clustering of errors by firm. In addition, random and fixed effects
models were included to test for the consistency of both estimators, with inconsistency being found
for the random effects models in all cases, as can be seen in Appendix D. Model 1 regresses product
innovation; Model 2 examines the interactions between SIZE with TRAIN and REMP, and Model
3 examines how HRM index interacts with EEMP and TRAIN.
Model 1 exhibited an initial -2 log-likelihood of -248.9 (χ2 = 44.16, p-value < 0.0001). All
control variables indicated the expected signs, and, all coefficients were significant or nearly
significant except for FK and EXP. The variables MAKESRAT2 and COPNET were almost
significant at a 90% confidence level while SIZE and BUYSTRAT2 exhibited significant effects
on firm product innovation at a 5% and 1% level, respectively. The key explanatory variables,
EEMP did not exhibit a significant effect on the likelihood of a firm’s product innovation. TRAIN
and HRM exhibited a significant influence on firms’ probability of product innovation at a 1% and
5% correspondingly, showing the positive sign expected in hypotheses 2 and 3.
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Table 3 – Logistic Regression Estimations, Firm Product Innovation
TRAIN
EEMP
HRM

Model 1
(PRODIN = 1)

Model 2
(PRODIN = 1)

Model 3
(PRODIN = 1)

0.332**

0.346**

0.465***

(0.111)

(0.119)

(0.139)

0.0943

-0.0318

0.0875

(0.122)

(0.157)

(0.117)

0.277*

0.317**

0.277*

(0.110)

(0.113)

(0.109)

TRAIN * SIZE

0.273*
(0.128)

EEMP * SIZE

-0.316*
(0.161)

TRAIN * HRM

-0.135
(0.0905)

EEMP * HRM

-0.0553
(0.102)

SIZE
EXP
MAKESTRAT

1.152*

1.080*

1.128*

(0.547)

(0.544)

(0.548)

0.104

0.129

0.0803

(0.212)

(0.206)

(0.206)

+

+

1.537
(0.842)

MAKESTRAT2
BUYSTRAT
BUYSTRAT2
FK
COPNET
Firm-fixed effects
Time-fixed effects

1.542+

1.528
(0.863)

(0.846)

-0.0933

-0.0910+

(0.0508)

(0.0531)

(0.0509)

0.783**

0.828**

0.761**

(0.253)

(0.262)

(0.246)

-0.0527**

-0.0574**

-0.0511**

(0.0179)

(0.0187)

(0.0176)

-0.147

-0.100

-0.138

(0.405)

(0.419)

(0.400)

0.443+

0.475*

0.434+

(0.233)

(0.234)

(0.233)

YES
YES

YES
YES

YES
YES

792
-244.5
44.52, p-value < 0.0002

792
-247.9
45.84, p-value < 0.0001

-0.0911

+

+

N
792
-2 log-likelihood
-248.9
Wald χ2
44.16, p-value < 0.0001
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Model 2 includes the two-way interactions between SIZE and both TRAIN and EEMP to
test Hypotheses 1a and 2a. The inclusion of these interaction terms significantly improved the
model fit (log-likelihood, 244.5, χ2 = 44.52, p-value < 0.0002). As Table 3 shows, in Model 2 HRM
increased its significance to a 1% level. Both interactions were significant at the 5% level, but only
EEMP*SIZE is negative as expected. The inclusion of the interaction effects in Model 2 increased
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COPNET significance to 5% level. FK and EXP remained insignificant, MAKESTRAT2 was
almost significance at a 10% level, and BUYSTRAT2, as well as COPNET, showed the expected
sign and significance at a 5% level.
Model 3 evaluates the interactions between HRM and EEMP, and HRM and TRAIN. The
model had a significant effect in explaining product innovation variance and a higher -2 loglikelihood (-47.9) than Model 2. However, the interaction terms were not statistically significant,
although the multiplicative effect of HRM and TRAIN was almost significant at the 90% level.
Consequently, Hypotheses 1b and 2b are not confirmed: HRM did not have a multiplicative effect
on both EEMP and TRAIN. Because the inclusion of the interaction between the HRM and both
TRAIN and EEMP also change COPNET to almost significant as in Model 1. The remaining
control variables did not change their significant levels nor signs.

4.2. Market product innovation
The outcomes of the binary logistic regressions using market product innovation as the
dependent variable are listed in Table 4. Z-scores were again used to standardize the variables.
Similar to Models 1, 2, and 3, robust errors were used, allowing for firm clustering. Random and
fixed effects models were tested for the consistency of both estimators, resulting in better
consistency for the fixed-effects models, as can be seen in Appendix D. Model 4 is the baseline
model that regresses PRODIN-MKT on innovation; Model 5 examines the associations of the
interactions between human capital, and size and Model 6 studies how HRM interacts with
educated employees and training.
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Table 4 – Logistic regression estimations, market product innovation

TRAIN
EEMP
HRM

Model 4
(PRODIN-MKT = 1)

Model 5
(PRODIN-MKT = 1)

Model 6
(PRODIN-MKT = 1)

0.150

0.186

0.283*

(0.101)

(0.108)

(0.128)

0.0633

0.0383

0.000410

(0.145)

(0.144)

(0.157)

0.232*

0.268*

0.245*

(0.103)

(0.107)

(0.105)

TRAIN * SIZE

0.276**
(0.104)

EEMP * SIZE

-0.139
(0.132)

-0.147+

TRAIN * HRM

(0.0824)

EEMP * HRM

0.116
(0.109)

SIZE

+

1.023*

0.919

0.979*

(0.458)

(0.476)

(0.464)

0.0211

0.0476

0.0341

(0.241)

(0.235)

(0.233)

0.437*

0.430*

0.434*

(0.175)

(0.170)

(0.175)

-0.0222*

-0.0234*

-0.0220*

(0.0102)

(0.0100)

(0.0103)

0.235

0.227

0.216

(0.236)

(0.230)

(0.226)

-0.0136

-0.0132

-0.0120

(0.0179)

(0.0175)

(0.0178)

-0.430

-0.401

-0.404

(0.362)

(0.368)

(0.360)

COPNET

0.216

0.190

0.249

Firm-fixed effects
Time-fixed effects

(0.216)
YES
YES

(0.215)
YES
YES

(0.224)
YES
YES

688
-237.3
32.43, p < 0.01

688
-238.9
32.48

EXP
MAKESTRAT
MAKESTRAT2
BUYSTRAT
BUYSTRAT2
FK

N
688
-2 log-likelihood
-257.905
Wald χ2
29.98, p<0.01
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.1,* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Model 4 was significant in explaining PRODIN-MKT (log-likelihood = -257.9, χ2 = 29.98,
p-value < 0.01). From key independent variables, only HRM influence a firm’s external product
innovation at a 5% level while EEMP and TRAIN were not significant. The signs of all control
variables were as expected. The variable MAKESTRAT2 showed the expected negative direction
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and a significant effect at a 5% confidence level. SIZE was significant and positive, while
BUYSTRAT, BUYSTRAT2, COPNET, FK, and EXP were not significant.
In Model 5, the multiplicative effects between SIZE and both TRAIN and EEMP were
introduced to test Hypothesis 1a and 2a for PRODIN-MKT. The inclusion of the two-way
interactions did not improve the model fit, but their effects were significant (-log likelihood -237.3,
χ2 = 32.43, p < 0.01). The variable SIZE was a moderator only of training, but contrary to
Hypothesis 2a its sign was positive. The control variables did not vary in its sign nor significance
compared as in Model 4.
The goal of Model 6 is to test Hypotheses 3a and 3b using PRODIN-MKT as the dependent
variable. This model was significant, but the inclusion of the two-way interactions between HRM
and both TRAIN and EEMP did not improve the model fit (-log likelihood = - 237.9, χ2 = 32.43,
p < .01). The interaction terms were not significant, but it is worth mentioning that TRAIN * HRM
reached a 90% confidence level and the expected negative sign. The significance and sign of the
control variables did not vary compared to Model 4 and 5.
5. DISCUSSION
The findings from this research support previous studies which suggested that, especially
in developing countries, innovation occurs primarily at the firm level. Internal firm practices for
managing human capital, such as training or fostering human interactions and communication,
improve the likelihood of innovation (Hayton, 2003, De Winne and Sels, 2010; Nazarov and
Akhmedjonov, 2012; Sung and Choi, 2014; González-Velosa et al., 2016). Updating and sharing
employee knowledge seem to be a predictor of a firm's product innovation.
We did not, however, find that the proportion of educated workers is associated with
product innovation directly, neither at the firm nor the market level. This result suggests that firm-
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level practices such as training or human resource management are more beneficial than individual
human capital endowments in Uruguayan firms for either firm or market product innovation.
However, this situation changes when the firm size is taken into account. As a result, the effect of
both the share of educated employees and firm size must be examined together as is shown in
Figure 5.
Educated employees enhance product innovation at the firm level for smaller companies
as is seen through the interaction effect between SIZE and EEMP in Model 2. To examine these
interactions, Figure 5 shows the regression line equation assigning a value of −2 standard
deviations in SIZE for small firms and +2 standard deviations in SIZE for large firms. All values
were converted from logits to conditional probabilities.
Figure 5 – Interaction between size and educated workers, predicted probabilities

An increase in the share of educated employees (EEMP) tends to increase the conditional
probability of product innovation for small firms. However, this term does not increase as much;
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the predicted probability increases from 0.06 to 0.18 for those small firms with a +2 SD in EEMP12.
The apparent weak effect on small firms has to be taken with caution due to the skewness toward
large firms in the panel dataset (only 60 cases around -2 SD in SIZE).
Unlike for small firms, there is a reduction in the product innovation probability for large
firms when they increase their educated worker’s share. As in most developing countries, in
Uruguay innovation strategies primarily involve technology acquisition (Bittencourt, 2012).
Acquiring the ability necessary to work with machinery and equipment is key for firm-level
innovation. As mentioned previously, small companies tend to innovate primarily at the firm level.
In addition, the significant values of the buy strategy in Models 1-3 indicate that to innovate at the
firm level, adapting external assets to innovate is essential and can create the need for more
professionals. However, hiring more professionals than needed can reduce the likelihood of
innovation. Because this situation is more likely to occur in larger firms with fewer budget
restrictions for hiring educated employees than in small firms, it can explain the negative
interaction effect between size and skilled workers seen by the red line in Figure 5.
This analysis implies that it is not possible to examine human capital dimensions in a
vacuum, a realization that is especially crucial for policymaking. As mentioned earlier, in Uruguay,
the number of firms with no educated workers grew during the period of study. More importantly,
the number of small and mid-sized manufacturing firms with no professionals increased
throughout the study period, as shown in Figure 3. Thus, public policy to foster product innovation
by hiring educated workers in Uruguayan manufacturing firms has to target small firms. If small
firms increase their number of skilled workers, it is possible to increase to some extent the
innovative capacity of the Uruguayan manufacturing industry.

12

This accounts for approximately 25% of educated workers in its workforce

46

Figures 6a and 6b show that when size is considered as a moderator, the effect of training
on both firm and market innovation change. Contrary to Hypothesis 2a, the sign of the moderator
effect between size and training is positive. The predicted probabilities for the interaction effect
between size and training are plotted in Figure 6a and 6b. The former shows that a small share of
internal trained employees in large firms accounts for a 0.59 predicted probability in a firm’s
product innovation, increasing to 0.96 for companies with a high share of internally trained
employees. For small firms, those that account for a low share of internally trained employees
exhibit an innovation probability of 0.25, higher than those companies with a high share (0.07).
Market product innovation essentially does not vary when comparing companies with low and
high shares of internally trained employees, ranging from only 0.15 to 0.07; however, it is again
worth recalling the few small firms in the dataset.
Figure 6 – Interaction between size and training, predicted probabilities
A - Firm Product Innovation
B - Market Product Innovation

In conclusion, human capital is associated with product innovation. However, not all types
of human capital operate in the same way for all companies. For small firms, increasing the number
of educated employees fosters the likelihood for product innovation, but it is not the case for large
firms with fewer budgetary restrictions for hiring professionals. Even do having more
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professionals can result in a negative impact on innovating in products. However, for large firms,
internal training is a critical factor for increasing their likelihood of product innovation, while it
does not seem to be a crucial factor in small companies.
There are also some findings that highlight that the context is a chief dimension when
analyzing human capital and innovation. Consistent with Crespi and Rovira (2012), the make
strategy contributes significantly to introducing market innovations as is see in Models, 4, 5, and
6. However, the buy strategy is not of influence when evaluating market product innovation. The
number of professionals is not associated significantly with market product innovation. Thus,
make and buy strategies are related to different sources of human capital for introducing an
innovation successfully. Firm-level practices and communication flows seem to be crucial for both
levels of innovation (product and market), a result that has been identified for developing countries
in previous studies (van Uden et al., 2016). Individual human capital aligned with the adaptation
of equipment and external knowledge impacts firm-level innovation, but not the local or foreign
market innovation.
6. IMPLICATIONS
Other studies found that Uruguay compares well with other regional economies regarding
their level of human capital (Iván et al., 2016). However, section 2 of this article has shown how
the Uruguayan manufacturing industry has reduced the number of educated employees hired and
investment in internal training during the period of study. At the same time, several research pieces
and reports have pointed to human capital as one of the leading factors in helping companies
increase their innovative behavior. However, this research found that the characteristics of a
company, especially its size, and the risk level of innovation are central factors for policy design.
It is not just a mattter of increasing the average human capital level, either by hiring more educated
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employees or investiging more in internal training. These results illustrate that the relationships
between innovation and human capital investments is more nuanced that intially hypothesized.
For less risky innovations, those targeted to the firm itself, the policies that might help
small firms hiring its first college graduate employee can have a significant impact on the
likelihood of this type of innovation. However, the role of internal training and communication
flows are useful for innovation at the firm and market level, especially in large firms.
Thus, this paper leads to several policy recommendations. As can be seen in Appendix C,
the vast majority of policies aimed to foster innovation in Uruguay through human capital are
focused on individual endowments, i.e., hiring more professionals, providing post-graduate studies
for firm’s employees. The firm’s internal level practices, such as training or human resource
management, are essentially not mentioned in these policies. Based on the ten policies found and
reviewed to the date, only one focuses on internal training, and only one focuses on human resource
management practices. Nine of these policies aim to increase the number of skilled workers
through either helping companies to hire more professionals or by funding their employees to
attend graduate studies.
However, as this study revealed, hiring more professionals can foster product innovation
only in small firms. This paper showed that even after controlling for firm’s characteristics and
economic trends over time, internal firm practices such as training and fostering employee
participation, communication, and motivation are positively associated with innovation. The
Uruguayan policies aimed to foster innovation through human capital do not focus these factors.
There is much innovation capacity to be gained by reshaping Uruguayan innovation policy tools
by emphasizing on internal firm’s practices toward human capital.
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According to Arocena and Sutz (2010), in Uruguay, local characteristics were not
sufficiently taken into account in relation to the definition of innovation policies. Internal firm
practices such as training, employee decision making, and communication were not adequately
considered. Given the relationship between innovation and the human capital dimensions analyzed
in this study, innovation policies should, at the very least, redesign objectives to achieve higher
levels of product innovation in Uruguay.

7. LIMITATIONS
Does human capital influence innovation or innovation foster human capital? The
impossibility of being able to answer this question is the main drawback of this paper. To analyze
causation is necessary to design specific research focusing on that objective. It is important also to
stress that due to the cross-sectional nature of the UIS, the resulting panel ceases to be
representative, skewing the dataset towards high-size firms. However, by using this panel data
structure, this study was able to control for firms’ time-invariant unobservable characteristics while
providing a rich set of time-varying observable characteristics. Another significant limitation is
how educated employees were measured. With the available data, only measurements of individual
human capital endowments using employees with a college degree can be used. Distinguishing the
effects of high-school, technical, or graduate education on innovation is worth investigating.
Probably, workers with more specialized education can influence innovation more than workers
with only a college degree, but we cannot differentiate between the two with the UIS dataset.
Another limitation of this study is that it did not account for firms’ survival biases. It was not
possible to include those firms that did not survive over the research period since we are working
with balanced panel data to maintain the fixed effects. In addition, it is well known that data on

50

firm innovation tend to overestimate successful firms since innovation reduces the firm’s death
likelihood. Thus, these results are biased toward successful firms. Another limitation is the
underestimation of other intangible assets as social capital. As previously mentioned, many studies
have found that social capital enhances innovation and, in this relationship, interacts with human
capital. In this study, there were no available data for measuring firms’ social capital level. Instead,
it was possible to measure the firm’s intention to create internal social capital through the HRM
index.
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CHAPTER THREE
A MATTHEW EFFECT IN ENTREPRENEURIAL FUNDING? AN ANALYSIS OF
REPEATED EVENTS

1. INTRODUCTION

Attributes not related to entrepreneurial talent can determine who receives external
funding. Previous research found that more than half of emerging ventures’ funding comes from
the personal contributions of founders (Gartner, Frid, and Alexander, 2012). In addition, more
educated and affluent entrepreneurs are significantly more likely to obtain external funding
(Gartner, Frid, and Alexander, 2012). Personal wealth is also a primary driver of acquiring external
financing (Frid, Wyman, Gartner, and Hechavarria, 2016), reinforced by the circumstance that
low-wealth entrepreneurs are less likely to obtain funding from formal institutions (Frid et al.,
2016). However, it has also been found that when low and moderately wealthy entrepreneurs get
over the gestational phase (Reynolds and Curtin, 2008), their likelihood of abandoning their
intentions of becoming a business owner is similar to any other entrepreneur (Frid, Wyman, and
Coffey, 2016). Without economic constraints, less privileged entrepreneurs can perform as well as
the wealthiest.
Based on the Matthew effect theory (Merton, 1968), which depicts the social phenomenon
of accumulated advantage, this study examines the biases in entrepreneurial financing and their
effects. Precisely, by using event history analysis, this research estimates the effect of receiving
recurrent funding for firm creation and survival. Also, this research sheds light on the factors
associated with receiving recurrent financing during the early entrepreneurial stages, applying
event history analysis for repetitive events.
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The estimates of this research result in several contributions. First, the study shows that the
recurrence and timing of the external funding received by entrepreneurs matters for firm survival
and creation. Second, this project found that some characteristics pointed out by the Matthew effect
theory shapes the entrepreneurial reward system, such as the entrepreneur’s socio-economic
background, but also some specific actions that entrepreneurs can take toward reducing
asymmetrical information between them and lending agents. Finally, from a methodological
perspective, this research highlights the necessity to account for the repeated nature of the funding
event when analyzing entrepreneurial financing.

2. THEORY DEVELOPMENT AND HYPOTHESES
2.1 The Mathew Effect
External funding increases the likelihood for an entrepreneur to create a new company and
reduces the probability of not being successful in this endeavor (Hechavarría, Matthews, and
Reynolds, 2016). However, previous research has found that the possibility of being funded is not
directly related to entrepreneurship talent. Several personal characteristics such as wealth,
ethnicity, and other intangibles like human and social capital increase their probability of receiving
these funds (Frid, Wyman, and Coffey, 2016; Frid, Wyman, Gartner, and Hechavarria, 2016; Frid,
2014; Gartner, Frid, and Alexander, 2012). Merton (1968) developed a framework for explaining
why higher economic and social status actors receive greater rewards, such as funding, than those
at a lower status for a similar activity. He turns this situation the Matthew effect13 when rewards

Inspired in the Bible verse found in the Gospel of Matthew: “For whosoever hath, to him shall be given, and he shall have
more abundance: but whosoever hath not, from him shall be taken away even that he hath.”
13
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are allocated based on social status and not on the efforts made. As a result, a self-reinforcing
mechanism appears in a reward system.
Fields such as Science and Technology and Society examined how access to funding
reinforces a trajectory of gaining new grants, does confirming the Mathew effect (Azoulay, Stuart,
and Wang, 2014; Petersen et al., 2013; Arora, David, and Gambardella, 1998; Arora and
Gambardella, 1997; David, 1994; Medoff, 2006; Zuckerman, 1972). The self-reinforcement
trajectory increases research group productivity and explains the increasing concentration of
publications around a stable group of scholars. Further, successful grant funding impacts positively
on a research group due to a cumulative advantage based on the positive feedback between
research and resources, in turn, increasing a team's productivity (David, 1994). However, a
reputation effect can also explain this increase in productivity, which emerges when other
researchers focus their attention on the work of “the elite” (Arora et al., 1998; Medoff, 2006),
minimizing allocation time in the search for new relevant publications. David (1994) claims that
the “Matthew effect” could lead to a stable equilibrium, where the allocation of funds is targeted
not necessarily on projects’ quality, but rather on the number of citations that a particular
researcher has. In Economics (Pereira and Suárez, 2017; Antonelli and Crespi, 2013; Medoff,
2006) and Education (Glasswell, 2001; Stanovich, 1986) the Mathew effect has been tested as
well, the results finding a similar pattern.
Two theoretical considerations make the Matthew Effect worth investigating in
Entrepreneurship Studies, first, the asymmetrical information between lenders and entrepreneurs,
and second, the high transaction costs of the small business loan market. Asymmetrical
information (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976; Akerlof, 1970) is found when there is unbalanced
information between supply and demand, leading to inefficient outcomes in specific markets.
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Since new ventures typically do not disclose financial information about their trade, products, and
services, asymmetric information is particularly problematic for small business loans (Berger and
Udell, 1998). Lenders have to monitor borrowers, leading to a second theoretical argument for
investigating the Matthew effect in entrepreneurship: the high transaction costs (Coase, 1937) of
the entrepreneurial loan market. While these costs are not problematic for larger companies, they
can make these loans unreachable for NEs. Consequently, on the supply side, banks and lenders,
in general, are typically not willing to lend capital to small companies, while on the demand side
nascent small firms are off the market (Ang, 1992).
The evaluation of an entrepreneurial project is a cognitive activity. Like any other type of
assessment, this activity requires an affirmative or negative decision about what is being evaluated.
Any cognitive action involves information processing. However, complete information about
entrepreneurial projects is hardly ever available, and for that reason, evaluators —banks, agencies,
venture capitalists, and angel investors — search for signals for assessing entrepreneurial projects,
because they need cognitive heuristics and shortcuts to process high amounts of incomplete and
asymmetric information. These signals are reviewed in more detail in the next section and help in
developing the hypotheses of this study.
2.2 Factors associated with entrepreneurial funding
Some factors associated with external funding are related to an entrepreneur's economic
and social status, while others to the specific actions of an entrepreneur for acquiring funding.
Among economic and social factors, a primary driver for acquiring external funding an
entrepreneur wealth. Even the decision to become an entrepreneur is subject to an individual’s net
worth capacity (Evans and Jovanovic, 1989). Frid, Wyman, Gartner, and Hechevarría (2016) found
that personal wealth is a primary driver for acquiring external startup financing. Also, low-wealth
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entrepreneurs are less likely to get external funding, and even when they do so, they receive lower
amounts compared to wealthier entrepreneurs (Frid, Wyman, Gartner, and Hechevarría, 2016;
Frid, Wyman, and Coffey, 2016; Frid, 2014; Reynolds, 2011). Frid, Wyman, Gartner, and
Hechevarría (2016) observed the impact of the wealth of an entrepreneur on venture creation and
performance during its gestational phase (Reynolds and Curtin, 2008). They found that low wealth
and moderately wealthy nascent entrepreneurs face liquidity constraints, influencing the
performance of the new ventures. Consequently, low and moderately wealth entrepreneurs are
more likely to abandon the startup process during the gestation period. However, once low and
middle wealth entrepreneurs pass that phase, their likelihood of deserting is similar to the wealthy
entrepreneurs. Therefore, and as Frid Wyman, Gartner, and Hechevarría (2016) point out, low and
middle-wealth entrepreneurs face liquidity constraints, but they are as capable as wealthier
entrepreneurs once they pass the financial constraints of the gestational phase. Thus, personal
wealth is a crucial factor in obtaining external funding recursively due to two reasons: first, its
positive relationship with external funding and on second extending the gestational phase, which
is the period when NEs could get external funding. Therefore, the first hypothesis is:
H1: Less wealthy nascent entrepreneurs will be less likely to acquire external funds recurrently
than wealthier business founders.
A similar logic applies to social capital. Entrepreneurs' career trajectories have a
remarkable impact on their firm’s growth, as shown by Burton, Sørensen, and Beckman (2002).
The accumulation of social capital facilitates access to information and tangible resources such as
credit and financing tools. Uzzi (1999) found in his study on existing firms,
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“the ability to meet financial selection criteria is a product of a firm’s characteristics as
well as the socially arranged opportunity structures within which it is embedded. Firms with
embedded relations and high networks complementarity are more likely to be deemed credit
eligible and to receive lower cost financing (…) Thus, market-making –or the creation of
exchanges for mutual benefit– depends on social relations and networks.” (Uzzi; 1999, 502).

While there is no difference in the amount of social capital between entrepreneurs and the
general population, the formers use it differently: entrepreneurs are more skillful in taking
advantage of their connections and ties (Liao and Welsch, 2005). As mentioned, low-wealth
entrepreneurs are less likely to get funded compared then wealthier entrepreneurs, as Casey (2014)
demonstrated, the support provided by community-based organizations increases their credit
access. As social capital seems to affect the quality and results of an entrepreneur’s ability to get
funded, it is hypothesized that
H2: Entrepreneurs with higher levels of social capital are more likely to obtain external funding
recurrently.
In addition, there are also factors associated with receiving funding based on an
entrepreneur’s actions, and not from here social or economic origin. NEs can reduce the
asymmetrical information and transaction costs by developing signals for lenders, such as business
plans, patents, or financial projections. Entrepreneurs that develop business plans receive higher
funding amounts (Hopp, 2015) because such plans are associated with persistence in the process
of business creation (Liao and Gartner, 2006). Kirsch, Goldfarb, and Gera (2009) indicate that
business plans have a critical purpose in entrepreneurship, namely the role of acquiring a costly
signal. Honig and Karlsson (2004) also affirm that business plans are legitimation devices which
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communicate to investors that entrepreneurs understand the rules of the game but reveal little to
none about their abilities. Scholars have pointed out that business planning reduces entrepreneurial
uncertainty. Liao and Gartner (2006) found that pre-venture planning increases the chances of
emerging firm persistence in high uncertainty contexts. For those NEs who are confident about
their competitive and financial situation, planning is less relevant. Also, Liao and Gartner (2006)
found that business planning significantly increases the likelihood of firm creation and persistence.
Brinckmann and Sung Ming (2015) also show that NEs look for external financing develop
business planning activities, and finding that education helps them to engage in business planning
activities and formally set up business plans. In contrast, prior work experience has a weak effect
on developing business plans.
As signals for obtaining funding, financial projections have been the focus of research less
than business plans. However, there is evidence that entrepreneurs develop them more often when
their new venture operates in markets where intangible assets such as patents or R&D spending
are critical to reducing uncertainty (Cassar, 2009). Also, patents infer reputation for NEs' (Hsu,
2004; Lounsbury and Glynn, 2001). Funders interested in high-tech new ventures look for
evidence of NEs’ prior accomplishments, like patents (D. H. Hsu, 2007). Thus, a set of hypotheses
is proposed to test how these signals affect NEs’ recursive financing:
H3a: Nascent entrepreneurs who develop business plans are more likely to receive external
funding recurrently.
H3b: Nascent entrepreneurs who develop financial projections are more likely to receive external
funding recurrently.
H3c: Nascent entrepreneurs who develop patents are more likely to receive external funding
recurrently.
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2.3 Effects of recurrent external monitored funding
Behind the idea of a potential Matthew effect in entrepreneurial financing, there is an
underlying hypothesis: Receiving externally monitored funding several times provides an
advantage to NEs in their goal of creating a new firm. Frid (2014) and Gartner, Frid and Alexander
(2012) studied new companies’ capital structure in the nascent context, demonstrating that NEs
tend to use personal funds as the primary funding source during the earliest stages of the
entrepreneurial process. Hecheverria et al. (2016) challenged these findings by using event history
analysis and confirming that a capital structure that contains external funds (equity) is positively
associated with accelerating new firm creation during the gestational phase. They also found that
firms with a capital structure that contains external loans and equity are less likely to disengage
from the entrepreneurial process. They suggest that external sources of capital could add more
value to investee firms than private money from savings. As a result, there appears to be a
relationship between a firm’s capital structure and external funds, with firm creation and survival.
Thus, receiving external funding recursively during the early stages could accelerate firm creation
and reduce disengagement, because acquiring these funds steadily during the gestational phase can
increase the share of external funds in the capital structure new venture. Therefore, the underlying
hypotheses are;
H0a: Receiving monitored external funding several times extends firm survival
H0b: Receiving monitored external funding several times accelerates firm creation

3. METHODS
Receiving external funding can happen several times during a new venture’s gestational
phase. Thus, time is a central dimension for this research reported here, and longitudinal studies
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offer the appropriate data structures to follow NEs through time. The Panel Study of
Entrepreneurial Dynamics (PSED) is a representative longitudinal sample of individuals
attempting to start businesses in the U.S. PSED offers substantial research advantages, such as
avoiding the biases found in other longitudinal studies for entrepreneurship, such as the
survivorship and the recall biases. The former happens when the study gathers information about
operating ventures and not for those that disengage during the period of study, while the latter
occurs when surveying established entrepreneurs about past events (Gartner et al., 2004). The
PSED-I and II datasets are the primary sources used in this study
3.1 Sample
The sample in this study resulted from matching PSED-I, II, and the PSED harmonized
transitions database. PSED-I and II offer a representative and a publicly available14 sample of NEs
at the U.S. scale focused on the business formation process. This study provides data on new
venture founders on the timing to create a new firm or to disengage from the start-up process
(Gartner and Shaver, 2012). To be considered a NE during the screening process, the respondent
had to answer that:
a) “[they] considered themselves in the firm creation process;
b) [they] had been engaged in some behavior to implement a new firm—such as
having sought a bank loan, prepared a business plan, looked for a business location, or taken
other similar actions;
c) [they] expected to own part of the new venture;
d) the new venture had not yet become an operating business” (Reynolds and Curtin,
2008, p. 172).

14

Access for PSED-I, PSED-II and the consolidated data set can be found at www.psed.isr.umich.edu
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Based on these screening questions, 830 and 1214 individuals were selected for the samples
of PSED-I and PSED-II, respectively. PSED-I has a maximum of four waves for each entrepreneur
collected between 1999 and 2003, while PSED-II consists of a maximum of six waves for each
case, collected between 2005 and 2012.
Matching PSED-I and II resulted in 2044 cases. However, only those categorized as “good
cases”15 (1599 entrepreneurs) in the PSED harmonized transition dataset were considered. From
those cases, 41 were removed due to the lack of information about household net-worth as other
26 cases because their conception dates were defined after the first interview, adding another
period of observation (before gestation) for those cases which was not of interest for this study
(see Figure 1). As a result, 1532 cases are under analysis for this research.
The period under observation was the entrepreneurial gestational phase. Gestation starts
when conception, and it is completed when NEs disengage from creating the new firm or when it
is finally created. More specifically, conception takes place when two intended activities aimed to
create a firm16 has have been taken within a twelve-month window17 (Reynolds and Curtin, 2008,
2011). Figure 1, based on the work of Reynolds, Gartner, Greene, Cox, and Carter (2008),
describes the entrepreneurship process under the PSED framework, highlighting the gestational
phase in it (Reynolds, 2017; Reynolds and Curtin, 2008; Reynolds, Carter, Gartner, and Greene,
2004).

“Good cases” are those qualified as active nascent entrepreneurs for which there are one or more follow-up interviews
These possible startup activities are: Invested own money; Began business plan Developed model, prototype; Purchased
materials, supplies, parts; Define markets to enter; Promote products or services; Sales, income, or revenue; Leased, acquired major
assets; Talk to customers; Financial projections; Full time start-up work; Saving money to invest in firm; Phone book listing for
business; Established bank account for firm; Obtained supplier credit; Began to organize start-up team; First use of physical space;
Hire lawyer; Business plan finished; Model, prototype fully developed; Signed ownership agreement; Proprietary technology
developed; Invested own money; Investment in legal business; Know listed in Dun and Bradstreet; Signed ownership agreement;
Full-time start-up work; Invested own money; Received patent, copyright, trademark; Signed ownership agreement; Signed
ownership agreement; Invested own money; Full time start-up work; Signed ownership agreement; Invested own money; Full time
start-up work; Full time start-up work. Serious thought on starting a company it is an activity asked, but it is not considered to start
or end counting gestations since virtually all entrepreneurs mentioned it. (from Reynolds, 2017)
17 The specific date that defines gestation is the first of the two activities within the 12 months period.
15
16
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Figure 1 - Conceptualization of the entrepreneurial process period

During the gestational phase, the startup's creation or disengagement from the
entrepreneurial process can occur. The definitions of startup creation and disengagement are
defined in section 3.2.1.
3.2 Variables
3.2.1 Dependent variables
When the objective is to analyze the time-to-events, there is a need for using an event
indicator and either time-to-event or time-to-censoring measurement. Based on the hypotheses of
this research, there are several time-to-event variables modeled: firm creation, survival, receiving
external monitored funding, or duration of gestation period until none of these events happens
(censoring). Time begins with the startup’s conception date, and it is measured as the number of
months-to-event or months-to-censoring.
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The event indicator changes depending on the model evaluated. The first model tests the
underlying hypotheses, whether the recurrent reception of monitored funding matters for firm
survival. In this case, disengaging from the gestational phase occurs when an entrepreneur reports
that no one is managing the startup anymore. The second model tests whether receiving monitored
funding several times affects firm creation. In this case, the event occurs when the entrepreneur
reports start-up profits for the first time, defined as positive month cash flow for six of the past
twelve months in PSED-II and three of the past twelve months in PSED-I (Reynolds and Curtin,
2008). Those cases that have not reached a resolution (firm's disengagement or creation) after the
observation period constitute entrepreneurs labeled as "still trying" and will be the right-censored
cases.
After evaluating the effects of recurrent monitored funding, this research aimed to
understand the factors associated with receiving it. For that exercise, the event is receiving external
monitored funding (REMF). The definition of external monitored funding used in this research is
the same applied by (William B. Gartner, Frid, Alexander, & Carter, 2009a), in other studies done
using PSED datasets (Frid, Wyman, Gartner, and Hechavarria, 2016; Frid, 2014). Virtually all
entrepreneurs use personal and other team members’ funds to invest in their projects. However, in
terms of acquiring funds from external sources, Gartner et al. (2009) note that two categories
emerge with different levels of oversight and involvement: unmonitored and monitored funding
sources. If the former includes funding coming from family members, friends, second mortgage,
or credit cards. These sources are not strictly monitored in terms of how the funds are or will be
used.
In contrast, monitored sources include bank or finance company loans, Small Business
Administration credit, venture capital, and credit coming from a current employer granted after a
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thorough understanding of the business or financial plan. In those cases, NEs must provide some
indication of how they are planning to use these funds or, in case of loans, when they will be paid
back. Also, this type of funding can be subject to governmental policy, through public funding or
through programs to foster and facilitate loans for NEs. Thus, receiving externally monitored
funding (REMF) is the third event of interest.
Since there is no exact date associated with REMF in PSED, it is approximated using the
time from conception to the first interview when the entrepreneur reported receiving its first
externally monitored fund. The subsequent REMF events are the time-gaps in months between the
interviews that the entrepreneur reported receiving externally monitored funds. The PSED
interviews usually were conducted approximately every 12 months 18 for each entrepreneur
(Appendix E). This date is the most effective and accurate approximation of the time of receipt of
external funding. In the case of models explaining externally monitored funding, censoring defines
for those companies that have either disengaged, created the company, or have never received
externally monitored funding during the period of observation.
3.2.2 Independent variables
3.2.2.1 Firm survival and creation models
The effects of REMF on firm creation and survival are analyzed by developing a similar
model that Hechavarría et al. (2016) applied to understand the effect of funding sources (equity
and debt) on the same dependent variables used here. With some adjustments adapted to the
questions of this study, virtually the same variables that Hecheverria et al. (2016) used are included
here, but letting them vary with time. This study included funding times, a categorical variable that
measures whether the startup has not received any external monitored funding (=0), has received

18

While there are some extreme observations, most cases have time-gaps around 12 months between PSED interviews. That is
possible to be seen in the average time as well as the median time between interviews available in Appendix A.
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it once (=1), has received least twice (=2). This variable aims to test hypotheses 0a and 0b, the
effect of REMF on firm survival and creation.19
Wealth impacts the probability of disengaging from the entrepreneurial process (Frid,
Wyman, and Coffey, 2016; Frid, Wyman, Gartner, and Hechavarria, 2016). For that reason, the
entrepreneur’s household net-worth is included. Values were standardized using 2005 prices based
on the recommendations of Reynolds and Curtin (2008). Since this variable was asked only for the
first PSED interview, it is not time-dependent and accounts only for the respondent’s household
net worth. The size of the organization influences the disengagement from the start-up process, as
Carroll and Hannan (2000) demonstrated. For this reason, a time-varying variable that measures
the number of start-up owners (individuals or organizations) for each PSED wave is included. The
variable sweat equity accounts for the team’s total hours of work on the startup, for each PSED
interview.
The number of men on the start-up team (owners) is also included females start smaller
businesses compared to males (Fairlie and Robb, 2009). There are also links between motivations
and aspirations to become entrepreneurs based on race: whites are more internally motivated and
have higher expectations to become entrepreneurs, and on the other hand, unemployment and low
wages motivate African-Americans to start new companies (Sabbaghi, 2018; Singh, Know, and
Crump, 2008). Thus, the number of men on the startup team is included to account for the former,
and the number of Caucasians on the startup for the latter. Because these variables can vary with
time, both are time-varying variables for each PSED wave available. Entrepreneurs’ age is an
essential factor for start-up survival and creation. Hechavarría et al. (2016) used five variables to
control for the number of members on the start-up teams age between 18-24, 25–34, 35–44, 45–

19

It could have been possible to create a variable that measures the number of all funding events, but the second category was
restricted to two or more to avoid the possible correlation with the time that a counting variable of funding events can have.
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54, and 55–99 and the same variables were applied in this study. These variables vary with time,
depending on the number of owners within each age-range20.
Entrepreneur’s growth preference is a dummy variable that accounts for entrepreneurs’
over-optimistic tendencies, leading them to underestimate competition and overestimate growth
aspirations (Delmar and Shane, 2003). Startup’s degree of innovativeness is a categorical variable
ranging from 0 to 3. This variable is categorized 0 when the (a) entrepreneur reports that the
products and services are not a novelty21, (b) their report the decision to not spending funds on
R&D, and (c) report that their new venture is not hi-tech. When the entrepreneurs affirm one of
these three categories, the degree of innovativeness is labeled 1. This variable is categorized 2
when the entrepreneur reports at least two of these and 3 when all of them were affirmed.
A business plan is associated with persistence in the entrepreneurial process, especially if
entrepreneurs develop them one during the early stages (Liao and Gartner, 2006). Thus, a control
for having a plan or not, and for the type of business plan for each PSED wave is included. This
variable is categorical ranged from 0 to 3, and it is labeled 0 when the entrepreneurs did not develop
a business plan, 1 when they have an unwritten plan, 2 when they have an informal plan, and 3
when they developed a formal written plan. Financial projections reduce uncertainty in highly
uncertain markets (Cassar, 2009); thus, this time-varying variable is included, and it is labeled 1
when the entrepreneur report having financial projections in a specific PSED interview and 0
otherwise. Team industry experience is a variable that measures the number of years of experience
in the same industry of the startup for each owner. It is an aggregate of each owners’ years of
experience, and it is also time-varying. Based on the positive attitudes that can emerge towards

Unfortunately, PSED I asked age only for the five more important owners; thus, when one of these variables is “5” it means
that there are five or more startup owners within that range. However, less than 0.05% of total PSED-I observations declared
having more than 5 owners. In the case of PSED II, this number increases to 1.06%.
21 This category measures if products or services to be provided by the new venture were available five years ago
20
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entrepreneurship due to previous exposure to it (McCann, 2017), the number of prior start-up
attempts is also a time-varying variable, accounting for the number of former startups that each
team member individually intended. Since PSED-I contains only the respondent's educational
level, it is measured using a categorical variable that accounts for only the respondents' level and
not the entire team. This variable uses 0 as base if the entrepreneur has a high school degree or
less; tech, community, or some college = 1, college or some graduate training = 2, master's degree
=3, or Ph.D. degree = 4.
A categorical variable start-up principal economic activity is included to control for the
effects of the economic sector. This variable equals 0 when the startup expects to operate in the
business service market, 1 in the extractive sector, 2 in transforming sectors, =3 in consumeroriented sectors, and 4 for other sectors/NA. Also, total funds in logs are included regardless of
the source secured by the start-up team. Gartner, Frid, and Alexander (2012) demonstrated that
NE uses their funds as the primary source of funding during the early gestational phase and as
these individuals advance in the process, their likelihood of acquiring external sources of debt and
equity increases. Therefore, a time-varying variable that accounts for the percentage of personal
funds on start-up total funding is included. Also, a time-varying variable is used, measuring the
unmonitored external funds as a percentage of total startup funding. Lastly, conception lag is
included based on the recommendation of Yang and Aldrich (2012) to account for left truncation
when evaluating firm survival and creation using PSED. This variable accounts for the time in
months of the first interview minus the conception date in months. This variable was interacted
with time to account for the proportional hazard assumption of the Cox regression model (Cox,
1972), described in Section 4.
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3.2.2.2 Recursive funding models
As a second step after analyzing firm survival and creation using Cox regression models,
the goal will be to test hypotheses 1, 2, and 3a, b, and c. To meet these objectives, a set of standard
and conditional frailty models (explained in the next section) are applied. One of the most cited
articles aimed to understand the effects of social and economic origin on receiving funding grants
using PSED is the article of Frid, Wyman, Gartner, and Hechavarría (2016). Receiving “funding”
can happen several times, making it a potential repeated event. For that reason, the models used in
this paper differ from those applied in Frid, Wyman, and Coffey (2016). The same variables
utilized in Frid, Wyman, Gartner, and Hechavarría (2016) were included, to have a threshold to
compare with, adding the specific variables to test the hypotheses of this paper.
Some variables already described are also used for these models. These variables are
conception lag, type of business, level of education variables, number of team's prior start-up
attempts, the number of white/caucasians in team, the number of men in team, percentage of
personal funding in total funding, and the age-range variables. Household net worth was divided
into tertiles to test hypothesis 1. If it is addressed linearly using a continuous variable, it will be
possible to know how an additional dollar of net-worth affects receiving funding. However, and
taking into account that information is lost when a continuous variable is transformed into a
categorical one (Osborne, 2017b), testing a continuous variable adds no value to test the hypothesis
of this study. Using a continuous variable will not help in the objective to know how the wealthier
performs against the non-wealthy. Also, it will not reveal at which threshold net-worth becomes
explicative of receiving external monitored funding. The option of dividing house-hold net-worth
into three equal percentiles was done following Frid, Wyman, and Coffey's (2016) study, which
addressed a similar issue using tertiles.
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In entrepreneurship studies, scholars have measured social capital using different
approaches. Casey (2014) used years of industry experience, and years of management experience,
as proxies for social capital. It is well-known from the literature that entrepreneurs with senior
management experience are perceived as being stronger candidates by third parties, making them
more likely to obtain external funding (Burton et al., 2002). Therefore, team managerial experience
(in years) measures a status-based social capital. Regarding industry experience, Hellmann and
Puri (2002) found that teams with relevant experience in a specific industry are aware of critical
resources and key individuals in that domain.
It is important to highlight that industry experience has been linked with entrepreneurs'
human capital, as well. Previous work experience in the same industry can help entrepreneurs in
enhancing their tacit knowledge on different dimensions, especially about how to interpret
information, and then perceive and evaluate opportunities in the economic sector within which
they aim to operate (Muñoz-Bullon, Sanchez-Bueno, and Vos-Saz, 2015; Shane, 2000). While
recognizing the former, for the goal of this research, which is to investigate the entrepreneur's
access to external funding, it is more important to consider the social capital side of industry
experience. That is because industry experience operates connecting entrepreneurs to funding
networks that may otherwise not be available, or signal lower risk to outside investors, as argued
by Gartner et al. (2012). Thus, industry experience is interpreted here as a status-based social
capital as well. Therefore, team industry experience (years) in the start-up economic sector is
measured as described in the previous section, but it is entered squared since Frid, Wyman,
Gartner, and Hechevarría (2016) found a curvilinear relationship between this variable and
receiving external funding.
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Additionally, Newbert and Tornikoski (2012) quantified entrepreneurs’ social capital
through its networks measuring a specific number of individuals, who have provided resources to
the emerging organization and are not part of the start-up team. To properly evaluate the data,
family and friends were removed to ensure that strong ties will not be related to the weak ties that
can provide an emerging firm with new resources. This approach relies on Granovetter’s (1985)
distinction between strong and weak ties (bonding and bridging social capital). Strong ties involve
significant investments of time and energy, whereas weak ties are acquaintances. Strong ties may
help gain access to emotional support and assistance in the case of emergencies. Weak ties may
especially aid in finding assets (Green and Haines, 2008). It is through weak ties that entrepreneurs
can exploit social capital. Based on the previous, a numeric variable, social capital – bridging, will
count numbers of non-family and non-friend helpers, aiming to measure the concrete
entrepreneurs’ network. Social capital – bonding is another control variable that measures the
number of non-owner family helpers. Table 1 simplifies the social capital concepts and variables
used in this research.
Table 1- Social capital concept, variables, and previous research
Social capital
concept
Status-based
social capital
Network-based
social capital

Variables applied

Previous PSED research that
applied the concepty

Team’s managerial experience (years)
Team’s Industry experience (years)

Casey (2014)

Bridging social capital (numberf of people)

Newbert an Tornikoski (2012)

Regarding hypothesis 3a, 3b, and 3c, the aim is testing three signals that might reduce
asymmetrical information. A business plan is measured as described previously, as well as
financial projection. Regarding patents, they are placed into the same question as other signals: the
specific question is: “there are trademarks, and copyrights (as well as patents) granted for the
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new venture?”. Thus, the variable patents, trademarks, and copyrights granted will = 1 when the
entrepreneurs answered “yes” to the last question, otherwise is coded = 0.
Following Frid, Wyman, Gartner, and Hechavarrِía (2016), this study includes another set
of control variables. Startups located in or near a metropolitan area have more opportunities to
acquire formal, external financing compared to those in rural zones. Thus, a dummy variable, new
venture in metropolitan area will be coded = 1 when the startup is located in metro areas, otherwise
will be coded 0. The start-up legal form coded as 0 = sole- proprietorship (base); 1=partnership;
2=limited liability company; 3=C- or S-corporation; and 4=not yet determined; 5=other. Startup
type codes are 0= independent new venture; 1=takeover of existing business; 2=franchise;
3=multilevel marketing initiative; and 4=startup sponsored by an existing business22.
3.3 Models
The first objective of this study is the impact of REMF on event occurrence while
controlling for a wide range of fixed and time-varying covariates, using a similar model as
Hechavarría's et al. (2016). The event of interest is exiting the gestational phase via either new
firm creation or giving up the intention to do so. Previous efforts exploring external funding during
startup gestation did not use event history analysis techniques and, therefore, did not account for
censoring (Frid, 2014; Gartner et al., 2012). Consequently, this research uses event history analysis
and employed two Cox proportional hazards regressions (Cox, 1972) to investigate, if receiving
funding more than one-time impacts positively on either firm survival or firm creation.
Based on Allison (2014), the modeling strategy is as follows. The probability that an
entrepreneur experiences firm creation in the interval from t to t + s, given that the entrepreneur
was at “risk” at time t, is denoted P(t, t + s). This probability is divided by s, which is the length

22

Procedures in R-script for variable construction and models can be provided by contacting the author.
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of the time interval, and if s become smaller until the ratio reaches a specified limit, it is defined
as the continuous-time hazard, denoted by λ(t), formally

𝑃(𝑡, 𝑡 + 𝑠)
𝑠→0
𝑠

𝜆(𝑡) = 𝑙𝑖𝑚

A basic Cox regression model aims to explain the continuous-time hazard for subject i as
formally defined

𝜆𝑖 (𝑡) = 𝜆0 (𝑡)𝑒 𝑋𝑖 𝛽+𝑋𝑖 +𝛿
where the baseline hazard function λ0 is unspecified, is interpreted as the hazard function for
subject i whose covariates all have the value of zero. Consequently, Cox models do not have an
intercept term. The second part of the equation shows a linear function of an exponentiated set of
β covariates, some of them fixed and others time-varying. The δ coefficient is the categorical
variable external monitored funding times aimed to test Hypothesis 0.
A different model set that accounts for the repeated nature of receiving external monitored
funding was developed to explore associated with recurrent financing. Since REMF allowances
can occur more than one time during the gestational phase, a methodological approach designed
to explain repeated events is needed. If the repeated nature of a potential recurrent event is taken
into account, estimators can be biased (Amorim and Cai, 2015; Allison, 2014; Mills, 2014; Twisk,
Smidt, and De Vente, 2005). The Cox model is both biased and inefficient in typical repeated event
problems due to the correlation among events. Using a simple Cox model in for addressing
repeated events violate the assumption that events are independent (Box-Steffensmeier and De
Boef, 2006).
There are several advantages of using recurrent event models; addressing heterogeneity
issues is being the most prominent. In addition, some NEs can be “frailer” than others. For
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example, they have different levels of information about funding sources, how to complete forms,
the funding process in general, and other unobservable characteristics that make some NEs more
likely to receive external monitored funding. When there is heterogeneous susceptibility to the risk
of recurrent events, the frailty model must be applied (Amorim and Cai, 2015).
Frailty models incorporate heterogeneity into the estimator by making assumptions about
the frailty distribution and including it in the model estimates. The underlying logic of frailty
models for the research questions explored here is that some entrepreneurs are inherently more or
less likely to obtain REMF than others, and the distribution of these effects can be approximated.
Frailty models treat repeated events as a particular case of more general unit-level heterogeneity.
In this case, the random effect is across entrepreneurs and constant over time, as seen in the formula
below

𝜆𝑖 (𝑡) = 𝜆0 (𝑡 − 𝑡𝑘−1 )𝑒 𝑋𝑖𝑘𝜈+𝑋𝑖𝑘𝜋+𝑋𝑖𝑘𝜌+𝑋𝑖 𝛽+𝜔𝑖
where Xi is the ith row of a covariate matrix X. The frailty model incorporates a random effect ω
to the Cox regression equation that represents the subgroup for individual frailties, assumed to be
an independent sample of a distribution with a mean 0 and a variance of 1. The term (t − t

k−1)

accounts for the gap time structure, meaning the hazard gives the risk for event k since the previous
event occurred. β gives the effect parameters of the control variables, while ρ, π, and ν, the effect
of wealth, social capital, and signals parameters to test Hypothesis 1-3c.
In addition, if it is reasonable to assume that the occurrence of an event affects its reoccurrence, a conditional frailty model can address this issue by letting the baseline hazard vary
for each event (Box-Steffensmeier and De Boef, 2006). Therefore, a conditional frailty model was
applied,
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𝜆𝑖𝑘 (𝑡) = 𝜆0𝑘 (𝑡 − 𝑡𝑘−1 )𝑒 𝑋𝑖𝑘𝜈+𝑋𝑖𝑘𝜋+𝑋𝑖𝑘𝜌+𝑋𝑖 𝛽+𝜔𝑖
where k denotes the event number; λ0k is the baseline hazard rate that varies by event number k; (t
−t

k−1)

incorporates a gap time structure so that the hazard gives the risk for event k since the

previous event occurred; X is a vector of independent variables which may be time-varying; and β
gives the effect parameters, while the standard frailty model ρ, π, ν, parameters account for the
effect of wealth, social capital, and signals for testing Hypothesis 1-3c. The remaining portion of
the hazard incorporates the random effect. Each subject i has a random effect that is shared and
constant over time (across events) and ω is a vector containing unknown frailties.
4. RESULTS
4.1 Firm survival and creation
In an event model, the dependent variable is composed of an event indicator and a measure
of time from the baseline to the event or censoring. The disengagement from the entrepreneurial
process and firm creation (births) are the first events of interest of this research. In the first case,
the interest relies on those who do not disengage (survival). As seen in Table 2, on average, NEs
take about 43 months to reach some outcome event, 26% of startups finally became a new firm,
and 44% disengage from the entrepreneurial process in the observation period.
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Table 2 – Descriptive Statistics, for firm survival and creation
Firm creation and Survival Models
Mean
S.D.
Dependent variables
Time months
Firm birth
Disengagement from the entrepreneurial process
Independent variables
Times received external monitored funding
Demographic controls
Education
Number of men in the team
Number of white/Caucasians in team
Total number of under 24 years old team members
Total number of 25-34 years old team members
Total number of 35-44 years old team members
Total number of 45-54 years old team members
Total number of above 54 years old team members
Entrepreneurs’ experience and intentions controls
Team industry experience in the start-up economic sector (years)
Number of team's prior start-up attempts
Growth preference dummy, "as large as possible" =1
Startup characteristics controls
Number of people or institutions that owns the start-up
Degree of innovativeness
Business plan
Financial projections, "have developed financial projections" = 1
Type of business
Financial controls
Household net worth, 2005 prices
Personal funding / total funding
Unmonitored external funding / total funding
Total startup funding (log)
Team's sweat equity (total hours)
Other controls
Conception lag

43.29
0.26
0.41

31.12
0.44
0.49

0.31

0.62

1.42
0.89
1.34
0.12
0.32
0.44
0.45
0.38

1.04
0.94
1.25
0.45
0.65
0.68
0.66
0.69

14.75
1.87
0.22

16.36
3.87
0.41

1.86
0.81
0.79
0.20
1.37

2.81
0.90
1.12
0.40
1.34

803,281
44.18
10.24
5.49
2610

7645779
45.21
23.21
4.82
6381

33.07

28.40

In this research, the key independent variable of interest when evaluating firm survival and
creation how many times it was funded during the entrepreneurial process. Receiving monitored
external funding show a mean value of 0.31, meaning that most of the firms did not receive any
external monitored funding. External funding is not the most common source of funding for
entrepreneurs, and as it is known from the work of Frid (2014) that most of the entrepreneurs use
their funds as the principal source of funding.
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One of the advantages of this research is the wide range of control variables applied (21).
These variables ranged from entrepreneurs’ demographic variables, their trajectories and future
intentions regarding the startup, its characteristics, and the entrepreneurs’ financial origin and
investments. Among the demographic characteristics of the entrepreneurs, on average, they are
educated, work in small teams, are males within 35- and 54 years old, and are from Caucasian
ethnicity. Specifically, it is worth noting that most founding teams have at least a college degree
since the education mean is 1.42. Entrepreneurs tend to work together ins small teams since on
average, the number of people or institutions that owns the start-up is 1.8. Also, the average number
of males on the startups of this sample is 0.9, meaning that in most entrepreneurial teams it is
possible to find at least one male member. Also, most start-ups have one person of Caucasian
ethnicity, because the mean is above 1 (1=Caucasian). Regarding age, 35–44 and 45–54 years of
age are the most common age ranges for start-up team members.
Regarding entrepreneurial trajectories and intentions, entrepreneurs are experienced in
their economic sector, have intended to create companies before, and do not show high aspirations
in terms of their startup growth. As seen in Table 2, founding teams shows a mean of 14.7 years
of industry experience and have, on average, engaged in 1.8 start-ups. Most entrepreneurs (78%)
want to create a new company that is easy to manage, and only 22% of entrepreneurs want to
maximize the growth of their startups.
Entrepreneurs create startups that are not technologically sophisticated on average. Also,
they do not prepare their business using a business plan nor financial projections and aim to operate
in the service sector. The degree of innovativeness accounts for an average of 0.81, which indicates
that the vast majority do not aspire to offer new products or services and do not invest in R&D.
Most of the entrepreneurs indicate they do not have a business plan, since the mean is 0.79, and
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only 20% have completed financial projections. A mean of 1.3 in the type of business informs that
the majority operates in the business services sector. The distribution of this variable shows that
43% of startups will do business in the business services sector (base category), 4% in the
extractive activities, 19% in transforming industries, 33% in consumer-oriented sectors, and 1%
in other activities.
Financially, most of the entrepreneurs in this study are economically affluent, tend to use
their funds for financing the startup instead of unmonitored external funds, and spent working a
high number of hours on them. Specifically, the average household net worth in the sample is
approximately $803,20023. and the percentage of personal funds on the total startup funding
average is 44.18, meaning, as previous studies identified as well, that it is the most used funding
source for startups compared to unmonitored external funding, which is on average only 10.24.
The average amount of total funds (in logs) invested in the startup is 5.49, which is around
$100.000, while the total working hours on the startup for teams is 2610.
Hypotheses 0A and 0B were tested by fitting two Cox-regressions (Cox, 1972). For the
analyses, the statistical models were performed using R packages survival (Therneau and Lumley,
2015) and survminer (Kassambara, Marcin, Przemyslaw, and Scheipl, 2018). Using the surv
command, this set of regressions analyzed data from the 1532 NEs. First, a Cox regression was fit
using the firm disengagement from the entrepreneurial process as the event of interest. Next, a Cox
regression using firm creation as the event investigated. In both models, cases that are still trying
to create the firm are right-censored. To analyze time-varying variables, the dataset was
transformed from wide to long format using the survSplit function of the survival R package. After

23

The trimmed mean (0.025 for each distribution side) is around 245000, meaning that few households are accounting for a high
net worth influencing on the mean results.
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this transformation, each row represents an entrepreneur’s specific month during the gestational
phase until an event happens.
In this sample, 406 cases reached new firm status, 630 were disengaged, and 495 are
censored (still trying). Figure 2 presents Kaplan-Meier estimates for those new ventures in the
still-trying phase. The analysis focused on parameter δ, which estimates the effect of a categorical
variable aimed to measure how many times startups received external monitored funds. In Figure
2, the number 1 represents the total startups, and any reduction from 1 means a startup that
disengaged from the entrepreneurial process. Based on these estimates, 90% of startups that
receive funding at least two times (blue line) do not disengage from the entrepreneurial process
during the period of observation. Interestingly, startups that received external funding one time
(green line) disengage in similar numbers to those that have never receive external monitored
funding (red line).
Figure 2 – Kaplan-Maier estimates for firm survival, stratified by the number of external
monitored funding received
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The survival function of startups that receive funding one time and those that never
received start to look very similar after 80 months of being in the entrepreneurial process.
Therefore, it seems that all the benefits of being funded one time might have for firm survival
disappear if the startup does not receive another monitored external funding before its first 80
operating months. This finding reinforces the central thesis of this study: receiving external
monitored funding recurrently during the gestational phase is vital for startup survival.
Table 3 presents the empirical results. Model 1 evaluates firm survival. At least one of the
covariates contributes significantly to the explanation of the duration of the events of interest. The
likelihood-ratio chi-square statistic is the difference between -2 partial log-likelihood for the model
with 36 covariates and the null model with no covariates. Since its p-value is <0.001, it is possible
to reject the null hypothesis of the model’s overall significance. The proportional hazard
assumption implied in a cox model was met: Schoenfeld residual is >0.05. Since conception lag
was not meeting this assumption in a previous model (not shown), an interaction was included
between this variable and time, following as Allison, (2014) and Mills', (2014) recommendation,
and therefore the proportional hazard assumption was met.
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Table 3 – Cox Regression Models, firm survival and creation
MODEL 1:
Cox regression model
(new venture disengagement)

MODEL 2:
Cox regression model
(new firm creation)

COEF

SE

Exponentiated
coefficient

COEF

SE

Exponentiated
coefficient

-0.31*
-1.22***
0.00*
0
-0.00*
0.01
0.09*
-0.03
0.19**
0.02
0.08
-0.12
0.16

-0.14
-0.34
0
-0.01
0
-0.06
-0.03
-0.1
-0.07
-0.08
-0.08
-0.08
-0.1

0.73*
0.30***
1.00*
1.00
1.00*
1.01
1.09*
0.97
1.21**
1.02
1.08
0.89
1.17

0.1
0.43*
0
-0.06
0
-0.02
0.05
0.17
0.19
0.12
0
0.03
-0.28*

-0.15
-0.18
0
-0.06
0
-0.07
-0.04
-0.13
-0.1
-0.1
-0.1
-0.1
-0.13

1.11
1.54*
1.00
0.94
1.00
0.98
1.05
1.19
1.21
1.13
1.00
1.03
0.76*

-0.09
-0.14
-0.09

-0.09
-0.12
-0.19

0.91
0.87
0.91

0.03
0.24
-0.28

-0.12
-0.14
-0.23

1.03
1.27
0.76

-0.08
-0.02
-0.49*
0.40**
-0.01***
0

-0.21
-0.16
-0.21
-0.12
0
-0.02

0.92
0.98
0.61*
1.49**
0.99***
1.00

-0.13
0.32*
0.3
-0.16
0.01**
0.01

-0.23
-0.14
-0.17
-0.14
0
-0.01

0.88
1.38*
1.35
0.85
1.01**
1.01

-0.23*
-0.08
-0.32
-0.64*

-0.11
-0.11
-0.18
-0.28

0.79*
0.92
0.73
0.53*

0.15
0.02
0.02
0.14

-0.14
-0.16
-0.21
-0.27

1.16
1.02
1.02
1.15

0.1
0.24*
0.11
0.02
-0.11**
-0.01**
-0.01*

-0.24
-0.11
-0.09
-0.5
-0.04
0
-0.01

1.11
1.27*
1.12
1.02
0.90**
0.99**
0.99*

-0.29
-0.13
-0.12
-0.74
-0.02
0
0

0.57
1.43**
0.99
0.46
1.05*
1.00
1.00

Conception lag

-0.06***

-0.01

0.94**

-0.01

0.96***

Conception lag*time

0.00***

0

1.00***

-0.57
0.36**
-0.01
-0.77
0.05*
0
0
0.04***
0.00***

0

1.00***

Funding: never received external monitored funding, base = 0
Monitored external funding one time
Monitored external funding at least two times
Household net worth, 2005 prices
Number of people or institutions that owns the start-up
Team's sweat equity (total hours)
Number of men in team
Number of white/caucasians in team
Total number of under 24 years old team members
Total number of 25-34 years old team members
Total number of 35-44 years old team members
Total number of 45-54 years old team members
Total number of above 54 years old team members
Growth preference dummy, "as large as possible" =1
Degree of innovativeness, base = 0
Degree of innovativeness 1
Degree of innovativeness 2
Degree of innovativeness 3
Business plan, base no business plan = 0
Unwritten business plan
Informal business plan
Formally written business plan
Financial projections, "have developed financial projections" = 1
Team industry experience in the start-up economic sector (years)
Number of team's prior start-up attempts
Respondent education (base, high school degree or less)
Tech, community, or some college
College or some graduate training
Master's degree
PhD degree
Start-up principal economic activity, base business services =0
Extractive sector
Transforming sectors
Consumer oriented sectors
Other sectors/NA
Total startup funding (log)
Personal funding / total funding
Unmonitored external funding / total funding

Likelihood ratio χ2
Proportional Hazard test
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05

883.4***, on 35 df
0.61

166.6***, on 35 df
0.30

By examining the hazard ratios in Model 1, specifically the exponentiated coefficients
column reported in Table 3, it is possible to explore the nature of the relationship between variables
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and time to these events. If the estimated hazard ratio is greater than 1 for any variable of interest,
higher levels of that covariate are associated with a higher incidence of disengagement, controlling
for other variables in the model. For those firms that received externally monitored funding, results
indicate the startup’s hazard of disengagement is 73% of those startups that did not receive (pvalue<0.05); start-ups which received monitored funding two or more times during gestation were
revealed to be 30% of those that start-ups that did not receive any funding (p-value <0.001).
Other covariates of interest account for similar relationships found by Hechavarría et al.
(2016). As mentioned previously, the main difference between the models of this study and those
of Hecheverria et al. (2016) is the time-varying nature of many of the covariates added, with
subsequent differences in results between the two studies. For example, holding all variables
constant, each additional dollar of the entrepreneurs’ household net worth slightly raises the
likelihood of disengagement (0.000006%) while in Hechavarria et al’s. model this variable was
not significant to explain this event.
Sweat equity slightly reduces disengagement; for each additional hour of teamwork, the
monthly hazard of disengagement decreases by 0.2%. Similarly, each additional Caucasian
member on the start-up team reduces monthly disengagement from the gestational phase by 8.8%.
As predictable, NEs whose business plan is formally written have a 21% hazard of disengagement
compared to those without any business plan. Unexpectedly, the hazard ratio of disengagement of
those entrepreneurs who have developed financial projections is 1.5 compared to those who have
not developed one. For every team’s year of industry experience in the same economic activity
that the startup will operate, monthly disengagement hazard decreases by 1.3%. Respondent
education accounts for an interesting association; the monthly disengagement hazard of those
respondents who have a tech, community, or some college degree is 0.79% of those with a high
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school diploma or less. Ph.D. degree-holding entrepreneurs show a monthly disengagement hazard
of 53% of those who have a high school diploma or less. Other educational categories were not
significant compared to those who have a high school diploma or less.
The only statistically significant comparisons among economic sector categories of the
startups are those that aim to operate in the transforming sector. These startups are more likely to
disengage compared to those in the business services (base category): their monthly
disengagement hazard is +12% of those who plan to operate in the business service sector. Each
additional increment in total startup funding (in logs) reduces monthly disengagement hazard by
11%. In addition, for each additional percentage increment in private and external unmonitored
funding on total startup funding, disengagement decreases by approximately 1.20%. The only agerange variable that shows significant relationship with time to disengagement was the number of
owners age ranged 25-34 (exp coefficient = 1.21, p value< 0.01), meaning that for each additional
owner in that age new ventures survive; disengagement hazard decreases by 21% for each
additional team member between 25 and 34 years old. The size of the startup team, men, growth
preference, degree of innovativeness, and prior start-up attempts did not show any significant
statistical relationship with time to disengagement.
Figure 3 shows the Kaplan-Meier estimate for firm creation, illustrating that companies
that receive funding twice (blue line) are created faster than those funded once (green line) or never
received funding (red line). Approximately 70 months from conception, close to 50% of startups
that received external monitored funding at least two times were born. In the case of those that
receive external monitored funding one time, it took around 100 months to reach the 50% creation
mark. Startups that never received funding required 130 months to reach the same milestone.
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However, it is worth noting that confidence intervals overlap each other after month 100, due to
the small number of cases that survive until that time.
Figure 3 – Kaplan-Maier estimates for firm creation, stratified by the number of external
monitored funding received

Model 2 evaluates the time to the firm creation. At least one of the covariates contributes
significantly to the explanation of firm creation. The null hypothesis of the model’s overall
significance is rejected, and the proportional hazard assumption was met. The model reveals that
startups funded at least twice are 54% more likely to become a firm compared to start-ups that
never received funding (Table 3). This effect is insignificant when comparing one-time funded
startups to those that never received externally monitored funds. Figure 3 illustrates the slight
differences between K-M estimates for the never-funded startups (red line) and those funded once
(green line), especially during the first 100 months up the gestational phase.
Holding all variables constant, for those entrepreneurs that declared the intention of
growing its startup “as large as possible,” results reveal a 24% less chance of creating a firm
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compared to those who declared planning to maintain their company at a “manageable size.” The
firm creation hazard of entrepreneurs that developed an informal business plan is +38% of those
who do not have one, and that number is +35% for whom that developed a formal written plan
(but significant at the 10% level). For each additional year of experience of the team in the same
economic sector, the hazard of firm creation increases slightly more than 1%. When compared to
startups that will operate in the business service sector, the firm creation hazard is +43% of
planning to do it in the transforming sector. Finally, each additional increment in total startup
funding (in logs) increases monthly firm creation hazard by 5%.
None of the age-range variables show a significant relationship with time to firm creation.
None of the following variables are significant in addition: the entrepreneurs’ household net-worth,
the number of people or institutions that own the start-up, team's sweat equity (total hours), number
of white/Caucasians in the team, degree of innovativeness, the financial projections, the prior startup attempts, the percentage of personal or unmonitored external funding on total startup funding.
4.2 Firm funding
As previously stated, a startup could receive monitored funding many times during its
gestational phase. This research accounts for this by analyzing the repeated nature of this event,
and the dataset structure also was rearranged for that objective. Figure 4 displays a hypothetical
example that describes the possible time-structures for this research. This illustration is the case of
a NE who received funding two times in months 6, 10, and his last observation was at month 15.
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Figure 4 - Elapsed, calendar, and gap-times structures, hypothetical example

The elapsed time structure will result in observation with events in months 6, 10, and 15
and would have a start and stop times of 0–6, 0–10, and 0–15, respectively. In a calendar time
structure, it would result in a start and stop times of 0-6, 6-10, and 10-15, while for the gap time
structure these values will be 0–6, 0–4, and 0-5. Gap time is the time-structure that this study uses.
A gap-time data structure was chosen since the underlying hypothesis of this paper argues
that there is an effect from receiving external monitored funding for the first time and in subsequent
external funding events. Thus, the clock should restart after each event to account for this.
Otherwise, if an elapsed-time structure was be selected, the main interest will rely on the effect of
covariates on the kth event since the time from the beginning of the study and not their effect on
the kth event since the time from the previous event. Another possibility is the calendar time
structure, where the focus is on the effect of covariates on the kth event since the time from the
previous event, using a fixed starting point (the first observation). The gap time was chosen over
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this calendar structure since this study does not focus on a specific starting point in time, but it is
on the gaps between events.
As explained previously, frailty models are appropriate when there are issues related to
heterogeneity. Two Cox regressions with a frailty component (standard and conditional) using a
gap-time structure were fitted to explore the factors related to receiving recurrent monitored
external funding. Also, Amorim and Cai (2015) and Box-Steffensmeier and De Boef (2006)
recommend truncating the database when the number of events becomes small to avoid estimators
became unreliable. Thus, the dataset was restricted to 1 (196 cases) and 2 (36 cases) funding
events, since there are only ten startups with three and one with four funding events during
gestation. The dataset is transformed into a long format where each row contains a startup time
with a funding event or censoring time associated, which could be the last time of observation, a
firm creation, or quitting from the startup process. As a result, the long format dataset contains
1764 rows, 1532 startups with this censoring time plus 232 funding events. As Allison (2014)
pointed out, it is necessary to make all efforts possible to account for right censoring when it is
non-random, and that is the case when a startup becomes a profitable new company (firm birth) or
when give up the entrepreneurial process. Thus, firm birth and quitting were included as controls
aiming to reduce the non-randomness censoring in these models.
Table 4 describes the variables of this dataset aimed to test hypotheses 1, 2, 3a 3b, and 3c.
These are the same variables included in Frid, Wyman, Gartner, and Hechavarria (2016) to
understand external funding with some additional variables. In these event models, the dependent
variable is composed of an event indicator labeled “1” for each repeated event and “0” otherwise.
Also, it includes a measure of time in months from the baseline to the first event, between events,
or censoring. The event of interest is receiving external funding. As seen in Table 4, on average,
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the gap times are of 37 months between the events of interest, and 15% of startups obtained
external funding.
Table 4 – Descriptive Statistics, Model 3 and 4
Frailty models
Mean
S.D.
Dependent variables
External monitored funding
Time
Key Independent variables
Household net worth, 2005 prices, tertiles
Team managerial experience (summation, years)
Team industry experience in the start-up economic sector (years)
Business plan (base, no business plan)
Social Capital - Bridging: number of non-owner and non-family helpers
dummy, "have developed financial projections" = 1
dummy, "Patents, trademarks and copyrights granted" = 1
Demographic controls
Respondent education (base, high school degree or less)
Number of white/Caucasians in team
Number of men in the team
Total number of under 24 years old team members
Total number of 25-34 years old team members
Total number of 35-44 years old team members
Total number of 45-54 years old team members
Total number of above 54 years old team members
Startup characteristics controls
Legal form of start-up, base = sole proprietorship
Startup type, base = independent new venture
Start-up principal economic activity, base = business services
Entrepreneurs’ experience, background and location controls
Number of team's prior start-up attempts
Personal funding / total funding
dummy, new venture in metropolitan area = 1
Social Capital - Bonding: number of non-owner family helpers
Other controls
Startup creation
Startup quitting
Conception lag

0.15
37.63

0.44
29.23

2.01
30.01
14.47
0.55
0.96
0.14
0.02

0.82
29.00
16.96
1.00
1.36
0.35
0.14

1.38
1.52
0.95
0.13
0.34
0.46
0.44
0.41

1.03
1.40
0.98
0.46
0.67
0.70
0.67
0.45

2.57
1.48
1.44

1.67
1.15
1.33

2.05
22.98
0.74
0.54

4.89
37.98
0.44
0.92

0.26
0.40
22.81

0.44
0.49
22.34

In this section, the key independent variables of interest are those in the hypothesized
relationships from H1 to H3b. For example, the mean of the household net-worth (categorical
variable) is close to 2 since it is the category of the second tertile24. In the case of team managerial
experience, it accounts for a mean of 30.01 years since it is the summation of the team’s years of

24

Observations with funding more than one funding events appears more than one time in this dataset (more rows), and for that
reason the mean of household net-worth is not exactly 2.
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experience. For example, three startup owners with ten years of experience each will result in a
value of 30 for this variable. Another key independent variable is the entrepreneurial team's years
of industry experience, which shows a mean of 14.4.
Regarding entrepreneurs’ networks, on average, each firm has approximately one nonfamily helper (mean 0.96). Among the signals that entrepreneurs can develop, it is possible to say
that most of the entrepreneurs in this dataset do not have a business plan. However, 5% of them
have an unwritten plan, 12% have an informal written plan, and 9% have a formal written business
plan. About 14% of the cases have completed financial projections, and only 2% have been granted
patents, trademarks, or copyrights.
Among the demographic characteristics, again on average, entrepreneurs are mostly
educated, are males within 35- and 54 years old, and are from Caucasian ethnicity. Specifically, it
is worth noting that most founding teams have at least a college degree since the education mean
is 1.38. The average number of males in startups is very close to one (0.95). Thus, most have at
least one male on the team, while most start-ups have about one person of Caucasian ethnicity on
the team since the average number is 1.52. Regarding age, start-up averages are reported for the
five ranges; 35–44 and 45–54 years of age are the most common ranges for start-ups team
members.
The 5% of the new ventures operate in extractive sectors, 19% in transforming sectors, and
33% in the consumer-oriented sectors, 42% in the business services sector (base category). The
most common startup type are independent new ventures, that account for 82% of cases, while the
other categories range from a 7% of sponsored new ventures to a 4% for a takeover new venture.
The most common startup legal form is unknown, since when this variable varies it is often not
declared (62%) during gestation, while other categories are sole proprietorships (16%),
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partnerships (6%), limited liability company (3%), C or S-corporations (6%), not yet determined
(7%). Lastly, 22.08 is the average time-lag (in months) from conception to PSED initial interview.
In terms of location, on average, 74% of entrepreneurial teams operate in metropolitan areas. Also,
teams’ prior startup attempts average is 2.05, so they are experienced entrepreneurs. The
percentage of personal funds on the total startup funding average is 22.98, and only have an
average of 0.54 of family members non-owner helpers in the team.
Regarding the model, the first relevant result that emerges from the standard frailty model
is the significant within-entrepreneurs correlation seen in the random effect (ω = 1.11, p<0.001).
In the conditional frailty model (stratified by funding event number), while still significant, the
random effect is reduced close to zero (ω= 0.17, p<0.001). Hence, this is a signal that factors
associated with receiving funding previously made entrepreneurs less heterogeneous.
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Table 5 – Standard Frailty and Conditional Frailty Models
MODEL 3: Standard frailty
model, gap-times (event:
external funding)

Household net worth, 2005 prices, tertiles, base = beneath the 33rd percentile,
between the 33rd and 66th percentile
above the 66th percentile
Team managerial experience (years)
Team industry experience in the start-up economic sector (years)
Team industry experience in the start-up economic sector (years), squared
Social Capital - Bridging: number of non-owner and non-family helpers
Social Capital - Bonding: number of non-owner family helpers
Business plan (base, no business plan)
unwritten business plan
informal business plan
formally written business plan
dummy, "have developed financial projections" = 1
dummy, "Patents, trademarks and copyrights granted" = 1
Number of white/Caucasians in team
Number of men in team
Personal funding / total funding
dummy, new venture in metropolitan area = 1
Number of team's prior start-up attempts
Respondent education (base, high school degree or less)
tech, community, or some college
college or some graduate training
Master’s degree
PhD degree
Legal form of start-up, base = sole proprietorship
partnership
limited liability company
C- or S-corporation
not yet determined
unknown
Startup type, base = independent new venture
takeover of existing business
franchise
multilevel marketing initiative
startup sponsored by existing business
Start-up principal economic activity, base = business services
Extractive sector
Transforming sectors
Consumer oriented sectors
Total number of under 24 years old team members
Total number of 25-34 years old team members
Total number of 35-44 years old team members
Total number of 45-54 years old team members
Total number of above 54 years old team members
dummy Firm birth = 1
dummy, new venture quit = 1
Conception lag
Variance of random effect=

COEF

SE

Exp.
coefficient

COEF

SE

Exp.
coefficient

0.51*
0.69**
0.03***
-0.02
0.00
-0.15*
-0.17

-0.23
-0.23
-0.01
-0.01
0.00
-0.07
-0.1

1.67*
1.99**
1.03***
0.98
1.00
0.86*
0.84

0.53**
0.72***
0.02***
-0.02
0.00
-0.17**
-0.1

-0.20
-0.20
-0.01
-0.01
0.00
-0.06
-0.08

1.70**
2.05***
1.03***
0.98
1.00
0.84**
0.90

0.56
0.62*
0.3
0.74***
-1.09
0.16
0.02
0.00
-0.05
0.03*

-0.32
-0.25
-0.29
-0.22
-0.58
-0.14
-0.09
0.00
-0.2
-0.01

1.75
1.86*
1.35
2.10***
0.34
1.17
1.02
1.00
0.95
1.03*

0.61*
0.72**
0.43
0.91***
-0.87
0.09
0.00
0.00
-0.1
0.02*

-0.28
-0.22
-0.24
-0.18
-0.48
-0.12
-0.07
0.00
-0.17
-0.01

1.84*
2.05**
1.54
2.48***
0.42
1.09
1.00
1.00
0.90
1.02*

0.25
-0.14
-0.18
0.33

-0.24
-0.27
-0.35
-0.45

1.28
0.87
0.84
1.39

0.13
-0.07
-0.26
0.35

-0.2
-0.24
-0.3
-0.37

1.14
0.93
0.77
1.42

-0.03
0.16
-0.06
-0.67*
-2.87***

-0.33
-0.36
-0.33
-0.33
-0.25

0.97
1.17
0.94
0.51*
0.06***

0.02
0.14
-0.19
-0.73*
-2.70***

-0.27
-0.29
-0.27
-0.28
-0.22

1.02
1.15
0.83
0.48*
0.07***

1.27***
0.87*
-0.2
0.36

-0.38
-0.42
-0.5
-0.35

3.56***
2.39*
0.82
1.43

0.89**
0.78*
0.07
0.33

-0.31
-0.36
-0.43
-0.3

2.44**
2.18*
1.07
1.39

1.05**
0.58*
0.45*
0.06
0.22
0.29
-0.17
-0.48*
-0.31
0.02
-0.04***

-0.35
-0.23
-0.21
-0.24
-0.17
-0.18
-0.18
-0.19
-0.24
-0.22
-0.01

2.86**
1.79*
1.57*
1.06
1.25
1.34
0.84
0.62*
0.73
1.02
0.96***

0.73*
0.46*
0.43*
0.14
0.27*
0.35*
-0.1
-0.43**
-0.11
0.12
-0.03***

-0.29
-0.2
-0.18
-0.19
-0.14
-0.14
-0.16
-0.17
-0.21
-0.19
0

2.08*
1.58*
1.54*
1.15
1.31*
1.42*
0.90
0.65**
0.90
1.13
0.97***

1.190817***

R2
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05

0.37
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MODEL 4: Conditional
frailty model, gap-times
(event: external funding)

0.1810787***
0.27

Hypothesis 1 stated that less-wealthy NEs would be less likely to acquire external funds
recursively compared to wealthier NEs. Conditional on the unmeasured heterogeneity, event
dependence, and covariates, Model 4 indicates that the odds of a wealthier entrepreneur to get
externally funded since the last funding is about 2:1 in comparison to the non-wealthy. When
compared to coefficients in Model 3, those in Model 4 with less heterogeneity have more power
(significance increased) and are more precise (standard errors decreased).
Hypotheses 2 stated that entrepreneurs with higher levels of social capital are more likely
to obtain recurrent external funding. Recall that social capital was measured using different
approaches, one related to the entrepreneur’s network and another on their status. Model 3 and
Model 4 have very similar results. For every one-year increase of NEs’ managerial experience, the
hazard of obtaining monitored external funds since the last one goes up by an estimated 3%.
Industry experience did not account for any statistically significant effect in Model 3 and 4. The
effect of non-family external helpers could be surprising: an increase in the number of helpers is
associated with a decrease in the hazard of receiving monitored external funds since the last fund
by 15% (once more, this effect is stronger in Model 4). This negative relationship should be
investigated, but it could be the consequence that helpers are also potential funders for
entrepreneurs. Thus, if entrepreneurs have more external non-owner helpers, the need for getting
funding might decreases.
The set of hypotheses 3 aim to test the effects of NE’s signals, postulating that nascent
entrepreneurs that develop business plans, financial projections, or patents are more likely to
receive recurrent external funding. Patents, copyrights, and trademarks did not show significant
results in Models 3 and 4, but it is worth recalling that very few (2%) entrepreneurs during the
gestational phase have granted a patent, copyright, or trademark (Table 4). However,
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unsurprisingly, developing financial projections is the signal that accounts for the highest “hazard”
in reducing gap times for receiving external monitored funding: the odds of being funded since the
last external monitored funding event are 2.5 to 1 for those NEs that develop financial projections
compared to those that did not. This effect is more precise in Model 4 than in Model 3, since
standard errors are smaller in the former. In Model 4, business plan accounts for an interesting
effect: The odds of NEs with an unwritten business plan receiving external funding since the last
funding event is about 1.8:1 in comparison to those that did not develop any business plan.
Compared to NE’s without any business plan, the odds of receiving external funding for NEs with
a non-formal written plan are 2:1. However, the hazard of getting funded for those that have a
formal written business plan shows the expected sign, but only at a 10% level. Model 3 shows
similar coefficients, but with higher standard errors and less power.
Regarding the control variables, an additional prior start-up attempt increases the hazard
of receiving external funds recurrently by 3% and 2% in Model 3 and 4, respectively. Compared
to sole proprietorships, other legal forms show a reduced hazard of receiving externally monitored
funding since the last event. For example, “not yet determined” and “unknown” account for 48%
and 7% of the sole proprietorship’s hazards of receiving recurrent monitored external funding.
Looking at the type of startup, the odds for receiving external monitored funding of takeover new
ventures are almost 2.5:1 of those independent new ventures. In the case of franchises, their odds
are 2.1:1 compared to independent new ventures. The odds of receiving kth funding since the
previous one for those startups aiming to operate in extractive sectors are 2:1 of those in the
business services sector. Startups intending to operate in transforming sectors and consumeroriented sectors account for 58% and 54% of the hazard of receiving external funding since the
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previous funding event compared to business services (Model 4) Always, Model 4 accounts for
more precise and robust estimators.
In Model 4, an additional owner aged between 25-34 and 35-44 reduces the time-gap to
receiving external monitored funding since the last event. For every extra member among 25-34,
the hazard of receiving external monitored funding after the previous one goes up by 31%, and
41% in the case of owners aged 35-44. Contrarily, each additional owner of 54 years old or older,
reduces the hazard of recurrent financing by 35%. This owner age range is the only significant
variable in Model 3 among age-range variables. The number of non-owner family helpers,
white/Caucasians, and the number of men in the entrepreneurial team were not of statistical
significance in Model 3 or 4. Also, the percentage of personal funding in the startup total did not
show any significant relationship with reducing the gap to receipt external funding. Neither did
the following variables: the entrepreneur's household net-worth, the rural/urban location of the
startup project, nor the respondent’s educational level.
4.3. Summary of the main results
This paper provides evidence of the effects of receiving external monitored funding more
than one time on firm survival and creation. Recurrent funding increases both the survival of new
ventures and accelerates their creation significantly, with the relationship becomes statistically
stronger in the case of survival. The Kaplan-Meier estimates show the effect of receiving
monitored funding at least twice has on firm survival, with almost 90% of firms funded at least
twice surviving during the observation period.
For this reason, this study also offers evidence about who receives external monitored
funding recurrently. H1 hypothesizes those NEs coming from a more affluent background obtain
external monitored funding recurrently sooner. The findings provide convincing evidence that
those entrepreneurs have shorter time gaps between each external funding event than less affluent
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counterparts. H2 hypothesizes that social capital reduces gap times between finding events, and
the status-associated dimension of social capital, measured by teams’ years of managerial
experience, confirmed this relationship. However, teams’ years of industry experience is not
statistically associated with reducing gap-times in receiving external monitored funding. Social
capital measured using entrepreneur’s networks shows the opposite direction expected. We
suggested an explanation for this unexpected relationship that requires additional investigation.
The number of helpers who can potentially aid entrepreneurs in obtaining funding may explain
this outcome, an area requiring further investigation.
In addition, this study found evidence that developing signals can reduce gap times in
receiving external monitored funding, as the third set of hypotheses suggested. However, some
signals are more powerful than others. For example, patents were not significant in reducing
monitored funding gap times, but it is worth remembering that only a few NE’s have one granted
during gestation. NEs who developed financial projections reduced gap times in receiving external
monitored funding, while the development of business plans did as well. Both unwritten and
informally written business plan are significant in reducing monitored funding gap times compared
to not having one, although the comparison between having a formal written business plan and not
having one is significant only at the 10% level.

5. DISCUSSION
This study provides evidence that receiving external financing during the entrepreneurial
process is a dynamic process influenced by social factors. Receiving external monitored funding
several times during the gestational phase enhances firm survival and creation. Also, those who
are more likely to receive funding several times during the gestational period are NEs coming from
a wealthy background and high social status. This study provides initial evidence of a potential
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Mathew effect in entrepreneurship financing. However, other factors related to entrepreneurs’
actions in developing signals for investors and lenders are on influence and might reduce this
effect.
This study extends on Hechavarría et al. (2016), a research that examined how the capital
structure of startups impacts on their survival and creation. In our study, the dynamic nature of
funding through the gestational phase revealed the importance of receiving external monitored
funding several times as a critical determinant for a firm’s survival and creation. Although there
are some divergences in results regarding the control variables, most of the outcomes of this
research agree with Hechavarría et al. (2016). For example, they found that firms primarily
financed with external equity show a 47 % increase in the incidence of new firm founding over
time (Hechavarría et al. , 2016). In our models, these variables were not of interest. However, this
study found that receiving external monitored funding several times, which might increase the
external equity in a startup’s capital structure, supports Hechavarría et al. (2016). Additionally,
they found that there is a significant decrease in the incidence of disengagement over time for
startups financed primarily with debt and external equity. In this research, Model 1 revealed that
receiving external monitored funding at least once during the gestation significantly decreases the
risk of disengagement, as well.
Using a different modeling strategy and only data from PSED II, Frid, Wyman, and Coffey
(2016) found that compared to wealthier entrepreneurs, those coming from a low-wealth
background are less likely to acquire external financing. This study found evidence that supports
their conclusion that wealthier entrepreneurs are more likely to receive external monitored funding
several times. Previous research has found that social origin influences the reception of external
funding (Frid, Wyman, Gartner, and Hechevarría, 2016; Frid, 2014). This study showed that
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economic and social origin influence the reception of external funding several times during
entrepreneurial gestation.
However, the models developed in this research analyzed the repetitive nature of the
funding event, suggesting some differences with previous investigations. While race has been
mentioned as a critical factor in explaining receiving monitored funding (Frid, Wyman, Gartner,
and Hechavarría, 2016; Frid, 2014; Gartner et al., 2012), this research found that race is not a
critical factor associated with recurrent external monitored funding. In Frid Wyman, Gartner, and
Hechavarría’s (2016) models, African-American entrepreneurs are less likely to acquire external
funds than Caucasians. However, this relationship was found to be weak statistically, supporting
Casey's (2014) findings regarding the external financial amount that non-Caucasians receive.
Unlike these studies, our research measured race counting the number of White/Caucasian owners
during the gestational phase, and did not find any significant association with the repeated event
of monitored funding. In various other research fields, there are many examples where race effects
disappear after including socioeconomic variables, and entrepreneurship research does not an
exception. In this regard, another possibility to for future research is that race could be an inhibitor
for minority-owned startups to get their first external funding, but, once funded for their first time,
the effect of race as an inhibitor might disappear for further funding events.
The findings from this research also highlight that both business planning and preparing
financial projections are associated with receiving external monitored funding. Thus, the
entrepreneur’s ability to develop signals might affect receiving external monitored funding
recurrently and thus, accelerate firm creation and deaccelerate disengagement. It is possible to
assert that preparing financial or business plans for potential investors likely diminishes the
information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers and subsequently reduces transaction costs
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for both parties. Therefore, the Mathew effect of the wealthier and well-connected entrepreneur is
likely to be reduced if those coming from less privileged backgrounds are more exposed to these
activities. These findings suggest that hands-on financial practice is associated with an increase in
the likelihood of receiving funding recurrently. The heterogeneity reduction found when the model
was stratified by a funding event (Model 4) indicates something a similar pattern. There is probably
a learning process for entrepreneurs for getting funding for the first time, but this cannot be
confirmed, only suspected, based on the models of this research since it was not directly tested. It
is also possible that banks, institutions, and any lender in general, can ask for a business plan after
identifying a viable project. A specific study designed to detect causality could shed light on this
regard.
Other variables were not of significance in explaining getting funding more than once, and
some of them can be even considered a contradiction to what has been found previously. For
example, NEs that invested more personal funds, as a proportion of the total startup funding, are
less likely to get funded recurrently as previous studies suggested (Frid, Wyman, Gartner, and
Hechavarría, 2014; Frid 2014). Contrary to what has been found in Frid, Wyman, Gartner, and
Hechavarría. (2016), entrepreneurs’ private funding investments do not act as a signal for external
borrowers who monitor their money or loans when all funding events during gestation are
considered. These differences should be further investigated. However, one possible suggestion is
that the “skin in the game” hypothesis is plausible just for the first funding received. After being
funded for the first time, and therefore, after "signaled" the project as viable for external funders
by obtaining an external fund previously, there may not be a relationship between the personal
funds invested in obtaining further external financing.
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6. IMPLICATIONS
Time is central to the understanding of entrepreneurship ((Bird & Page West III, 1998), pg.
6) argue that “temporal issues uniquely and explicitly characterize the entrepreneurial process”;
yet, temporal issues are some of the most challenging to comprehend. Time is a valuable, if scarce,
resource, and one goal of this research was to understand whether receiving external funding
several times during gestation has implications for accelerating firm creation or attenuating their
disengagement from the entrepreneurial process. Being funded repeatedly was demonstrated to be
a crucial resource for entrepreneurs to operate and survive the nascent stage of the startup process.
In this study, data from the PSED I and II were used to provide new evidence on
entrepreneurs’ characteristics associated with the reception of external funding. Overall, the
findings challenge the assumed benefits associated with pecking order theory, where entrepreneurs
first use their funds and then attempt to obtain external funding. When the repetitive nature of
external monitored funding is taken into account by letting the hazard vary by event number and
accounting for individual heterogeneity, the personal funds invested in the startup are not of
significance in receiving external funding recurrently during gestation. However, signals that
reduce asymmetrical information for investors and lenders do affect the hazard of receiving
external monitored funding recurrently, as does as entrepreneurs’ social background.
This study has three main implications. First, it adds another piece to the growing literature
analyzing data from the PSED project by presenting new evidence on the benefits of external
funding for entrepreneurs. Specifically, this study considers the repeated nature of receiving
external monitored funding. When time is considered, the time-varying nature of the variables
must be considered as well, leading to outcomes that differ from previous research findings.
Therefore, the need to account for time is emphasized when analyzing entrepreneurial funding.

105

Second, this research indicates that the number and the timing of the external monitored
funding received by entrepreneurs impacts on firm survival and creation. Among startups that
received funding several times, virtually all survived, and a high percentage become profitable
firms. The startups that obtained external monitored funding only once survive longer than those
that never received funding, but only during the first years of gestation. It seems that the impact of
receiving external monitored funding decreases with time, and if the venture does not receive
further funding, its positive effects on survival disappear.
Third, this research also suggests that some characteristics pointed out by the Matthew
effect theory might operate in the entrepreneurial reward system. This study confirms that wealth
and managerial experience are positively associated with receiving funding in shorter periods.
Contrary to what can be inferred from previous studies, the personal funds invested do not seem
to affect the reception of external monitored funding when the repetitive nature of this event is
considered. The same applies to race, measured as the increasing presence of white owners in
startups. Further investigations are needed to understand if these factors only affect the first
funding received. However, factors such as socio-economic background (wealth and status) appear
to be the critical factors for obtaining of getting external monitored funding as well as business
plans and financial projections.
Fourth, as mentioned previously, signals for investors and lenders, such as business plans
or financial projections, positively affects the likelihood of receiving funding more than once
during the gestational phase. These factors are not necessarily related to entrepreneurs’ social or
economic origin. Thus, there is room for

targeted policy approaches that could provide

opportunities to groups of potential entrepreneurs from underserved groups. Entrepreneurial
education programs, hands-on internships, or mentoring can help these entrepreneurs in
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developing skills to formulate business plans and financial projections for their entrepreneurial
projects. Future research evaluating the success of these types of programs and their costs and
benefit would add value to our understanding of this process.

7. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
In this study, startups were not analyzed after gestation, and important limitation because
profitable firms (based PSED definition, when firms born) could be more likely to attract investors
and receive more external funding after gestation. In this research, the focus was on one phase of
the entrepreneurial process. Future research can extend upon this study by more thoroughly
exploring the start-up process during the nascent stage (after profitability).
This study also highlighted the importance of receiving external funding more than once
during the gestational phase and the factors associated with it. However, there is a blind spot about
performance outcomes other than startup creation and survival that could mediate the effect of
receiving external funding. For example, are those startups that receive external funding repeatedly
more likely to transition from a sole proprietorship to hiring its first employee? Have these startups
increased their earnings after receiving external financing? Further research combining new
venture’s performance outcomes and the reception of funding could shed light on these questions.
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CHAPTER FOUR

CREATIVE-ENTREPRENEURS AND NEW VENTURE PERFORMANCE: A STUDY OF
THE CREATIVE CLASS AT THE FIRM-LEVEL
1. INTRODUCTION
Creative Class Theory (CCT) proposed by Richard Florida in his book The Rise of the
Creative Class (2002) had a vast influence on regional studies and economic geography. Today,
when talented individuals’ mobility is thought to be increasing, CCT describes what factors lead
these skilled people to settle in specific regions and not in others, and more importantly, their impact
on regional economic development.
Since the release of Florida’s book, CCT and its relation to entrepreneurship and innovation
have been extensively applied to most of the high-income countries of the world. The conceptual
framework of the creative class has been extended and criticized in the academy, while at the same
time, it has been understood by policy-makers as a critical guide for today’s urban and regional
growth. There is significant evidence supporting CCT’s central thesis, which states that there is a
relationship between the percentage of creative workers and economic development in a region,
specifically regarding entrepreneurship and innovation for U.S., Canadian, and European
metropolitan areas. CCT suggests an alternative way of measuring human capital. Based on an
individual’s occupation, it specifies a set of professions that make up the “creative class,” which
includes scientists, artists, entertainers, and a wide range of knowledge-based professions across
"classic" activities such as management, finance, law, healthcare, and education.
Instead of focusing on the regional level, this paper investigates the influence of creative
individuals at the startup level. The creative class has been found to impact regional levels of
entrepreneurship, but this alternative way of approaching human capital has been overlooked at
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the firm level. Given the significant evidence of the relationship between the creative class and
regional entrepreneurship, this study focuses on new venture projects and their entrepreneurial
teams by investigating the following question: Does a higher number of creative individuals on
entrepreneurial teams improve startup performance?

2. THE CREATIVE CLASS THEORY AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP
2.1 - The creative class theory
According to The Creative Class Theory (CCT), the availability and quality of people shape
differences in regional economic performance; thus, it is possible to classify CCT among human
capital theories. The conventional approach to human capital is based on educational attainment,
usually measured by an individuals’ years of formal education or other indicators such as having or
lacking a bachelor’s degree or postgraduate studies. CCT relies on a different approach, measuring
people’s activities on their work instead of what they have studied. The critical difference between
this occupation-based approach and the classical human capital approach is its focus on individuals’
daily activities instead of the educational level or the economic sector in which people work since
people do not necessarily receive formal schooling for the jobs they perform. For example, one
person without formal information technologies (IT) degree can perform IT tasks in his or her job
for a company not related to the IT industry. The educational background and economic sector do
not entirely reveal what people do on their jobs.
Florida (2002, 2012) theorized that there is a social group, the creative class, with a shared
core of norms and values that identify problems and new solutions by creating new knowledge. The
creative workers are valued primarily for their mental work. CCT differentiates creative workers to
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those who are paid mainly for performing physical tasks, namely the working class, or for their
physical presence, which is the service class.
The creative class also has an internal composition. Florida established a hierarchy of
different creative individuals, the super-creative core, the creative professionals, and the bohemians.
The super-creative core consists of those specialists who focus primarily on research activities,
finding and anticipating new problems to solve. These individuals have a high degree of formal
education and often received a college degree, at least. Engineers, mathematicians, doctors,
physicists, chemists, economists, and astronomers, among others, characterize this subgroup. A
second creative class sub-group is the “creative professionals,” who work primarily on creative
problem-solving. The creative professionals regularly perform tasks that require thinking on their
own and applying and combining standard approaches to fit different situations. They use their great
deal of judgment to create radically new solutions in their work, for example, various management
occupations. Lastly, the third sub-group is the bohemians, defined as those who spend a significant
proportion of their working time performing artistic tasks, such as designers or musicians25.
CCT outperforms conventional human capital measurements based on individuals’
educational levels in accounting for regional development. For example, Florida, Mellander, and
Stolarick (2008) found that while the classical approach to human capital impact positively product
and wealth, the creative class-related variables have been found to have a stronger impact on
employment and wage growth. Similarly, Qian (2017a) estimated spatial regressions to analyze
regional entrepreneurship levels, finding that labor skills, rather than education, are positively
related to high-tech entrepreneurship in the US metropolitan regions. In a second study, Qian
(2017b) examined Florida’s hypothesis with the goal of enhancing his precision; to do so, he

25

The codes used for creating the creative class occupations, variables, and modeling can be provided by contacting the author.
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investigated the relationship between skill categories and entrepreneurship, finding that problemsolving skills, like the ones proposed in CCT, revealed both a direct and moderating effect on hightechnology entrepreneurship regionally.
In summary, the central thesis of CCT hypothesizes a positive relationship between the
presence of these creative workers and regional economic development (Florida, 2002). A higher
percentage of creative workers in a region fosters higher rates of new firm formation and
employment creation. CCT has been applied to several regions of North-America (Florida, 2012,
Kundsen, Florida, Gates, and Stolarick, 2008; Florida, Mellander and Stolarick, 2006; Lee, Florida,
and Acs, 2004), and Europe (Andersen, Hansen, Isaksen, and Raunio, 2010; Boschma and Fritsch,
2009; Marlet and Van Woerkens, 2004).
2.2 The creatives at the firm level
Past research has been found that human capital dimensions influence new ventures through
different mechanisms. Supply and demand factors related to human capital can foster regional
entrepreneurship. From the supply side, the entrepreneur's educational level positively influences
new venture productivity (Fairlie and Robb, 2007; Smith, Collins, and Clark, 2005; Davidsson and
Honig, 2003) as well as a more educated labor force (Subramaniam and Youndt, 2005). From the
demand side, the level of education shapes consumption (Witt, 2001) and fosters the creation of
innovative startups. The demand for more innovative products increases in regions where the human
capital level of the population is high (Buenstorf, 2003).
The classical approach to human capital using education-related variables has been widely
applied in understanding new venture performance. However, the creative class approach, which
questions the classical human capital approach at the regional level, has not been investigated at the
firm level. Thus, this paper explores the latter, specifically focusing on the supply side by examining
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how the number of creative entrepreneurs on startup teams affects new venture performance. The
underlying hypothesis of this study is a superior startup performance among entrepreneurial teams
increases as the number of individuals with a creative background increases. Although a positive
association between a higher creative class presence has been found with regional entrepreneurial
rates, it has not been investigated if the creative class affects the supply side, the demand side, or
both. This paper aims to investigate the supply side, specifically focusing on entrepreneurial teams
aiming to create a new company and evaluating how creative members foster or inhibit their new
venture performance.
One limitation of regional entrepreneurial studies is the dependent variable used. Often,
the outcomes evaluated in regional studies a firms' births or death rates. These indicators are biased
outcomes of the entrepreneurial process, as evaluating firm births ignores a significant number of
projects that are still trying in the creation process at the moment of counting new births (primarily
new registered companies). Thus, using firm births as the dependent variable biases the analysis
of the entrepreneurial process towards the most successful companies. In addition, analyzing
failure via firm deaths also biases the results; as an example, it only counts already registered
companies that stop their operations. There is a significant number of startup projects that fail
before than registration occurs. By analyzing only these outcomes, it is not possible to know how
the higher availability of creative individuals affects regional entrepreneurship. One possibility is
that having more creatives in a region might push the demand for more innovative and niche
products provided by local new ventures. Another possibility is that entrepreneurs coming from
creative occupations, namely in this research the creative-entrepreneur, perhaps can initiate better
entrepreneurial projects, or could hire more such employees. Investigating the last requires
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research at the firm level. The objective of this research is to examine the relationship between
creative-entrepreneurs and their performance at the startup microlevel.
Specifically, the goal is to estimate the contribution of an additional creative-entrepreneur
in the startup team to several measurements of startup performance. The first performance outcome
investigated is the survival of the new venture, aiming to test the persistence of entrepreneurial
projects led by creative-entrepreneurs. Secondly, the transition from own-account to employ the
first worker is evaluated. Then, the analysis focuses on the total number of employees hired by the
new venture. These two indicators aim to examine if entrepreneurial projects led by more creative
entrepreneurs generate a higher level of employment. Finally, the focus moves to startups'
earnings, seeking to verify if entrepreneurial projects run by creatives-entrepreneurs are feasible
in terms of profitability. The last outcome evaluated is the time to reach the sixth month of earnings
in a row.
2. 2. 1 Firm survival
As pointed out previously, creatives individuals specialize in innovative tasks and products.
Therefore, they can create niche markets or entirely new markets where competition is virtually
nonexistent. Companies led by creative-entrepreneurs might seek to operate in those markets, and
as a consequence, increase the survival chances of their new ventures precisely because of the
limited competition they face (Kim and Mauborgne, 2014). Also, innovative entrepreneurs present
higher survival chances of their startups since the demand for new products and services increases
as consumer's wealth increases (Jackson, 1984). It also has been found that innovative firms tend
to survive for a longer time (Cefis and Marsili, 2005) to less innovative ones, and as mentioned,
the creatives are positively associated with more innovative places (Whitacre, Meadowcroft, and
Gallardo, 2019; Knudsen, Florida, Gates, and Stolarick, 2008). Therefore, hypothetically,
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entrepreneurial teams in which there is a higher presence of creative-entrepreneurs are more likely
to maintain their companies operatives for a more extended period; formally, it is hypothesized
that:
H1: Having more creative entrepreneurs on entrepreneurial teams extends a firm survival
2. 2. 2 Job creation
As mentioned previously, creatives individuals are innovative and have a special ability to
solve problems. There is an ongoing debate about the role of innovation as a factor for job creation
or the loss of existing jobs (Ciriaci, Moncada-Paternò-Castello, and Voigt, 2016; Mansury and
Love, 2008; Greenan and Guellec, 2000). However, it has been found that young firms drive job
creation (Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda, 2013; Haltiwanger, Hyatt, Mcentarfer, and Sousa,
2012), and additionally, there is evidence that a higher percentage of creative individuals is
associated with higher levels of job creation regionally (Boschma and Fritsch, 2009), especially
high-tech jobs (Andersen, et al. 2010). Thus, it is possible to formulate the second set of hypotheses
for this study, suggesting that more creative-based entrepreneurial teams will create more jobs and
more quickly. Formally:
H2a: The higher the number of creatives on entrepreneurial teams, the faster the transition from
own account projects to hire the first employee.
H2b: The more creatives on entrepreneurial teams, the more employees hired.
2. 2. 3 Profitability of new ventures
Florida et al. (2008) found that classical human capital is more strongly associated with
the GDP than to creative occupations. Thus, following the logic of applying regional-level findings
to firm-level findings, one could expect no association between creative-entrepreneurs and
profitability. However, since creative individuals are innovation agents and thereby associated
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with the creation of niche markets or new markets, creative entrepreneurs could earn higher profits
by creating pioneering new ventures that face low competition (Kim and Mauborgne, 2014). Thus,
it is hypothesized that:
H3: The higher the number of creative in entrepreneurial teams, the faster the firm will reach the
profitability status of their new ventures.

3. METHODS
3.1 Scope and unit of analysis
The relationship between creative class and entrepreneurship has been investigated
primarily by regional and urban scholars. As Perry reviewed (2011), CCT provides three primary
types of evidence regarding its connection to economic development, at times using
entrepreneurship-related variables as proxies. The most important approach explores situations
where regionally the creative class is higher, using statistical methods to verify hypothetical
relationships to determine superior business performance. The second approach tries to explain
why there is a relationship between CCT and entrepreneurship, primarily mostly on case studies
and qualitative methods, gathering primary information on individual participants in various urban
settings. The third approach examines the regional context by focusing on policies, local
features. While the first approach prevailed among CCT scholars, it has rarely informed about
causal relationships. In these approaches analyzed by Perry, the unit of analysis was a region, such
as a country, a state, or a metropolitan area. In contrast, the unit of analysis of this study is the
entrepreneurial team, delimiting the scope of this investigation to the firm level instead of the
regional level to analyze the impact of creative-entrepreneurs on startup performance, during the
gestational phase.
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The PSED project defines startup gestation as the moment of startup conception. This event
occurs when an entrepreneurial team first reports having done a pair of "start-up activities" within
12 months26. The earliest date of this first pair is considered the conception day of the start-up
process (Reynolds, 2017). The startup gestation lasts until the nascent entrepreneur(s) achieve six
months of profitability; this event is considered to be the birth of the new company. Thus, startup
gestation extends until the new company is launched. However, during gestation, nascent
entrepreneurs can disengage from the gestational phase before launching. By observing the
gestational phase, it is possible to investigate the actual transition from not having a business to
operating one in the US economy as well as other factors associated with this phenomenon.
3.2 Dataset and samples
Three datasets were combined for this research: The PSED I, the PSED II, and the PSED
harmonized transition outcomes dataset. PSED-I and PSED-II offer representative and publicly
available27 samples of individuals attempting to start a company at the U.S. scale focused on the
business formation process. It is one of the few studies that provide data on new venture founders
about the timing to create a new firm or to disengage from the start-up process (Gartner and Shaver,
2012). To be considered a nascent entrepreneur during the screening process, the respondent had
to answer positively that they ‘‘(a) considered themselves in the firm creation process; (b) had
been engaged in some behavior to implement a new firm—such as having sought a bank loan,

26 As

mentioned in the previous chapter, these startup activities are: Invested own money; Began business plan Developed model,
prototype; Purchased materials, supplies, parts; Define markets to enter; Promote products or services; Sales, income, or revenue;
Leased, acquired major assets; Talk to customers; Financial projections; Full time start-up work; Saving money to invest in firm;
Phone book listing for business; Established bank account for firm; Obtained supplier credit; Began to organize start-up team; First
use of physical space; Hire lawyer; Business plan finished; Model, prototype fully developed; Signed ownership agreement;
Proprietary technology developed; Invested own money; Investment in legal business; Know listed in Dun and Bradstreet; Signed
ownership agreement; Full-time start-up work; Invested own money; Received patent, copyright, trademark; Signed ownership
agreement; Signed ownership agreement; Invested own money; Full time start-up work; Signed ownership agreement; Invested
own money; Full time start-up work; Full time start-up work. Serious thought on starting a company it is an activity asked, but it
is not considered to start or end counting gestations since virtually all entrepreneurs mentioned it (see Reynolds, 2017)
27 Access for PSED-I, PSED-II and the consolidated data set can be found at www.psed.isr.umich.edu
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prepared a business plan, looked for a business location, or taken other similar actions; (c)
expected to own part of the new venture; and (d) the new venture had not yet become an operating
business” (Reynolds and Curtin, 2008:172). Based on these screening questions, PSED-I and
PSED-II ended up with 830 and 1214 respondents, respectively. PSED-I has a maximum of four
waves for collected between 1999 and 2003, while PSED-II consists of a maximum of six waves,
collected between 2005 and 2012.
Combining PSED-I and II resulted in 2044 cases, but only 1599 respondents are
considered for analysis. These respondents are considered the “good cases” from PSED because
these individuals are active nascent entrepreneurs interviewed at least twice (one or more followup interviews ) in the PSED harmonized transitions dataset (Reynolds and Curtin, 2011). The final
sample size for each model developed here differs. The number of cases under analysis in Models
I to III (Hypothesis 1) is 1544, as a result of dropping 14 cases because their conception dates were
defined after the first interview. These are problematic to this research because, by including these
cases, it adds another period of observation before the conception date. In addition, 41 cases were
removed due to the lack of information about household net-worth, one of the control
variables described below. In the case of Models IV-IX, 25 cases were also dropped due to extreme
outliers detected in the dependent and control variables28. As a result, when evaluating Hypotheses
2a and 2b, the number of cases is 1519. Finally, when evaluating profitability, the subsample
represents those entrepreneurial teams who have not disengaged but have remained in gestation or
created a new venture. Therefore, when evaluating Models X, XI, and XII, the number of cases is
901. All models are weighted to align the PSED II sample to the U.S. Department of the Census

28 This

study followed a conservative strategy of removing outliers by eliminating those cases exhibiting a standard deviation higher
than |6| in any of the variables included in the model, resulting in dropping 25 cases.
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Current Population Survey using the weights provided in the PSED harmonized transition dataset,
ensuring the generalizability of the findings to the population of nascent entrepreneurs in the USA.

3.3 Methodological strategy
The sample from the PSED project is representative of the number of U.S. individuals of
individuals attempting to start ventures between 2000 and 2012. At some point during this
gestation period, every respondent in the sample has started a new venture, has disengaged from
the process, or is still trying to start a business through the end of the observational period. Four
outcome variables are used here to evaluate the contribution of an additional creative entrepreneur
on startup performance, and the modeling strategy varies depending on the outcome variable
evaluated.
Various control variables that previous research found to influence the entrepreneurial
process were also included, as they are likely to influence the startup outcomes. More specifically,
the control variables included are similar to the ones in the models of Hechavarría, Matthews, and
Reynolds (2016), who evaluated new venture survival combining PSED-I and II. When the
times of the first employee hired, the number of employees, and the profitability for six
consecutive months are evaluated, the variables used by Frid, Wyman, and Coffey (2016) are
applied. The outcomes from Frid, Wyman, and Coffey (2016) are comparable to the ones in this
study, except that they used PSED II only and not PSED I and II combined, as in this study. Frid,
Wyman, and Coffey (2016) used the total revenue as a dependent variable, and instead of that
variable, six months consecutive of profits is evaluated in this study. It is not possible to use
revenues when combining PSED-I and II since both projects measure different outcomes:
in PSED-I, asked for expected revenues instead of the actual revenues, are asked in PSED-II.
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Therefore, six consecutive months of profitability, or under the PSED approach, refers to firm
births, is used as an outcome variable of profitability here.

3.4 Dependent variables
The primary interest of this study is to explain variations in the business performance of
entrepreneurial teams. The first outcome analyzed is a performance measure of survival of the
entrepreneur's start-up using the variable QUIT to detect whether entrepreneurial projects have
disengaged or not. QUIT is coded as “1’” for entrepreneurial teams or solo projects who
disengaged during startup gestation and “0” for those remained in gestation and or started a new
firm. This study is interested in those cases that did not disengage from the entrepreneurial process,
the cases coded “0.” The PSED project defines disengagement differently for PSED-I and II. In
the former dataset, it is coded “1” if the respondents claim they have terminated work on the startup, while in the latter they claim little recent work on the start-up, no future work on it, and
that future career plans do not include any new effort on this start-up (Reynolds and Curtin, 2011).
Secondly, as a proxy for how fast a startup project creates jobs, this study analyses the time
taken to hire the first employee. These startups include those that have disengaged from the
entrepreneurial process, or still trying to become profitable firms, or are already profitable. The
time in months from the conception of entrepreneurial projects to the first employee hired is the
time used, and it is labeled “1” in the variable FEMP and as “0” for those startups that never hired
an employee. These last cases are treated as right-censored if they are interviewed in the last PSED
wave and have not hired their first employee yet.
The third outcome variable evaluated also aims to analyze the entrepreneurial teams'
capacity to create jobs. EMPlog, which is the number of employees hired (in logs) for each wave
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in the panel dataset, is a left-censored variable since many entrepreneurial projects never hired an
employee or did not hire one within the PSED's observation period. This situation inflates the
number of zero cases in this variable, and the remaining part of the curve shows a close to normal
distribution. Section 3.6A discusses the special treatment of this variable.
The fourth outcome variable aims to measure the ability of entrepreneurial teams to design
profitable ventures, and it is analyzed using dummy variable PRF6. If the revenues of the new
venture cover all expenses, including owners’ wages and salaries during the last six of the past
twelve months, this variable is coded “1” and “0” if otherwise. The time in months from the
conception of the entrepreneurial projects to the date of six consecutive months of profits reported
is the time of the event “becoming a profitable new firm.”
3.5 Independent variable
The primary independent variable is the number of creative entrepreneurs on the
entrepreneurial teams. Creatives, as mentioned previously, are individuals who make their living
based on their inventiveness and originality. For each entrepreneurial team and each PSED wave,
this treatment variable measures the number of startup owners that held a creative job before
initiating the current startup project. The occupational codes used to compute the creative jobs are
the same provided by the USDA’s Economic Research Service (ERS) using Standard Occupation
Code (SOC), which is available in the PSED datasets, and available in Table 1.
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Table 1 – Occupation of the Creative Class, SOC code
Standard Occupation Code (SOC)
Management occupations
Top executives

11-1000

Advertising, marketing, promotions, public relations, and sales managers

11-2000

Financial managers

11-3030

Operations specialties managers, except financial managers

11-3010, 11-3020, 11-3040 through 11-3070

Other management occupations, except farmers and farm managers

11-9020 through 11-9190

Business and financial operations occupations
Accountants and auditors

13-2011

Computer and mathematical occupations
Computer specialists

15-1000

Mathematical science occupations

15-2000

Architecture and engineering occupations
Architects, surveyors, and cartographers

17-1000

Engineers

17-2000

Drafters, engineering, and mapping technicians

17-3000

Life, physical, and social science occupations
Life and physical scientists

19-1000 and 19-2000

Social scientists and related workers

19-3000

Legal occupations
Lawyers

23-1011

Education, training, and library occupations
Postsecondary teachers

25-1000

Librarians, curators, and archivists

25-4000

Arts, design, entertainment, sports, and media occupations
Art and design workers*

27-1000*

Entertainers and performers, sports, and related workers*

27-2000*

Media and communications workers

27-3000 and 27-4000

Sales and related occupations
Sales representatives, services, wholesale and manufacturing

41-3000 and 41-4000

Other sales and related occupations, including supervisors

41-1000 and 41-9000

*These two categories comprise the arts occupation subset.
Source: USDA, Research Division: available at www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/creative-class-county-codes/documentation

In both PSED I and II, respondents were asked to disclose their and their teammates’ (if
any) previous job. In addition, if new team members join the venture during the period of
observation, respondents must report their previous jobs as well. Therefore, the variable CCE is a
time-varying variable that measures the number of creative entrepreneurs observed for each
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entrepreneurial team (j) in each PSED wave (t). The PSED variables that report the previous job
of the entrepreneur are T(1-5)OCC, R, S, and T-686_1-6, for PSED I, and for PSED II the variables
used are A, B, and C-H1_6, and D, E, F-H1_10. Further, another variable that accounts for the
percentage of creatives among entrepreneurial teams is tested. This variable is calculated using the
CCE divided by the number of startup owners (TEAM), resulting in the variable CC% =
(CCE/TEAM*100).
3.6 Additional control variables
The variables used in this paper are similar to those used in Hechaverría et al. (2016) and
Frid, Wyman, and Coffey (2016). In their study, Hechavarría et al. (2016) investigated the effect
of funding sources (equity and debt) on firm survival and creation. Because under the PSED
approach, the firm creation happens when the revenue received in 6 of the past 12 months covers
all expenses, including owners’ wages and salaries. Thus it is directly linked to the new venture's
profitability. Since Hechaverría et al. (2016) merge both PSED I and II as is done in this study,
the control variables used here are very similar to theirs. However, in the case of the employment
models, the research reported here is unique in evaluating this dimension using both PSED
datasets. After exploring earlier articles on the topic, Frid, Wyman, and Coffey (2016) analyzed
the number of employees hired during the first year of the startup's operations using only PSED
II. In this study, extends Frid, Wyman, and Coffey's (2016) models using both PSED I and II29.

29

Some of the control variables used by Frid et al. (2016) are impossible to be included in the models of this study. For example,
that is the case of "gainfully employed at the decision to start" because is only available for PSED II as well as “community
support”. Also, this study does not explicitly control for "time in gestation" as Frid et al. (2016) did, since our modeling strategy
considers time as an intrinsic part of it (survival analysis and Tobit random effect models using panel data).
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3.6.1 Variables in survival models
Some controls have been found to affect new venture survival in previous studies,
specifically in Hechavarría et al.’ (2016) research. Among these controls, human capital related
variables are those more important for this study since the current theoretical debate is between
this occupation-based approach and the classical human capital approach, which focuses on the
individual educational level. EDUC is the variable used here that measures the respondent's
educational level. Since PSED-I only asks this information for the respondent, it is measured using
a categorical variable that accounts for his/her level and not for the entire team. This categorical
variable has the category high school degree or less as the base (=0), which is compared it with
other four categories, first entrepreneurs who have finished a tech, community, or have some
college studies (=1), those who finished college or some graduate training (=2), those holding a
Master's degree, (=3), and those who have a Ph.D. degree (=4).
As mentioned previously, the creative class approach aims to measure what people do in
their daily tasks instead of what they have studied. Thus, other variables aimed to measure the tacit
knowledge of entrepreneurial teams have to be included. In this sense, INDXP is a variable that
measures the number of years of experience for each owner in the same industry that the startup
aims to operate. Similarly, STPXP, which is a variable that measures the number of prior start-up
attempts for each team member since previous exposure to an entrepreneurial experience can
reinforce positive attitudes towards it (McCann, 2017) can also provide the team with the implicit
experience of being an entrepreneur. Both INDXP and STPXP are measured for each PSED wave;
thus, it is a time-varying variable, and its fluctuation is caused by the number of new entrepreneurs
joining or former members entrepreneurs leaving the startup project.
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HNW is the entrepreneur’s household net-worth, standardized using 2005 prices based on
the recommendations of Reynolds and Curtin (2008); since this variable was asked only for the
first PSED interview, it accounts only for the respondent’s household net worth, similar to Frid,
Wyman, and Coffey, (2016) and Frid, Wyman, Gartner, and Hechavarría (2016). Also, TOTFUND
is the team’s total funds invested in the startup regardless of the source. In addition, FUNPER is a
variable that measures the personal funds invested as a percentage of the total funding invested.
Frid, Wyman, Gartner, and Hecheverría (2016) found that the more personal funds invested in the
startup, the higher the chances of obtaining external funds, which positively impact profitability
(Gartner, Frid, and Alexander, 2012) and a subsequently potentially has a positive impact
on startup survival.
TEAM measures the number of entrepreneurial team members (owners defined as either
individuals or organizations) for each PSED wave. This variable is also included since it affects
disengagement from the start-up process (Carroll and Hannan, 2000). However, the number of
members does not necessarily have a relationship with the effort each put into the startup.
Therefore, the variable SWE accounts for sweat equity, which is the team’s total hours of work on
the startup, for each PSED interview.
Demographics also affects survival. The variable MEN controls for the number of male
entrepreneurs on the entrepreneurial teams (Fairlie and Robb, 2009), and WHITE accounts for the
number of whites-Caucasians (Sabbaghi, 2018; Singh, Know, and Crump, 2008). The number of
members on the entrepreneurial teams aged 18-24, 25–34, 35–44, 45–54, and 55–99 are controlled
using specific variables for each range (AGE<25, AGE35-44, AGE45-54, AGE>54). These
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demographic controls vary with each PSED wave depending on the number of new entrepreneurs
joining or former members leaving the startup project30.
The variable GRW is the growth aspiration of the respondent entrepreneur, coded =1 when
the entrepreneur wants his or her company to be “as large as possible” and =0 when entrepreneurs
want to keep the project manageable “by self or with key employees.” Over-optimism is an issue
for

firm

founders,

and

sometimes

it

might

lead

them

to

underestimate

the

competition, impacting firm survival (Delmar and Shane, 2003). INNOV controls for the
innovativeness of the start-up, measured as a categorical variable adapting Aldrich and Ruef's
(2006) definition, labeled “0” when the start-up is a reproducer venture and “3” if the start-up is
an innovator venture. Having a business plan is associated with firm survival during the
entrepreneurial process (Liao and Gartner, 2006). Thus, BPLAN controls for having a plan or
not, as well as for the type of business plan used for each PSED wave. This categorical variable
ranged from 0 to 3, with 0 representing when the entrepreneurs did not develop a business plan, 1
when they have an unwritten plan, 2 when they have developed an informal plan, and 3 when they
developed a formal written plan. Financial projections reduce uncertainty in highly uncertain
markets (Cassar, 2009); thus, FPRO is a time-varying variable included labeled =1 when the
entrepreneur reports have financial projections for each PSED interview and 0 otherwise.
The start-up principal economic activity (PRAC) is included to control for the effects of
the economic sector. This variable is coded 0 when the startup expects to operate in the business
service market, 1 in the extractive sectors, 2 in transforming sectors, 3 in consumer-oriented
sectors, and 4 for other sectors. Lastly, conception lag is included, following the recommendation

Unfortunately, PSED I asked age only for the five more important owners; thus, when one of these variables is “5” it means that
there are five or more startup owners within that range. However, less than 0.05% of total PSED-I observations declared having
more than 5 owners. In the case of PSED II, this number increases to 1.06%.
30
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of Yang and Aldrich (2012), to account for left truncation when evaluating firm survival and
creation using PSED, measuring the time in months between the first interview and the conception
date.
3.6.2 Variables in employment and profitability models
In their paper estimating the effect of the entrepreneur’s wealth on employment and future
profits, Frid, Wyman, and Coffey (2016) used the PSED II dataset. Since this study combines
PSED I and II, thus, the models for employment outcomes replicate as best as possible those used
in Frid et al. (2016)31. Their variables TEAM, MEN, WHITE, INNOV, STPXP, and EDUC are
included in the survival model developed here. In addition, as in Frid et al. (2016), HELPERS is
a variable that counts the number of non-owner helpers since it can have an impact on the need to
hire employees. The variable PFUND records personal funds invested in natural logarithms. This
variable changes for each PSED interview, depending on the amount invested. MANG accounts
for the team's managerial experience in years, measured only in the first interview, and thus, it is
a fixed covariate. The variable STYPE controls for the type of startup, coded 0 = independent
startups, 1 = takeover, 2 = franchise, 3 = marketing initiatives, 4 = sponsored new businesses, and
5 = others/no reply.
3.7 Models and estimation procedures
To test Hypothesis 1, the new venture’s likelihood of disengaging is estimated using Cox
regressions (Allison, 2014; Mills, 2014; Cox, 1972). Similarly, to test Hypothesis 2a, a series of
Cox regressions estimate the likelihood of transitioning from own account work (entrepreneurial
teams without personnel) to employer (entrepreneur teams with personnel). To test Hypotheses

31

Community support is not available in PSED I, as well as Gainfully employed since only the respondent is asked about this
variable in PSED I; thus, they are excluded for the controls.
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2b, the number of employees hired (in logs) is regressed, and equations are estimated using a
random-effects Tobit regression for panel data (Henningsen, 2010). Also, to test Hypothesis 3, a
series of Cox regressions estimate the likelihood for a team to develop a profitable startup.
When Cox models are applied, this study adopts Allison's (2014) guidelines and the
following modeling strategy. The probability that an entrepreneur experiences the event of interest
in the interval from t to t + s, given that the entrepreneur was at “risk” at time t, is denoted P(t, t
+ s). This probability is divided by s, which is the time interval, and if s is left to become smaller
until the ratio reaches a limit, it is defined as the continuous-time hazard, denoted by λ(t): F

𝑃(𝑡, 𝑡 + 𝑠)
𝑠→0
𝑠

𝜆(𝑡) = 𝑙𝑖𝑚

A basic Cox regression model explaining the continuous-time hazard for subject i is
formally defined as

𝜆𝑖 (𝑡) = 𝜆0 (𝑡)𝑒 𝑋𝑖 𝛽+𝑋𝑖 + 𝜑
where the baseline hazard function λ0 is unspecified, but it is interpreted as the hazard
function for subject i whose covariates all have the value of zero. For this reason, Cox models do
not have an intercept term. The second part of the equation represents a linear function of an
exponentiated set of β covariates, some of which them fixed and others time-varying. The φ
coefficient is a continuous and time-varying variable measuring either the number of creativeentrepreneurs or the percentage of them among entrepreneurial teams, aimed to test Hypothesis 1,
2a, and 3.
Hypothesis 2b is evaluated by fitting a series of Tobit models since they are useful when
an important percentage of observations have the value zero. In this study, using employment data
as the dependent variable highlight the issue of having a high proportion of zero values (i.e.,
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startups that never hired an employee). In this situation, parameter estimates obtained by
conventional regression methods such as OLS are biased. The method proposed by Tobin (1958),
commonly known as the Tobit provides consistent estimates in such settings. The standard Tobit
model applied in this study, following Henningsen's (2010) recommendations, it is defined as

∗
𝑦𝑖,𝑡
= 𝑥 ′ 𝑖,𝑡−1 𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜔𝑖
∗
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑦𝑖,𝑡
≤0
𝑦𝑖,𝑡 { ∗
∗
𝑦𝑖,𝑡 𝑖𝑓 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 > 0

where the subscript i = 1…,n, indicates the entrepreneurial team, and the subscript t = 1, …,n,
indicates time, specifically in this case the number of the interview the PSED dataset; y*i, t, is an
unobserved or latent variable; x'i,t is a vector of independent variables; β a vector of unknown
parameters; and εi,t is the error term. As it is denoted, the independent variables were lagged in
time (t-1), using as explanatory variables the values of the previous PSED wave. While this
research cannot inform about causality, at least it reduces as much as possible potential reverse
causality issues between the dependent and the independent variables. Finally, for each
entrepreneurial team i, there is a random effect that is shared and constant over time, represented
in the ωi coefficient. The variables are included in the same sequence as Liao and Gartner (2006),
who created a base model that includes the control variables first and then introduce the primary
independent variable of interest. Survival (Therneau and Lumley, 2015) and censReg
(Henningsen, 2010) packages are used for model estimation here, using the R version 3.5.2
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4. RESULTS
4.1 Descriptive statistics
The mean of the performance variables evaluated by entrepreneurial teams with either
none or at least one creative entrepreneur can be seen in Table 2. The first outcome variable is the
time from conception to disengagement from the entrepreneurial process, measured by the time in
months from conception until its abandonment, i.e., when the entrepreneur reports that no one is
any longer working on the startup project.
Table 2 – Outcome variables by entrepreneurial teams with and without
creative owners

No creative member
At least one creative member

Months to
disengage from the
entrepreneurial
process

Months to
first
employee
hired

Mean
number of
employees
hired

Months to six
months of
profitability in
a row

34.8
33.9

22.3
21.1

0.9
5.1

31.3
27.7

By analyzing the raw data from 1,599 cases without taking into account control variables,
right-censoring, or nonlinearity treatment, it is possible to see differences among entrepreneurial
teams with one creative entrepreneur compared to those who have none. Unexpectedly, teams with
creative members show a shorter mean time to disengagement than those with no creative
members. On the other hand, entrepreneurial teams with at least one creative member are more
likely to reach profitability with their new venture projects and hire employees faster and in higher
numbers. This previous data should be carefully considered. Table 2 is provided only to show that
there are potential effects based on the number of creative entrepreneurs on new venture
performance that could be worth investigating. To examine these possible associations, a
comprehensive analysis of the outcome variables helps to address the right-censored in all eventhistory analyses and to address heterogeneity issues as well in the case of random Tobit models.
A random-effect model was chosen because it allows estimation of the effects of time-invariant
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determinants. Including a random effect is especially important in this research since human
capital variables, such as the creative background or the educational attainment vary little with
time.
Severe multicollinearity is not an issue for survival models developed here. Chart 1 shows
a correlation matrix for the variables included in the survival models, but only the first PSED
interview given the unbalanced nature of the dataset. The only case of concern is the high
correlation found between time and conception lag (0.7). Including CONLAG in the Cox
regression could result in a violation of the proportional hazard assumption. A special treatment
for this issue based on Alisson’s (2014) recommendation, described in Section 4 for Models I, II,
and III. The second coefficient of importance is between CC and MALE, which has a value of
0.54. The third most important is a Pearson correlation of 0.53 between MALES and WHITE.
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Figure 1 - Correlation Matrix, Survival Models

Multicollinearity was not an issue when analyzing employment and profitability models.
Again, by creating a correlation matrix of the first PSED interview using all variables of these
models, it is possible to see that the highest Pearson correlation is 0.55 between MALE and
WHITE. The second Pearson correlation in order of importance is between FUNP and EMP.
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Figure 2 - Correlation Matrix, Employment Models

Therefore, in both cases, an acceptable amount of remaining variation allows this study to
identify significant effects for the number of creative individuals among entrepreneurial teams.
Thus, including the control variables benefit this research by reducing biases without great concern
of multicollinearity.

137

4.2 Estimation results
Tables 3 to 6 provide the estimation results, where each table corresponds to one of the
four outcomes of entrepreneurial performance. All tables show the results from four model
variants. Three models help to evaluate each hypothesis. Models I, IV, VII, and X serve as a
benchmark and include the only control variables. The second and third models test the hypotheses
utilizing two measures of creative individuals at the startup level: (i) the number of creative
individuals among the team in Models II, V, VIII, and XI, and (ii) the share of creatives on the
team in Models III, VI, IX, and XII. The decision for including both measurements is to obtain
more information about the absolute and relative measurements since solo projects composed 51%
of the original PSED harmonized transition dataset.
Each specification is presented in a three-column format. The exponentiated coefficients
and the 95% confidence intervals are shown for the survival models. Similarly, when evaluating
the employment outcomes using the Tobit models including random effects, coefficients are
reported with their 95% confidence intervals. Also, at the bottom of each table are the results of
the likelihood ratio test, and for the survival models, the proportional hazard test. Results for each
of the performance outcomes are reported in separate subsections below. In each subsection, first,
findings related to the hypothesis are discussed, then the results concerning both creative
entrepreneurs and educational variables, and finally, the results regarding control variables.
4.2.1 Firm Survival
Table 3 presents the empirical results. Model I evaluates firm survival, including the
control variables. At least one of the covariates contributes significantly to the explanation of the
duration of the events of interest since the likelihood-ratio chi-square statistic, which is the
difference between -2 partial log-likelihood for the model with 32 covariates and the null model
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with no covariates, reveal a p-value <0.001. Thus, it is possible to reject the null hypothesis of the
overall significance of the model. The proportional hazard assumption implied in any Cox model
was met: Schoenfeld residual is = 0.51. This assumption was not met in the original model with
no interaction term due to the variable CONLAG, and therefore is not shown here. For this reason,
following Allison's (2014) and Mills' (2011) recommendation, an interaction was included
between this variable and time, and then the proportional hazard assumption was met.
Table 3 presents the estimation results of the Cox regression for startup survival. The risk
considered is disengaging from the entrepreneurial process. To test Hypothesis 1, Models II to III
focus first on the number of creatives and the percentage of creative individuals’ effect within
entrepreneurial teams. Both Models II and III contribute at least one covariate that significantly
explains survival duration. The results from Model II reveal that the rate of disengagement
decreases 13% for each additional creative member on the start-up team. Model III indicates a
similar pattern, meaning that for an additional 1% increase in the percentage of creatives in the
startup team, the rate of disengagement decreases 0.1%. However, it is good to bear in mind that
an actual 1% increase of creative-entrepreneurs among startup owners is unlikely. The addition of
one creative owner will increase the percentage of creatives-entrepreneurs significantly more than
1%, since the maximum number of team members is fifteen (see Appendix F). However, this result
should be taken with caution since it is only significant at the 90% level.
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Table 3 – Cox Regression Models, Start-up Survival Analysis
MODEL I:
Cox regression model
(disengagement)
Lower
Upper
Exp
.95
.95
(coef)

CCE
CC%

MODEL II:
Cox regression model
(disengagement)
Lower
Upper
Exp
.95
.95
(coef)

0.87*

EDUC,
base: high school degree or less
Tech, community, or some college
College or some graduate training
Master's degree
PhD degree
INDXP
STPXP
MEN
WHITE
AGE<24
AGE25-34
AGE35-44
AGE45-54
AGE>54
HNW
TEAM
SWQ
GRW, base: as large as possible =1
INNOV, base = 0
Degree of innovativeness= 1
Degree of innovativeness= 2
Degree of innovativeness= 3
BPLAN,
base: no business plan = 0
Unwritten business plan=1
Informal business plan=2
Formally written business plan=3
FPRO, "have financial projections"=1
PRAC, business service sector, base
Extractive sector
Transforming sectors
Consumer oriented sectors
Other sectors/NA
TOTFUND
FUNPER
CONLAG
CONLAG*TIME
Likelihood ratio χ2
Proportional Hazard test
***p <0.001, **p <0.01, *p <0.05, +p <0.1

0.76

MODEL III:
Cox regression model
(disengagement)
Lower
Upper
Exp
.95
.95
(coef)

0.97
0.99+

0.99

1.01

0.78*
0.95
0.69*
0.54*
0.99***
0.99
1.00
1.06+
1.02
1.25**
1.05
1.11
0.93
1.01*
1.01
0.99*
1.15

0.63
0.76
0.49
0.31
0.98
0.95
0.88
0.99
0.84
1.09
0.90
0.95
0.79
1.00
0.98
0.99
0.96

0.95
1.18
0.98
0.95
0.99
1.03
1.12
1.14
1.23
1.44
1.22
1.30
1.09
1.00
1.02
1.00
1.39

0.79*
1.00
0.72+
0.59+
0.99**
0.99
1.02
1.06+
1.03
1.29**
1.07
1.12
0.93
1.01*
1.00
0.99*
1.16

0.64
0.80
0.51
0.34
0.98
0.95
0.90
1.00
0.85
1.12
0.92
0.95
0.79
1.00
0.98
0.99
0.96

0.97
1.25
1.02
1.02
1.00
1.03
1.16
1.14
1.24
1.48
1.24
1.31
1.09
1.00
1.02
1.00
1.40

0.78*
0.99
0.71+
0.57+
0.98**
0.98
1.00
1.06+
1.01
1.25**
1.05
1.10
0.92
1.01+
1.01
0.99*
1.16

0.64
0.79
0.50
0.32
0.98
0.95
0.88
0.99
0.83
1.09
0.90
0.94
0.78
1.00
0.98
0.99
0.96

0.96
1.23
1.00
1.00
0.99
1.02
1.13
1.13
1.21
1.44
1.22
1.29
1.08
1.00
1.02
1.00
1.40

0.93
0.92
0.84

0.78
0.73
0.59

1.12
1.16
1.22

0.93
0.93
0.86

0.78
0.74
0.60

1.12
1.18
1.24

0.93
0.92
0.85*

0.77
0.73
0.59

1.11
1.16
1.23

0.86
0.83
0.65*
1.44**

0.57
0.61
0.43
1.12

1.29
1.13
0.97
1.84

0.86
0.84
0.66*
1.46**

0.57
0.62
0.44
1.14

1.29
1.15
0.99
1.86

0.86
0.84
0.64
1.45**

0.57
0.61
0.43
1.13

1.29
1.14
0.97
1.85

0.96
1.22+
1.08
0.98
0.99**
0.98***
0.94***
1.00***

0.60
0.97
0.91
0.37
0.99
0.98
0.93
1.00

1.53
1.52
1.30
2.59
0.99
0.98
0.95
1.00

0.94
1.22+
1.10
0.93
0.99**
0.98***
0.94***
1.00***

0.59
0.98
0.92
0.35
0.99
0.98
0.93
1.00

1.50
1.53
1.32
2.47
0.99
0.98
0.95
1.00

0.94
1.22+
1.09
0.93
0.99**
0.98***
0.94***
1.01***

0.59
0.98
0.91
0.35
0.99
0.97
0.93
1.00

1.51
1.53
1.31
2.48
0.99
0.98
0.95
1.01

783.4***, on 32 df
p-value = 0.52

789.4***, on 33 df
p-value = 0.61

787.3***, on 33df
p-value = 0.58

In Chart 3, the number 1 on the y-axis represents the total number of entrepreneurial teams
in the sample which are at risk of disengagement, and the x-axis represents the time in months.
Any reduction from 1 means a startup disengaged from the entrepreneurial process. The survival
curve indicates that entrepreneurial teams with two or more creative entrepreneurs experience this
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event at a lower rate than those with one or zero creative entrepreneurs 32. Entrepreneurial teams
with none or one creative owner behave similarly in terms of disengagement. The results from the
Cox estimations and the survival curve supports Hypothesis 1 that having more creatives among
entrepreneurial team members extends firm survival.
Figure 3- Start-up Survival curve, stratified by the number of creative entrepreneurs in
teams

The educational control variables show a stronger effect before including the CCE and
CC%. For example, in Model I, EDUC is a categorical variable that reveals the odds of
experiencing disengagement for each category compared with the base category (high school
degree or less); three of four EDUC categories were significant in reducing the likelihood of
disengagement compared to those entrepreneurs who have a high school degree or less. After
including CCE and CC% in Model II and III, only one of the EDUC categories describing the
entrepreneurs with a tech, community, or some college background remained significant in

32 The

last also confirms the results shown in Model II. Since the number of creative entrepreneurs in teams ranges from 0 to 10,
plotting survival curve for each number would be illegible. For that reason, CCE has been re-codified to plot the survival curves
into three categories. First, no creative entrepreneurs in the team, second, one creative entrepreneur, and finally, two or more
creative entrepreneurs in the startup.
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reducing disengagement when compared to the base category. Similarly, for each year of the team's
industry experience, disengagement is reduced by 1.2%. This result was significant at the 0.1%
level in Model I, but after the creatives variables are entered in Model II and III, its significance
decreased to 99%, as well as the power of the coefficients to 1%. Previous startup experience
shows no statistical significance in Models I to III.
Other control variables contributing to explaining disengagement and did not vary after
entering CCE and CC%. For example, as the percentage of personal funds in total funds increases
by 1%, disengagement is reduced by 2% for Models I to III. As expected, the total funds invested
and entrepreneurs' household net worth, show a similar effect in reducing disengagement for all
models. The effects of having financial projections and business plans did not vary in Models I to
III either. However, having a financial projection increases the disengagement likelihood by 30%.
This unexpected result could be explained because entrepreneurs with financial projections can
monitor and forecast economic performance, meaning they can anticipate a decision to disengage
as appropriate. Entrepreneurs that have a formal written business plan increase the likelihood of
startup survival compared to those who do not have one. Having additional entrepreneurs between
the ages of 25 and 34 decreases disengagement likelihood. Also, a small but significant effect is
shown by sweat equity, which reduces disengagement slightly.
4.2.2 Transition from own account to employer
Table 4 shows results for the outcome measure “transitions from own-account worker to
employer.” Model IV evaluates the event of hiring the first employee, including the control
variables. At least one of the covariates contributes significantly in explaining the duration of the
events of interest since the likelihood-ratio chi-square statistic, which is the difference between -2
partial log-likelihood for the model with 21 covariates and the null model with no covariates,
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indicates a p-value <0.001, allowing the rejection of the null hypothesis of the model’s overall
significance. The proportional hazard assumption implied in a Cox model was met: the Schoenfeld
residual is > 0.53. It was not possible to meet this assumption an original model which is not shown
here, due to the variable QT, and therefore, again based on Allison (2014) and Mills (2011)
recommendations, an interaction was included between this variable and time, resulting in meeting
the proportional hazard assumption.
Concerning the role of creative-entrepreneur in hiring their first employee, the result is the
relatively stable positive effect of the number of creatives. At the 0.1% significance level, the
results in Model V show that the likelihood of hiring the first employee increases by 20% for each
additional creative member on the start-up team. The percentage of creatives in the team shows a
more robust significance in Model VI, where the exponentiated coefficient accounts for a 0.1%
significance level. Regarding the magnitude of the effect, the results in Model VI reveal that
holding other variables constant, an increase of 1% in creatives is associated with an increase in
the "hazard" of hiring the first employee by 0.5%.

143

Table 4 – Cox Regression Models, Analysis of the Time to Hire the First Employee
MODEL IV:
Cox regression model
(first worker)
Lower
Upper
Exp
.95
.95
(coef)

CCE
CC%

MODEL V:
Cox regression model
(first worker)
Lower
Upper
Exp
.95
.95
(coef)

1.20**

EDUC, base: high school degree or less
Tech, community, or some college
College or some graduate training
Master's degree
PhD degree
STPXP
MANG
WHITE
MALE
TEAM
HELPRES
PFUND(log)
INNOV, base = 0
Degree of innovativeness= 1
Degree of innovativeness= 2
Degree of innovativeness= 3
STYPE, base = independent startups
takeover = 1
franchise = 2
marketing initiatives = 3
sponsored new business = 4
Others = 5
QT
QT*TIME
Likelihood ratio χ2
Proportional Hazard test

01.05

MODEL VI:
Cox regression model
(first worker)
Exp
Lower
Upper
(coef)
.95
.95

1.37
1.01***

1.00

1.01

1.12
1.21
1.37+
1.33
1.01*
0.99
1.05+
1.08
1.00
1.06+
1.13***

0.86
0.91
0.95
0.81
1.00
0.99
0.99
0.97
0.95
1.00
1.11

1.47
1.60
1.99
2.20
1.02
1.00
1.12
1.19
1.04
1.12
1.16

1.09
1.08
1.26
1.25
1.04**
0.99+
1.03
1.08
0.89
1.05+
1.13***

0.83
0.80
0.85
0.75
1.01
0.98
0.96
0.94
0.78
0.98
1.11

1.43
1.45
1.85
2.11
1.08
1.00
1.10
1.25
1.02
1.11
1.16

1.09
1.06
1.28
1.23
1.04**
0.99*
1.03
1.10
1.05
1.06+
1.13***

0.83
0.79
0.87
0.73
0.98
0.98
0.96
0.95
0.98
1.00
1.11

1.43
1.42
1.88
2.07
0.99
0.99
1.10
1.26
1.12
1.13
1.16

0.87
0.82
0.78

0.69
0.62
0.51

1.10
1.10
1.21

0.85
0.72*
0.77

0.66
0.52
0.47

1.05
0.98
1.25

0.85
0.75+
0.77

0.67
0.55
0.47

1.07
1.01
1.25

2.22***
1.01
1.08
1.89***
0.77
6.27***
1.03***

1.43
0.59
0.51
1.35
0.23
3.71
1.02

3.46
1.71
2.27
2.66
2.57
10.59
1.04

2.22***
0.99
1.05
1.81***
0.72
6.67***
1.03***

1.41
0.54
0.49
1.28
0.23
3.93
1.01

3.44
1.59
2.22
2.55
2.56
11.3
1.04

2.24***
0.92
1.01
1.78***
0.72
6.63***
1.03***

1.43
0.54
0.448
1.26
0.21
3.91
1.01

3.51
1.58
2.14
2.52
2.42
11.24
1.04

620.3, on 21 df
0.53

599.9, on 22 df
0.58

602.8, on 22 df
0.55

***p <0.001, **p <0.01, *p <0.05, +p <0.1

In Chart 4, the number 1 represents the total entrepreneurial teams, and any reduction from
1 means a startup transitioned from not having any employees to employing its first worker. Based
on these estimates, entrepreneurial teams with two or more creatives, as shown by the blue line,
hire their first employee faster than those with one or zero. Interestingly, entrepreneurial teams
with at least one creative-entrepreneur hire its first employee at similar rates to those with two or
more at the beginning of the entrepreneurial process. However, as time passes, entrepreneurial
teams with one creative member, as shown by the green line, behave similarly to those with no
creatives among the owners, as shown by the red line. It is also possible to see that only startups
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with no creative-entrepreneurs remain until the last month of observation without having hired one
employee.
Figure 4 – Curve of the transition from own-account to employer, stratified by the number
of creative entrepreneurs in teams

Similar to Models I to III, the entrepreneurial teams’ educational variables are again
affected when CCE and CC% are included. In transitioning from sole proprietorships to hiring the
first employee, EDUC seems to have virtually no effect except for the category entrepreneurs
holding a Master's degree. These entrepreneurs are 31% more likely to hire their first employee
compared to entrepreneurs having a high school degree or less but only at the 10% level. This last
effect disappears when both CCE and CC% are entered in Models V and VI, respectively. The
variable STPX is significant at the 95% level in Model IV, but its significance increases to 99%
after introducing CCE and CC% in Models V and VI. The power of the STPX coefficient increases
after entering CCE and CC% as well. Before introducing these variables, for a yearly increase of
startup experience, the “risk” of hiring the first employee also increases by 1%. After CCE and
CC% were introduced, this risk increases to 4% for every additional year of team startup
145

experience. These results also reveal a similar pattern for managerial years of experience (MANG).
This variable exhibited a 90% significance level before CCE, and CC% were introduced. However,
after the introduction of the creative variables in Models V and VI, its significance increases to
95% and 99%, respectively. In both models, an increase in the team's average years of managerial
experience accounts for a small but decreasing “hazard” of hiring the first employee.
The coefficients of the control variables show that an increase in FUNP increases the
“hazard” of employing the first worker. Two types of startups, takeover and sponsored businesses
are associated with an increased “risk” of hiring the first employee. A shorter time to hiring the
first employee is associated with QUIT as well because those startups that disengage were
observed for a shorter period due to their exit. It is essential to control for this variable since it can
bias the time if it is not included. All these effects of the control variables do not change
significantly across Models IV to VI; the only exception been is the variable HELPERS. This
variable is associated positively with the event of hiring the first employee, and it is significant at
the 95% level before including the CCE and CC% in Model IV. After adding CCE and CC% in
Models V and VI respectively, it is significant only at the 10% level.
4.2.3 Number of employees
Table 5 provides the result for the Tobit estimations. The coefficients capture the effect on
the uncensored latent variable, not the observed outcome. Given that EMPlog is expressed in
natural logarithms, these coefficients are interpreted as the percent change in the number of
employees in the case of continuous variables. For dichotomous or categorical variables, the
coefficients reflect the percent change in earnings for a discrete change in the category or from the
change from 0 to 1 in the case of a dummy variable.
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Table 5 presents the estimated results of the number of hired workers for every
entrepreneurial project. Based on the log-likelihood, the inclusion of CCE and CC% improved the
model fit. Model I accounts for a log-likelihood of -2640.1, while for Models VIII and IX, it was
reduced to -2637.1, and -2637.9, respectively. According to Model VIII, as can be seen in Table
5, for an increase in the number of creative entrepreneurs by one individual, the expectation is an
increase in the number of employees by 29%, holding other variables constant. This significant
association is also found in Model IX when using CC%: An increase of just 1% of creativeentrepreneurs on the team is associated with 0.4% employment growth. Recall that a 1% increase
in creative-entrepreneurs among startup owners is theoretical. Empirically it is unlikely to happen
since just one additional creative owner on the team will have a higher impact than 1% because
the maximum number of team owners is fifteen members.
Both results regarding CCE and CC% are significant at the 95% level. Thus, Hypothesis
2b is supported for both measures of creative individuals in entrepreneurial teams.
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Table 5 – Tobit Regression Models, Number of Employees Hired
MODEL VII:
Tobit model
(number of employees)
Coef

Lower
.95
-5.16

Intercept
CCE
CC%
EDUC, base: high school degree or less
Tech, community, or some college
College or some graduate training
Master's degree
PhD degree
STPXP
MANG
WHITE
MALE
TEAM
HELPRES
PFUND
INNOV, base = 0
Degree of innovativeness= 1
Degree of innovativeness= 2
Degree of innovativeness= 3
STYPE, base = independent startups
takeover = 1
franchise = 2
marketing initiatives = 3
sponsored new business = 4
Others = 5
logSigmaMu
logSigmaNu

-4.48***

Log-Likelihood
***p <0.001, **p <0.01, *p <0.05, +p <0.1

-2640.1, on 22 df

MODEL VIII:
Tobit model
(number of employees)

Upper
.95
-3.80

0.08
0.12
0.01
1.33**
0.03
-0.02***
0.10
0.30
0.04
0.15***
0.07***

-0.38
-0.37
-0.65
0.51
-0.03
-0.03
-0.02
0.11
-0.14

0.54
0.62
0.67
2.15
0.09
-0.01
0.21
0.49
0.23

0.09

0.20

0.05

0.32
0.05
-0.38
1.33***
-0.36
-0.17
0.83
-0.90
0.73
0.58

Coef
-4.32***
0.29*

Lower
.95
-5.02
0.07

Upper
.95
-3.63
0.52

MODEL IX:
Tobit model
(number of employees)

-4.42***

Lower
.95
-5.09

Upper
.95
-3.74

0.01*

0.00

0.01

-0.45
-0.53
-0.67
0.45
-0.02
-0.03
-0.04
0.05
-0.11

0.46
0.47
0.63
2.01
0.09
-0.01
0.20
0.42
0.25

0.09

0.20

0.05

0.10

Coef

-0.48
-0.53
-0.57
0.43
-0.01
-0.03
-0.07
0.05
-0.16

0.43
0.47
0.71
2.02
0.10
-0.01
0.17
0.42
0.19

0.09

0.20

0.10

-0.02
-0.03
0.07
1.22**
0.05+
-0.02***
0.05
0.23
0.01
0.14***
0.07***

0.05

0.09

0.01
-0.03
-0.02
1.23**
0.04
-0.02***
0.08
0.24
0.07
0.14***
0.07***

-0.04
-0.42
-1.21

0.68
0.52
0.46

0.18
-0.07
-0.55

-0.18
-0.53
-1.41

0.54
0.40
0.30

0.29
0.03
-0.45

-0.07
-0.43
-1.29

0.65
0.49
0.39

0.61
-1.13
-1.06
0.21
-3.16
0.59
0.51

2.04
0.40
0.73
1.44
1.36
0.87
0.65

1.33***
0.1
-0.15
0.7
-0.92
0.75
0.58

0.61
-0.58
-1.07
0.07
-3.28
0.61
0.51

2.05
0.78
0.77
1.33
1.44
0.88
0.65

1.31***
-0.42
-0.2
0.76
-0.88
0.72
0.58

0.57
-1.21
-1.10
0.14
-3.12
0.58
0.51

2.04
0.38
0.71
1.37
1.36
0.86
0.65

-2637.1, on 23 df

-2637.9, on 23 df

The other human capital related variables show stable results in Models VII to IX.
Concerning an entrepreneur's formal education, Model VIII suggests that entrepreneurs with a
Ph.D. hire more than double the employees (132%) than entrepreneurs with a high-school degree
or less, the only significant comparison among EDUC categories. After including CCE and CC%
in Models VIII and IX, the coefficient power decreases slightly. Managerial experience is
negatively associated with EMPlog. For a year increase in MANG, there is a reduction of 1.7% in
the number of employees hired. When Models VIII and IX include CCE and CC% respectively,
the MANG coefficient remained stable in its both significance and power. STPX never reached a
95% significance level in any of the Models VII to IX.
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There is also a group of control variables associated with employment levels in Models
VII, VIII, and IX. For example, MALE indicates a positive relationship between male
entrepreneurs and the number of employees hired, an association found in all models. The variable
HELPERS exhibited the same pattern: Having more external non-owner helpers increases the
number of employees. The higher personal funds invested (FUNP variable), the higher the number
of employees hired, an association found across the three models evaluating the number of
employees. Finally, the type of startup is controlled using the STYPE categories. As was expected,
takeover startups are associated with having more employees when compared to independent
startups (the base category).
4.2.4 Six consecutive months of profit reported
Table 5 presents the results for the time it takes to become a profitable firm, defined as six
consecutive months of profits. Specifically, Models IX to XI use the subsample of those companies
that did not disengage from the entrepreneurial process. As a result, companies can either become
profitable or are labeled as “still trying” to achieve profitability. In all models, at least one of the
covariates contributes significantly to the explanation of the profitability event. The likelihoodratio chi-square statistic, which is the difference between -2 partial log-likelihood for the Model X
with 21 covariates and Models XI and XII with 22 covariates, and the null model with no
covariates, reveals a p-value <0.001in for these three cases.
The results cannot confirm hypotheses 3a and 3b. Given the significance of the chi-square
statistic, at least one of the covariates contributes significantly to the explanation of becoming a
profitable startup in Models X, XI, and XII. However, after the introduction of CCE and CC%, the
likelihood-ratio chi-square statistic did not improve in Models XI and XII. In addition, both
variables are not statistically significant in any model.
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Table 6 – Cox Regression Models, Analysis of the Time to Achieve a Sixth Months of Profits
MODEL IX:
Cox regression model
(first worker)
Exp
(coef)

Lower
.95

Upper
.95

CCE
CC%
EDUC, base: high school degree or less
Tech, community, or some college
College or some graduate training
Master's degree
PhD degree
STPXP
MANG
WHITE
MALE
TEAM
HELPRES
PFUND
INNOV, base = 0
Degree of innovativeness= 1
Degree of innovativeness= 2
Degree of innovativeness= 3
STYPE, base = independent startups
takeover = 1
franchise = 2
marketing initiatives = 3
sponsored new business = 4
Others = 5
CONLAG
CONLAG*TIME
Likelihood ratio χ2
Proportional Hazard test

126, on 21 df
0.26

MODEL X:
Cox regression model
(first worker)
Exp
(coef)
1.08

Lower
.95

Upper
.95

0.94

1.23

MODEL XI:
Cox regression model
(first worker)
Exp
(coef)

Lower
.95

Upper
.95

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.07
0.96
0.78
0.91
1.01
0.99
1.09*
1.11+
1.00
1.07*
0.99

0.80
0.70
0.52
0.54
0.99
0.99
1.01
0.98
0.93
0.97
0.97

1.41
1.30
1.17
1.54
1.01
1.01
1.17
1.25
1.07
1.114
1.01

1.06
0.92
0.76
0.88
1.01
0.99
1.08*
1.08
1.00
1.07
1.00*

0.80
0.67
0.51
0.52
0.99
0.99
1.00
0.95
0.94
1.01
0.97

1.40
1.27
1.15
1.49
1.02
1.00
1.16
1.23
1.08
1.14
1.02

1.05
0.91
0.76
0.87
1.01
1.00
1.08*
1.09
1.01
1.07
1.00*

0.79
0.67
0.50
0.51
0.99
0.99
1.01
0.97
0.94
1.01
0.97

1.39
1.26
1.14
1.48
1.02
1.00
1.17
1.23
1.08
1.14
1.02

0.95
1.08
0.82

0.75
0.83
0.52

1.20
1.43
1.28

0.94
1.07
0.80

0.74
0.82
0.51

1.19
1.41
1.26

0.95
1.08
0.81

0.75
0.82
0.52

1.20
1.41
1.26

1.37
0.99
0.82
1.70**
0.84
0.96***
1.01***

0.84
0.58
0.39
1.23
0.31
0.95
0.99

2.25
1.66
1.73
2.36
2.26
0.97
1.05

1.40
0.99
0.82
1.69**
0.85
1.06***
1.01***

0.85
0.58
0.39
1.22
0.32
0.93
1.00

2.29
1.66
1.73
2.35
2.29
1.23
1.01

1.41
0.98
0.81
1.70**
0.85
1.00***
1.00***

0.86
0.58
0.39
1.23
0.32
0.99
1.00

2.30
1.65
1.70
2.36
2.30
1.00
1.00

127.2, on 22 df
0.25

127.5, on 22 df
0.26

***p <0.001, **p <0.01, *p <0.05, +p <0.1

Unexpectedly, neither of the educational variables shows any effect on profitability.
Regarding the remaining control variables included, the variable HELPERS indicates that having
more helpers shows a positive and significant relationship with profitability, as well as the number
of whites/Caucasians in entrepreneurial teams. As expected, among the categories of STYPE,
sponsored new business is the only category that accounts for a significant effect when compared
to independent startups (the base category) in Models X to XII.
4.2.5 Summary of the primary results
The primary results from Tables 3 to 6 can be summarized as follows. Better startups
performance outcomes during the gestational phase are expected in entrepreneurial teams led by
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creative teams. This result is especially true when more than one creative entrepreneur leads the
team. Having more creatives among startup owners increases the survival chances of the new
venture. Also, there is a positive impact on the transition time from a startup without personnel to
the hire of the first employee. Similarly, an entrepreneurial project owned by a higher number of
creative individuals is positively related to the number of employees hired. Most of the analyses
of this study indicated that when evaluating startup performance outcomes, variables measuring
the entrepreneurs' creative background outperform the standard educational attainment
measurements. However, this study did not find a relationship between having more creatives
owners among teammates and startup profitability.

5. DISCUSSION
Human capital obtained through education is one of the most reliable drivers of
entrepreneurship performance at the firm level. However, this standard measurement of human
capital has been questioned at the regional level by Florida’s CCT in many studies related to
entrepreneurship and economic development. More specifically, Florida et al. (2008) research
found that formal education positively impacts gross product and wealth, while creative-class
related variables are strongly associated with employment and wage growth at the regional level.
In this study, the firm level is the scope of the analysis. This study examined whether having a
higher number of creative individuals on entrepreneurial teams improves startup performance,
finding that there are micro-level fundaments for the macro-level findings of Florida et al. (2008):
More creative-entrepreneur-owned startups are strongly associated with job creation. This research
also provides new results on the relationship between creative-entrepreneurs and the length of
startup survival times.
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Specifically, this research found support for a positive relationship between having more
creative-entrepreneurs as owners and three of the four measures of startup success considered —
survival, the transition from not having any to the hire of the first employee, and the number of
employees hired. Regarding new venture survival, companies led by creatives might seek to
operate in new and niche markets. Consequently, their survival chances increase because they face
low competition levels (Kim and Mauborgne, 2014). In addition, innovative entrepreneurs exhibit
higher survival chances since the demand for new innovative products and services increases
consumers’ growing wealth (Jackson, 1984). As described by CCT, creatives are innovative,
problem-solving individuals, and their startups might be as well. However, one limitation of this
study is not considering the markets where startups operate. Future research will have to consider
the regional dimension interacting with the startup factors, and the regional variables to analyze
firm survival. As mentioned previously, this study found that projects led by more creative
entrepreneurs tend to survive longer, but it did not investigate whether it is an effect of operating
in more sophisticated markets or not.
The more robust relations found in this study are between the creative-entrepreneur's
variables and employment creation. Both the transition from not having employees to hiring the
first worker and the startup's number of employees are positively associated with the number of
creative-entrepreneurs as owners. As mentioned above, Florida et al. (2008) research found that
creative-class related variables are strongly associated with employment and wage growth at the
regional level. It is not possible to make the same argument based on this study since PSED does
not provide information about employee’s wages. This topic should be investigated using a dataset
that contains the salaries provided by creative-led startups. However, at the startup micro-level,
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this study found that creative-led startups hire employees faster and at higher numbers, supporting
past results found at the macro-regional level.

6. CONCLUSIONS, POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE RSEARCH
Human capital is a measurement of the knowledge that individuals possess. Knowledge for
entrepreneurship matters. The policy implication of this study is to broaden the concept of
knowledge applied to entrepreneurship. Education can be viewed and is used as a direct instrument
for developing entrepreneurship behavior. However, highly educated individuals do not
necessarily have the highest entrepreneurial ability. In this regard, non-mainstream human capital
measurements such as the number of creative individuals helped in identifying these individuals.
Creative individuals possess tacit knowledge that is difficult to measure through the standard
human capital variables commonly used in entrepreneurship research. This idea is also reinforced
since measurements such as the team’s years of industry experience, managerial experience, and
previous startups attempts were more impactful compared to the education variables on the
outcomes tested in this study.
This first step in investigating creative entrepreneurs at the firm level highlights many
avenues of future research. For example, future research can examine how each sub-group of the
creative class influences new venture performance. Does, the super-creative core impact new
venture performance in the same manner that creative professionals or bohemians do? What’s the
role of the composition of entrepreneurial teams within the creative class subcategories? For
example, do teams composed of the super-creative, creative-professionals, and bohemians
perform better than teams composed only of super-creatives? All these questions can be analyzed
using PSED or other available entrepreneurship datasets.
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Data from PSED I and II were used to provide new evidence on entrepreneurs’
characteristics associated with startup outcomes. Overall, as similar to the previous research about
entrepreneurial development at the regional level, the findings from this study challenge the
standard measurement of human capital through educational attainment. The creative
entrepreneurs’ measurements significantly explained three of the four performance outcomes
tested in this research. Thus, the previous working background is important for entrepreneurship,
especially on entrepreneurial teams in which members had a creative occupation before starting a
new company. Therefore, policies targeted to support people in creative professions to join and
move towards entrepreneurship could benefit economic development, especially in employment
deprived areas.
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CONCLUSIONS
The articles comprising this dissertation extend on the current state of entrepreneurship
research, by applying theories and methodologies, while having being applied extensively in other
domains, are novel to this field. Based on these three research articles, it is possible to find out the
interdisciplinary nature of entrepreneurship research (Acs and Audretsch, 2003) and the need for
embracing as many fields as possible in order to recommended policies for the current economy
in this area. Therefore, the concluding remarks of this dissertation highlight what is new in the
field of entrepreneurship research as a result of these three pieces of research by looking at three
dimensions: the theory, the methods, and the policy recommendations resulting from each of the
three articles.
In the first article, the theory applied is the classical human capital approach used to
investigated firms in the developed world. However, few studies have applied this traditional
human capital approach to developing regions, especially Latin America. As is discussed,
contextualization is needed when investigating innovation, because what is new in one place may
not be a novelty in others. For that reason, the theoretical innovation of the first paper is
incremental, applying a well-known theory in a particular context that was not used before to
investigate entrepreneurship topics.
Methodologically, the paper uses a unique panel dataset to investigate the innovation
behavior of companies in Uruguay at the firm level. The logit model with time-fixed effects
allowed this research to control for firms’ time-invariant unobservable characteristics while
providing a rich set of time-varying observable characteristics. In addition, the inclusion of
interaction effects between the human capital variables and the size of the companies allowed this
study to examine the effects of these variables on different types of companies. Based on this
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technique, this research found variations on how three human capital dimensions impact
differently depending on the size of the companies.
This research found that human capital is associated with product innovation, but as
mentioned, not all types of human capital functions in the same way for all companies. Increasing
the number of educated employees fosters the likelihood of product innovation for small firms,
this analysis indicating that it is not possible to examine human capital dimensions in a vacuum.
In Uruguay, the economy investigated in the first paper, the number of firms with no educated
workers grew during the period of study, as did the number of small and mid-sized manufacturing
firms with no professionals. Thus, public policy to foster product innovation by hiring educated
workers in Uruguayan manufacturing firms has to target small firms. If small firms increase their
number of skilled workers, it is possible to increase to some extent the innovative capacity of the
Uruguayan manufacturing industry. However, for large firms, policies aimed to increase the
number of educated employees will not have an impact because having more professionals can
result in a negative effect.
However, for large firms increasing the investment in internal training for employees was
found to be an essential factor for improving their product innovation likelihood, something not
found for small companies. Taking into account that the vast majority of policies aimed to foster
innovation in Uruguay through human capital focuses on hiring more professionals or providing
post-graduate studies for the firm’s employees, the results support a change in the targeting
strategy. While the policies focusing on formal education would have a positive impact on small
companies, large companies require policies targeting internal training.
The second article applied the Matthew effect theory, which was initially designed to
explain cumulative advantages of agents in a wide range of domains, including science,
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technology, and society studies, but also in sociology, education studies, and public policy, to
mention a few. Using this theory to investigate entrepreneurship finance shed light on a potential
cumulative advantage in the entrepreneurial reward system, specifically the financing system.
Previous research identified the latter, studying specific dimensions such as wealth, race, or social
connections. Applying the Matthew effect theory allows the study to determine the critical factors
for obtaining receive funding recurrently. This theory help to identify how structural factors such
as personal income or social capital influence receiving external funding. However, other factors
associated with the actions that entrepreneurs can take impact on obtaining external financing as
well.
Methodologically, this second paper applied innovative models. Several advances result
from the use of PSED to investigate the entrepreneurship process (Shim and Davidsson, 2018;
Reynolds, 2017; Gartner and Shaver, 2012; Yang and Aldrich, 2012; Reynolds, Gartner, Greene,
Cox, and Carter, 2008). However, very few studies took advantage of the time trends of this
project, specifically, those that applied event history analysis (Frid, Wyman, and Coffey, 2016;
Hechavarría, Matthews, and Reynolds, 2016; Brush, Manolova, and Edelman, 2008; Delmar and
Shane, 2003). This study continues to fill this gap by taking advantage of the time trends available
in the PSED project and applying event history analysis to analyze firm creation, survival, and
financing. Specifically, to examine the latter, a series of Cox regressions with a frailty component
were applied, allowed us to analyze external funding as a repeated event. The last technique is a
novelty in the field since previous studies considered only the first funding event while the models
applied here considered all funding events during the entrepreneurial gestational phase.
The modeling strategy resulted in unique findings and, thus, new policy recommendations.
First, they highlight the importance of obtaining external funding more than once as a critical
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determinant for a firm’s survival and creation. The Cox regressions for repeated events applied
here identified structural factors such as wealth and specific dimensions of social capital that
influence receiving external monitored funding. Specifically, wealthier entrepreneurs have shorter
time gaps between each external funding event than their less affluent counterparts. Similarly, the
teams’ years of managerial experience are positively associated with reducing gap times in
receiving external funding. In addition, specific actions that entrepreneurs take can reduce gap
times in getting funded as well, such as defining a business plan or developing having financial
projections.
However, the modeling strategy of this study, which considered all funding events during
gestation, resulted in findings that question previous structural factors associated with receiving
funding. For example, this study found evidence that race, which has been mentioned as a critical
factor in explaining receiving monitored funding (Frid, Wyman, Gartner, and Hechavarría, 2016;
Frid, 2014; Gartner, Frid, and Alexander, 2012), was not a critical factor associated with recurrent
external monitored funding. Race as a variable, specifically being part of a minority group, could
be an inhibitor for minority-owned startups for obtaining their first external funding due to
discrimination or other social factors, but once funded for their first time, the effect of race as an
inhibitor might disappear for further funding events. Similarly, personal funds invested was
suggested by studies under the pecking order theory as a critical factor for obtaining external
funding (Frid et al., 2015; Prasad et al., 2000). But our findings suggest that personal funds do
influence on recurrent funding events. One possible suggestion for further research is that the
personal funds invested operate as a signal for just the first funding received, as previous studies
suggested, but not for additional funds obtained.
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Several programs to help entrepreneurs obtain funding exist, but it will be useful as well to
design policy tools to help entrepreneurs find a path of financing during the process of setting up
a new company. More important than design programs to help with funding issues is to keep
entrepreneurs in the financing system during their entrepreneurial gestational phase. This research
has found that less affluent entrepreneurs are disadvantaged in that regard. Microloans programs
have appeared in recent years for economic and socially disadvantaged entrepreneurs. However,
this research indicates the necessity of going beyond these financial tools and assist financially
less affluent entrepreneurs during the entire gestational phase.
The third paper utilized the theory of the Creative Class, a well-known and widely used
approach that discusses the key driving factors for economic development regionally. This theory
suggests that there is a social group, the Creative Class, that fosters innovation and
entrepreneurship regionally. Thus, it enhances the life quality of those places, increasing the level
of job creation and wealth. Since the scholarly community accepts the regional findings from
theory in general, the theoretical innovation of the third research article is to apply this theory at
the firm level to provide micro-fundamentals to the accepted macro-level findings.
At the methodological level, as the second paper did, this third article takes advantage of
the time trends available in PSED. It also uses survival analysis and longitudinal modeling for
analyzing new venture outcomes. The findings from this paper highlight that startups owned by
more creative class members are strongly associated with job creation and firm survival. The
results of this study suggest that policies can help entrepreneurs to transition from creative
occupation to entrepreneurship. Similar to the previous research on entrepreneurial development
at the regional level, the findings from this study challenge the standard measurement of human
capital through educational attainment. Having more creative entrepreneurs on the team
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significantly explained three of the four performance outcomes investigated in this research. Thus,
the previous working background is important for entrepreneurship, especially on entrepreneurial
teams in which members help a creative occupation before starting a new company. Therefore,
policies targeted to support people in creative professions to join and move towards
entrepreneurship could benefit economic development, especially in less affluent areas.
Given the interdisciplinary nature of entrepreneurship research, the three research papers
comprising this dissertation applied theories and methodologies coming from other disciplines.
Applying them resulted in new findings for this research field and from them a new set of potential
recommendations for the policy arena. As suggested by the findings in the first paper, the human
capital theory should be investigated in detail before making policy recommendations for firms in
the developing world, a result that has been found in previous research as well. Similar to what
has been observed previously in other reward systems, the second paper sheds light on some factors
that lead to the cumulative advantage that some entrepreneurs have in receiving external funding.
The third research article revealed that the Creative Class theory, which regional scholars have
found to impact regional-level entrepreneurship outcomes, helped in explaining firm-level
performance as well. This dissertation, thus, emphasizes the importance of entrepreneurship
scholars being aware of the advances in other research areas, both theoretically and
methodologically, to ensure the continued advancement of this growing interdisciplinary field.
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Appendix A
Inquiry of previous studies' dependent variable – Chapter 1

Independent
variable
Output / Input

Product

Innovative enterprise, defined as productinnovative enterprises which introduced a
product (i.e. a good or service) that is new or
significantly improved with respect to its
characteristics or intended uses during the
period 2008–2010. This includes significant
improvements in technical specifications,
components, and materials, incorporated
software, user friendliness or other functional
characteristics. Process-innovative enterprises
are enterprises which implemented a new or
significantly improved method of production
or delivery during the period 2008–2010.

Output

X

New or significantly improved products or
services to the main market

Output

X

New product development, product and
service differentiation and number of patents

Output

X

Output and input

X

Output

X

Output

X

X

Output and input

X

X

Output and input

X

X

Paper

Independent variable/s

Børing (2017)

Van Uden,
Knoben, &
Vermeulen
(2016)
Sung & Choi
(2014)
Smith,
Collins, &
Clark (2013)
Nazarov &
Akhmedjonov
(2012)
Goedhuys &
Veugelers
(2012)

De Winne &
Sels (2010)

Marotta,
Mark, Blom,
& Thorn
(2007)

Number of new products and services and
knowledge creation capabilities
Upgrading existing product line/service;
Obtaining a new product-licensing agreement;
Obtaining a new quality accreditation
if the firm successful introduced new
technology that has substantially changed the
way the main product is produced, in 1998–
2002;
if the firm successfully developed a major new
product line in 1998–2002
An index composed out of the weighted sum
of four dichotomous variables representing
achieved innovation projects, composed in this
way: innovation of supporting processes (1)
innovation of the production process (2),
improvement of existing products/services (4)
and development of new products/services (8)
(weight of each variables between brackets).
A firm is regarded as innovative from an input
side if the sum of expenditure on innovation,
in one expenses listed as new machinery;
training in innovation and product testing,
patents, licenses, introduction and
commercialization of new products or R&D
is larger than 0; A firm is regarded as
innovative in terms of product if it has
introduced at least one new technology for
production, a product that is known to the
market but new to the firm, a product that is
new both to the market and to the firm
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Process

Oragniz.

Marketing

X

X

Shipton, West,
Patterson,
Birdi, &
Dawson
(2006)

Li, Zhao, &
Liu, (2006)

Laursen &
Foss (2003)
Kyriakopoulos
& de Ruyter
(2004)
Kimberly &
Evanisko
(1981)

Product innovation and in technical systems

Technological innovation in the firm.
Measured through five variables on a 1-7
scale, composed by (1) Frequent introduction
of new product ideas into production process;
(2) high probability of success for new
products being tested; (3) spending shorter
periods in new product research and
development; (4) radical improvement in the
company’s technology; and (5) frequently
renewal of equipment.
Firms' introduce a product or service
innovation in the market.

Output and input

X

X

Input

Output

X

New product short-term financial performance
refers and new product creativity

Output and input

X

Technological innovation and administrative
innovation

Output and input

X
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Appendix B
Available variables or those potentially created in the different UIS panel waves –
Chapter one

Age

19982000
YES

20012003
YES

20042006
YES

20072009
YES

20102012
YES

20132015
YES

Foreign capital

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

% Exports on sales

NO

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

Make strategy (R&D investment p/employee)

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

Employment (log)

NO

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

% Buy strategy (investment p/employee)

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

Cooperation and network agreements

NO

NO

YES

YES

YES

YES

% Professionals & technicians on workforce

NO

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

HRM index (all variables)

NO

NO

YES

YES

YES

YES

% Employees trained

NO

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

1

Appendix C
Public Policies to foster innovation trough human capital – Chapter one
Granted by

Objective

National Agency for
Research and
Innovation (ANII)

Subsidy for internships in technology centers, foreign universities or
companies, to acquire skills and knowledge to be applied in the
company and facilitate access and transfer of knowledge and
experience to improve the competitiveness of the company.

Ministry of Industry,
Energy, and Mining
(MIEM)

Partial or total subsidy for projects of women entrepreneurs that
promote innovation, generate substantial improvements in critical areas
of their companies and have a positive impact on competitiveness. It is
open to all entrepreneurs whose companies are SMEs and develop
productive activities or services related to production, and which are
also integrated into productive chains of ministerial interest. The
projects must generate improvements in products, services, processes
or commercialization, and the strengthening of the capacities and
abilities of management of the company. The creation of quality
employment aimed at young women will be positively valued.
Subsidy for the hiring of highly qualified professional staff, with the
aim of implementing and developing research, development, and
innovation processes in the company.

National Agency for
Research and
Innovation (ANII)

Targeted to
PROFESSIONALS

National Agency for
Research and
Innovation (ANII)

Partial subsidy to hire a project formulator that works with the
company towards the preparation of innovative proposals before the
different instruments of the ANII. The formulator/s will be chosen by
the company and must have a background to support their experience
in the management and formulation of projects. The amount of the
subsidy depends on the type of program that is being formulated.

National Institute of
Employment and
Professional Training
(INEFOP)

Subsidy for organizations or economic activities that identify training
needs due to expansion factors, entry of new employees, new methods
implementation or modification, work processes, updating technology,
production, and marketing of new products and services, among others.
The demand for training will be agreed between workers and
employers. INEFOP will fund up to 100% of the training, assessing the
contribution of the companies concerning the delivery of the courses
during working hours, providing guidance and materials for its
dictation.
Partial subsidy for hiring abroad experts whose knowledge and skills
are not in the country (the experts may be of Uruguayan or of foreign
nationality), and aimed at solving specific problems of the company.

National Agency for
Research and
Innovation (ANII)

Targeted
to HRM

X
X
X
X
X
X
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Targeted to
TRAINING

X

National Agency for
Research and
Innovation (ANII)

Subsidy for the hiring of masters or doctorate students who carry out
part of their studies and research in the company. It seeks to promote
research and development activities within the business sector as well
as the company academy linkages.

National Agency for
Research and
Innovation (ANII)

Subsidy for funding masters or doctorate studies to professionals who
are already working in the company. It seeks to promote research and
development activities within the business sector as well as the
company academy linkages

National Agency for
Research and
Innovation (ANII)

National Agency for
Research and
Innovation (ANII)

The instrument supports the formation and consolidation of Sectoral
Technological Networks that work in the business development of
business, sectorial, or territorial competitiveness, synergistically
combining the stakeholders' capacities and establishing new ones for
the country. The stakeholders will be able to participate in these
networks: technological centers, universities, and research institutes.
Networks must achieve benefits for all the links that comprise it.
Development plans will be financed that may include, among others,
the following activities: Detection of technological bottlenecks for the
productive sector. Search for solutions to them through the
implementation of research and development projects. Technological
transfer and absorptive activities, and diffusion of new technologies to
the productive sector. The increase of qualified human resources.
Establishment of basic communication and interaction capacities
among the different key actors of the network. Investments to create or
expand common technological services with impact on the productive
sector.
With resources coming from the ANII, activities that are directly
related to the implementation of the project can be financed, among
which the following can be mentioned. a) Fees for consultancies,
technical assistance, and consultancies; b) For projects whose
recognized amount does not exceed $ 3,200,000, the maximum
recognizable amount for the company's personnel assigned to the
project may not exceed $ 1,280,0004 c) Internships for master's and
doctoral students. d) Expenses associated with visits and studies of the
destination markets; e) Expenses related to commercialization and sales
tests; f) Purchase of materials and supplies; g) Expenses in test
equipment, tests, and laboratories; h) Expenses in facilities and/or labor
and environmental protection measures; i) Purchase of bibliographic
material; j) Software purchase and/or lease expenses; k) Expenses of
technical and maintenance services associated with the projects; l)
Intellectual property protection expenses m) Licensing costs and
specific building adaptation for the installation of equipment; n)
Unforeseen expenses of up to 5% of the project's financeable cost; and
o) Expert fees for the formulation of projects to enhance Innovation for
a maximum amount of ANII of $ 160,000.
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X
X

X

X

Appendix D
Hausman test, all models – Chapter one

Fixed effects,
equation 1
Random
effects,
equation 1
Fixed effects,
equation 2
Random
effects,
equation 2
Fixed effects,
equation 3
Random
effects,
equation 3

Firm product innovation

Market product innovation

Implication

Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic
chi2(12) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) = 33.07
Prob>chi2 = 0.0009

Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic
chi2(12) = (b-B)'[(V_bV_B)^(-1)](b-B) = 60.12
Prob>chi2 = 0.0000

Fixed effects
needed

Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic,
chi2(14) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)=40.11
Prob>chi2 = 0.0002

Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic
chi2(14) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) = 73.98
Prob>chi2 = 0.0000

Fixed effects
needed

Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic
chi2(14) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) = 27.40
Prob>chi2 = 0.0170

Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic
chi2(14) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) = 58.70
Prob>chi2 = 0.0000

Fixed effects
needed
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Appendix E
Times between PSED interviews
database used for models 3 and 4– Chapter three

Months between wave 1 and 2
Months between wave 2 and 3
Months between wave 3 and 4
Months between wave 4 and 5
Months between wave 5 and 6

Mean
12.6
14.7
16.7
12.2
11.9
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Median
12.2
13.0
12.8
12.1
11.7

Max
19
24
27
16
16

Min
10
10
10
1
9.6

Appendix F
Descriptive statistics for each database used – Chapter four

CCE
CC%
EDUC
INDXP
STPXP
MEN
WHITE
AGE<24
AGE25-34
AGE35-44
AGE45-54
AGE>54
HNW
TEAM
SWQ
GRW
INNOV
BPLAN
FPRO
TOTFUND
FUNPER
CONLAG

Min.
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
-1000000.0
1.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.2

Models I to III
1st Qu.
Median
Mean
0.0
0.0
0.5
0.0
0.0
26.0
1.0
1.0
1.4
2.0
10.0
20.1
0.0
1.0
1.9
0.0
1.0
0.9
1.0
1.0
1.3
0.0
0.0
0.1
0.0
0.0
0.3
0.0
0.0
0.3
0.0
0.0
0.4
0.0
0.0
0.4
25000.0 108000.0 802943.0
1.0
1.0
1.9
150.0
660.0
2610.0
0.0
0.0
0.2
0.0
1.0
0.8
0.0
0.0
0.8
0.0
0.0
0.2
0.0
1759.0
112716.0
0.0
28.6
43.6
11.3
23.3
33.1
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3rd Qu.
Max.
1.0
7.0
50.0
100.0
2.0
4.0
30.0
298.0
2.0
120.0
1.0
8.0
2.0
10.0
0.0
4.0
0.0
5.0
0.0
5.0
1.0
4.0
1.0
8.0
360000.0 153010000.0
2.0
95.0
2500.0
81000.0
0.0
1.0
1.0
3.0
2.0
3.0
0.0
1.0
14000.0 43450000.0
100.0
100.0
46.1
119.9

CCE
CC%
EDUC
STPXP
MANG
WHITE
MALE
TEAM
HELPRES
PFUND(log)
INNOV
STYPE
QUIT

CCE
CC%
EDUC
STPXP
MANG
WHITE
MALE
TEAM
HELPRES
PFUND(log)
INNOV
STYPE

Min.
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0

Models IV to VI
1st Qu. Median Mean
0
0
0.52
0
0
24.95
1
1
1.37
0
1
1.72
10
32
30.53
1
1
1.43
0
1
0.92
1
1
1.84
0
1
1.52
0
0
1.34
0
0
0.76
0
0
0.46
0
0
0.02

3rd Qu.
1
50
2
2
49
2
1
2
2
0
1
0
0

Max.
6.00
100.00
4.00
32.00
83.00
10.00
5.00
15.00
8.00
13.06
3.00
5.00
1.00

Min.
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
1.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

Models VII to IX
1stQu. Median Mean
0.0
0.0
0.5
0.0
0.0
28.5
1.0
1.0
1.4
0.0
1.0
1.7
10.0
33.0
31.0
1.0
1.0
1.4
0.0
1.0
0.9
1.0
1.0
1.7
0.0
2.0
2.3
0.0
0.0
3.1
0.0
1.0
0.8
0.0
0.0
0.5

3rdQu.
1.0
50.0
2.0
2.0
49.0
2.0
1.0
2.0
4.0
7.8
1.0
0.0

Max
6.0
100.0
4.0
32.0
83.0
10.0
7.0
15.0
16.0
15.4
3.0
5.0

7

CCE
CC%
EDUC
STPXP
MANG
WHITE
MALE
TEAM
HELPRES
PFUND
INNOV
STYPE
CONLAG

Min.
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
1.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.2

Models X to XII
1stQu. Median Mean
0.0
0.0
0.5
0.0
0.0
26.8
1.0
1.0
1.5
0.0
1.0
2.0
6.0
26.0
27.7
1.0
1.0
1.3
0.0
1.0
0.9
1.0
1.0
1.8
0.0
1.0
1.6
0.0
6.2
4.7
0.0
1.0
0.8
0.0
0.0
0.4
12.4
26.8
35.3

8

3rdQu.
1.0
50.0
2.0
2.0
47.0
2.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
8.9
1.0
0.0
52.5

Max
6.0
100.0
4.0
120.0
82.0
10.0
8.0
55.0
8.0
15.1
3.0
5.0
118.2

